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PREFACE 
THIS little work has been written in the interest of harmony. 
In mathematics disputes must soon come to an end, when the 
one side is proved and the other disproved. And where 
mathematics enter into economics, it would seem that little 
room could be left for long-continued disputation. It is 
therefore somewhat surprising that one economist after 
another takes up the subject of index-numbers, potters over 
it for a while, differs from the rest if he can, and then drops 
it. And so nearly sixty years have gone by since Jevons 
first brought mathematics to bear upon this question, and 
still economists are at loggerheads over it. Yet index-
numbers involve the use of means and averages, and these 
being a purely mathematical element, demonstration ought 
soon to be reached, and then agreement should speedily 
foUow . 
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THE 
PROBLEM OF ESTIMATION 
(A SeveJlteeJlth-Century COJltroversy and 1'ts bearing on 
Modem Statistical Questions, especially Index-Numbers.) 
I.-THE CONTROVERSY. 
AMONG the problems which it was customary for scientists 
to set to one another two and three centuries ago, an interest-
ing one was started at Florence in 1627. A participant was 
Galileo, and in his collected works are usually included not 
only his own letters on the subject, but those of two others, 
a certain Nozzolini and the mathematician Castelli.1 
The question propounded was this: If a horse worth 
100 crowns is estimated by one person at 1 ,000 and by 
another at ten, which of these two estimates is the less 
erroneous, or are they equally erroneous? The problem 
may be varied thus: If an article worth 100 crowns is esti-
mated by one person at 1,000, what lower estin1ate would be 
equally erroneons; or if the first estimate were ten, what 
higher estimate would be equally erroneous r It admits also 
of a further variation: one person estimates an article at 
1,000 crowns, and another estimates it at ten; what must be 
its value in order that these errors be equal? Here it is 
evident that the answer is some sort of a mean between 
1,000 and ten. In the second form of the problem the mean 
is given as 100, and the question concerns the extremes. 
In the original form the question is what relation the proper 
mean between 1,000 and ten has to the true value 100. 
Thus the problem of estimation is a question of means, and 
its solution involves the finding of the kind of mean suitable 
for equalising errors above and below the tl ue quantity. 
1 References here are to the Opere di Galileo Galilei published 
at Milan in r832. The dispute occupies twenty finely printed, 
double-columned, large octavo pages: Vol. 1. pp. 57~7. 
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Evidently, we may say at once, the harmonic mean is 
ruled out of court; for if one person estimates the article 
at half or at less than half its true value, the other person 
could not equal his error, according to this mean, except 
by estimating it at infinity or at some imaginary negative 
value, which has no meaning in the matter before us. For 
the harmonic mean m between two quantities a and b is thus 
algebraically expressed, m = zab/ (a + b); and now, if the 
mean and one of the extremes be given, the other extreme 
is thus expressed, a = mb/(z b - m), wherefore, when b is the 
lower extreme, if it is half the mean, we have a = mbJo = "Xi, 
and if it is less than half the mean, then zb - m is a negative 
quantity, and the quotient is a negative quantity. But a 
negative quantity, no matter what be its absolute size, cannot 
be greater than a positive quantity; and yet it is offered as 
the greater extreme; which is absurd. 
The seventeenth-century disputants were well acquainted 
with the three classic means, the arithmetic, the geometric, 
and the harmonic, not to mention certain others. Yet not 
a word do they say about the harmonic mean: their dispute 
narrowed itself between the alithmetic and the geometric. 
Galileo and Castelli advocated the former, Nozzolini alone 
stood out for the latter. Perhaps it was the unwieldiness of 
the harmonic mean, or the less frequency of its use in general, 
that moved them to ignore it. But perhaps, at least with 
some of them, a consciousness of its unsuitableness, as just 
pointed out, was a contributory cause of its exclusion. 
Galileo, in a later stage of the dispute, tells us that when 
the question was first presented to him, he at once jumped 
to the answer, that the estimate of 1,000 crowns contained 
a much greater error than that of ten, since the gain in that 
case was 900 and the loss in the other only ninety. That is, 
he was inclined, as most people are, to use the arithmetic 
mean. But when he was informed that men of intelligence 
had raised a controversy over this question, he devoted more 
attention to it, and soon changed his mind, perceiving that 
there was more to be said in favour of the geometric mean. 
In his first letter he made a very simple argument. The 
example offered might seem extravagant enough; but he 
considered one still more extravagant. He supposed that 
one estimate of an article WOl th 100 crowns was of zoo crowns, 
and the other was of only one crown. If he employed the 
arithmetic mean, he would have to regard the former estimate 
as less erroneous than the latter. Yet the former estimate 
was only twice as great as the true value, involving an error 
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not infrequently made, while the latter estimate was 100 
times less than the true value, committing an error altogether 
unreasonable. Here, we may remark, Galileo abandoned 
difference for proportion. In the new supposition, the 
difference (and, we may say even, the distance) of the first 
estimate from the true value was a trifle greater than that 
of the second, but the ratio of the first estimate to the true 
value was much less than the ratio of the true value to the 
second. The problem, he concluded, is one to be solved by 
proportion; and therefore the geometric mean is the right 
one for the case. And the original question, which set the 
one estimate as ten times too great and the other as ten times 
too little, he answered by declaring these estimates equally 
erroneous. 
Nozzolini, unlike Galileo, stuck to his first inclination to 
use the arithmetic mean. The estimate of 1,000 crowns he 
unreservedly pronounced ten times more erroneous than the 
estimate of ten, since the former departs from the true value 
by 900 and the latter by only ninety crowns; and to make 
their errors equal, he maintained the horse must be worth 
505 crowns. But knowing of the geometric mean, which 
was suggested by the statement of the problem itself, and 
suspecting that some might advocate it, he proceeded to give 
an argument for the arithmetic mean. He put it on the 
ground that this is a case for commutative justice and not 
for distributive justice, and it has been established since the 
time of Aristotle that the geometric mean is the proper one 
to use in distributive justice, but in commutative justice 
(defined as a mean between gain and loss 2) the proper mean 
is the arithmetic. But his reason for assigning the affair to 
commutative justice is by no means clear. He maintained 
that, as a purchase is a ratified estimate, so an estimate is 
nothing but an unratified purchase; and he observed that 
in purchases and sales all errors are by merchants reckoned 
arithmetically. Yet he mentions many transactions in 
which merchants make use of the rule of three (which is a 
geometric process), and especially he notices that gains and 
losses are divided by partners in proportion to the capital 
they invested, wherein the geometric method is used. 
These, however, he says, are cases of distribution, and there-
fore they rightly employ the geometric mean. Still it 
remains that, although a question of estimation may not be 
a sqbject for distributive justice, it is not shown that it is a 
2 Nic. Ethics, V. iv. rather between pelf and penalty. 
B2 
• 
4 THE PROBLEM OF ESTIMATION 
matter of commutation, or balancing of gains and losses; 
nor is it proved that the geometric mean is confined to 
questions of distribution. 
When Nozzolini \-\-Tote this first letter, he was unaware of 
Galileo's opinion. After Galileo's letter was sent him, he 
returned to the charge. Galileo's still more extravagant 
case did not bother him in the least. The man who estimates 
a hundred-crown article at one crown commits, he says, a 
smaller error than the man who estimates it at 200, as 99 is 
less than 100. The argument about proportion he rejects 
on the ground that it changes the measure. In all compari-
sons of magnitude, he asserts, we must employ only one 
measure. We cannot say that two distances are equal 
because the one is ten yards and the other ten rods. And 
now when Galileo adduces the fact that in the original 
example the one estimate is ten times too great and the other 
ten times too little and therefore holds them to be equal, 
Nozzolini retorts that he has changed the measure, since the 
first estimate is distant from the truth by ten large measures 
of 100 crowns and the second estimate is distant from the 
truth by ten small measures of ten crowns; wherefore he 
likens it to saying that at Florence the campanile is the same 
distance from the cathedral as is the church of San Giovanni 
b.ecause the latter's distance is ten steps of a giant and the 
former's is ten steps of a baby. The argument, of course, 
goes too far; for by it a considerable amount of our ordinary 
use of proportion, or the equationing of ratios, would be 
quashed. Nozzolini has continued to speak of distances, or 
differences, when the question has been put in the form of 
ratios. In proportions the measures are eliminated, and 
therefore, as Galileo will show us in his reply, various measures 
can be used when we compare the ratios of the errors of 
estimation committed concerning them. 
In conclusion, to bring some hilarity into the too serious 
subject, Nozzolini appealed to a forum which he declared to 
be competent and which every day adjudicates such ques-
tions, and never hesitates in its decision. He had noticed, 
he wrote, that butchers often laid wagers among themselves 
and with countrymen about the weight of pigs or calves, 
and they decided the question always in favour of the one 
who came nearest to the true weight found when they 
weighed the animal. We have a similar proceeding in our 
country fairs, where often a charge is made for guesses over 
the weight of some huge hog or pumpkin, and the one who 
guesses nearest to the truth gets the prize. Here, apparently, 
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appeal is made to common sense in favour of the arithmet ic 
mean. 
Castelli now entered the lists, having seen the preceding 
letters. He backed up Galileo's position with two very 
pithy variations on the new example. First, if an article 
worth IOO crowns is estimated by one person at 200, he 
asked Nozzolini what should be the estimate below IOO with 
an equal error. The arithmetic answer must be that the 
other estimate should be nothing, since the difference between 
zero and I OO is the same as between I OO and 200. But is it 
not absurd to adjudge the former error as great as the latter, 
especially as, if some one estimated the article at 300, and 
it was asked what the lower estimate must be to match this 
error, only a very ridiculous answer is indicated? This, we 
may remark, is analogous to the argument whereby we at the 
commencement rej ected the harmonic mean. It shows that 
the arithmetic mean involves the same absurdity from the 
other side. If one estimate is half or less than half the true 
value, the harmonic mean can assign no valid higher estimate 
""ith equal error. If one estimate is double or more than 
double the true value, the arithmetic mean can assign no 
valid lower estimate with equal error. The aritlunetic mean 
is in this respect as faulty as the harmonic. Secondly, taking 
up Nozzolini's idea of the kinship between estimating and 
buying-and-selling, and supposing a hundred-crown article 
to be estimated at I99 crowns and bought for that sum by 
one party, and another equally valuable article to be esti-
mated at and bought for one crown by another party (with 
equal error, according to Nozzolini) , Castelli pointed to great 
inequality, in that, as he alleged, in the first transaction the 
gain and loss are 99 per cent. and in the second they are 
9,900 per cent. Here he made a mistake through too great 
conciseness. The seller's gain in the first transaction was 
99 per cent., but the buyer's loss was less than 50 per cent. ; 
and in the second the seller's loss was again 99 per cent., and 
the buyer's gain was 9,900 per cent. Still, though the seller's 
gain and loss in each case have the same percentage, the loss 
and gain of the two buyers have entirely different percentages. 
Compared with the amounts they ventured, their gain and 
loss are utterly unequal. 
Nozzolini answered Castelli in another letter. We may 
consider first his reply to the second objection, and carry it 
to its end. Here, he says, Castelli has unwarrantably altered 
the terms of the proposition. For at first in reckoning the 
gain of him who sold the hundred-crown article for I99 crowns 
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at 99 per cent., he went from the just price to the unjust 
price; and then in reckoning the gain of the purchaser of the 
similar article for one crown at 9,900 per cent., he went 
contrariwise from the unjust price to the just price. Nozzo-
lini contended that we should go in both cases from the just 
price to the unjust price; and therefore he relied on the 
fact that in each of the transactions the seller lost and gained 
the same percentage, wherein equality is manifested accord-
ing to the arithmetic mean. Rather, we might claim, it was 
Nozzo1ini who altered the propositions by going in opposite 
directions; for he went up from the mean to the higher 
extreme in the one case, and in the other he went down from 
the mean to the lower extreme; whereas Castelli went up 
from the lower extreme to the mean and continued going up 
from the mean to the higher extreme, although he happened 
to perform the latter ascent first.3 
We have no rejoinder from Castelli, but Galileo takes his 
place. While not admitting that gains and losses in actual 
transactions are the proper measure of error in the estimates 
upon which they are founded, he replied that the advantage 
of gaining 99 per cent. on one's capital is by no means equal 
to the disadvantage of losing 99 per cent. of one's capital. 
Absolute gains and losses are not proper measures of business 
capacity, in which the ability to make accurate estimates 
plays a considerable part; or else we should have to say 
that a merchant who increased his capital from 1,000 crowns 
to 2,000 was a better man of business than one who in the 
same time increased a capital of 100 crowns to 1,000; which 
is not so, as the former has increased his capital only 100 per 
cent., while the latter has increased his 900 per cent. To 
prove that the incapacity of him who reduces his capital 99 
per cent., from 100 to one, is much greater than the capacity 
of him who raises his capital 100 per cent., from 100 to 200, 
Galileo used this bit of demonstrative reasoning. Evidently 
the former's incapacity is much greater than the incapacity 
of one who reduces his capital from two to one; but this one's 
incapacity is exactly equal to the capacity of another who 
raises his capital from one to two; and this other person's 
3 Nozzolini added another counter-argument. He said that 
Castelli's problem was stated in the arithmetic progression I, 100, 
199, and therefore it was impossible to get a geometric progression 
out of it (p. 6ZB). What was meant by this, it is difficult to see. 
As well might it be said that the original problem was stated in 
the geometric progression 10, 100, 1,000, and therefore the 
arithmetic progression could not be got out of it. 
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capacity is equal to the capacity of the person who raises 
his capital from 100 to 200; therefore the first one's incapa-
city, being much greater than a capacity equal to this last 
one 's capacity, is much greater than this last one's capacity 
(p. 69A below). The argument hinges on the equality of the 
opposite qualities of two persons, of whom the one decreases 
his capital from two to one and the other increases his capital 
from one to two. This is evident. In practice, however, we 
reckon these movements from their starting points, and so go 
in opposite directions, saying the one has lost 50 per cent. 
and the other has gai.ned roo per cent.; wherein there is no 
appearance of equality. But the loser here is a person who 
was 100 per cent. better off than he now is, and the gainer is 
a person who now is 100 per cent. better off than he was; or, 
to turn both movements around, the loser is now 50 per cent. 
worse off than he was, and the gainer was 50 per cent. worse 
off than he now is. The appearance of equality is restored 
by reckoning always in the same direction, in each case from 
a higher to a lower position, or from a lower to a higher, as is 
done in the geometric mode of reckoning. And so in esti-
mates, the geometric mean, indicating the true value, stands 
in a proportion x: 1n :: m : y, in which x and y represent 
estinlates geometrically equally above and below the true 
. . h x m mYTh positlon; w ence - = - or - = -. e mean m must 
m y .~ m 
always be either in the numerator or the denominator, and 
cannot be in one position throughout in the same proportion. 
Thus an estimate above the truth may be represented by a 
ratio of the estimate to the mean, and then the estimate 
below the truth must be represented by a rati.o of the mean 
to the estimate ; or the former may be represented by a ratio 
of the mean to the estimate, and then the latter must be 
represented by a ratio of the estimate to the mean. There-
fore, in geometrically comparing errors on opposite sides of 
the truth, we must always go in the same direction, whichever 
be the clirection first chosen, as Castelli and Galileo clid, and 
not in opposite directions, as Nozzolini would have had 
them do. 
To Castelli's first objection, which, when an estimate is 
roo per cent. too high, required Nozzolini to place the 
equally wrong estimate on the other side 100 per cent. 
below the true value at zero, Nozzolini replied that he would 
do nothing of the sort. He would still do what he had done 
in boyhood when he had occasion to meet excessive estimates 
with the corresponcling estimates below the correct ones. 
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For when in the market he had been asked two farthings 
for a pear which he knew was selling for one farthing, he 
had been in the habit of countering, not by offering nothing 
for one pear, which he knew would be absurd, but by 
demanding · two pears for one farthing. And so now he 
maintains that when the owner of the hundred-crown 
article estimates it at 200, virtually demanding two pay-
ments for one article, the corresponding lower estimate of 
the purchaser should be to demand two such articles for 
100 crowns, thereby virtually offering one payment for two 
articles. Here, not in only the one, but in both the cases, 
he adds, is hidden the zero complained of. For, as the over-
estimating seller. wants two payments and offers the article 
for the one and nothing for the other, only so the under-
estimating purchaser wants two articles and offers payment 
for the one and nothing for the other (p. 62A). 
Here Nozzolini seems to give away his case, since to demand 
two articles for 100 crowns is the same as to demand each 
of them for fifty, so that the double estimate is met by a 
half estimate, as required by the geometric mean. But at 
the end of the letter, almost as an aftelihought, and again 
incidentally in his reply to Galileo's repetition of the objection, 
he discloses his meaning. He has converted the question 
from one of estimation to one of gain and loss in a business 
transaction, and then very lightly jumped back to the 
question of estimating. Thus, reverting to his idea that 
an estimate is nothing but an unratified purchase, and letting 
go of estimation, and considering only what happens in 
buying and selling, he says that when a merchant sells an 
article for 20 per cent. more than it is worth, the next time 
he sells a similar article to the same purchaser, if he wishes 
to make up for his first injustice, and to equalise his price 
above by a price below the true value, he should now ask 
20 per cent . less than it is worth-that is, if he had once 
sold a hundred-crown article for 120 crowns, he should 
now sell it for eighty; which is as required by the arith-
metic mean. And he points out that it would be absurd 
for the unjust seller of the hundred-crown horse at 1,000 
crowns to think that he could equalise the matter and make 
up for his injustice by selling to the same purchaser another 
hundred-crown horse for only ten crowns, in accordance 
with the geometric mean. No, he says, in this case the 
unjust seller, to ease his conscience, must sell ten such 
horses for ten crowns apiece (p. 63). This is perfectly 
evident of purchases and sales; and now Nozzolini claims 
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that the same must be true of estimates. He demands an 
estimate of ten horses at ten crowns apiece in order to have 
the same total amount of error in these estimates below the 
true value as was contained in the single estimate ten 
times above the true value, which cannot be equalled in a 
single estimate below the truth, even though, he says, the 
horse were estimated as worth less than a grain of sand 
(pp. 64A, 73 B). 
Thns Nozzolini admits that the error in an estimate 
twice, or more than twice, the trne value cannot be equalled 
by the error of a single estimate below the true value; 
but he thinks he gets rid of the difficulty by distributing 
the error over as many estimates as the first estimate was 
times greater than the true value. We may remark that 
in this way the hannonic mean might be rehabilitated, since 
an estimate less than half the true value could be met on 
the upper side by distributing the error over two or more 
positive, finite, and not very large estimates. In general, 
against both these means, we may argue that, although 
there is some resemblance of an estimate to a purchase, 
there is also some difference, and here the difference tells . 
For, if \ye allow a single hundred-crown horse to be esti-
mated along with nine other imaginary horses supposed to 
be its duplicates, when the first estimator, thinking of an 
actual horse, estimates it ten times too high, and the second 
estimator, in order to equal his error on the lower side, 
estimates the actual horse and the nine imaginary ones at 
ten crowns each, thereby in fact committing a total error 
of 900 crowns, equal to the other's, there is no reason why 
the first estimator should not now do the same, and so when 
he estimates the nine additional imaginary horses at I,OOO 
crowns each, the error of his estimate still is, in this way of 
computing error, ten times greater than that of the other's. 
At this rate the second party will never be able to overlake 
the first in error; for however many imaginary horses he 
invokes to estimate below the true value, the same can the 
first party employ to estimate above the true value. 
Galileo, for his part, after first making a reply which did 
not altogether reach the mark, as he seems to have failed 
quite to grasp Nozzolini's argument, made another reply, 
which left Nozzolini with nothing to say, for he first ignored 
it, rebutting only the less successful reply, and afterwards 
refused to consider it. Galileo claims that the problem of 
estimation need not be confined to values, but may be made 
of other quantities in which the question cannot be trans-
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ferred to one of gain and loss in an exchange. Thus, alter-
ing Castelli's example, he supposes a tower 100 feet high 
to be estimated 200 feet high, and asks what estimate 
below the true height will be equal in error to that. Cer-
tainly it cannot be an estimate of zero feet; for that would 
raze the tower to the ground. And if Nozzolini says the 
other estimate must be of two towers each 100 feet high 
so made as to get the total error of 100 feet, he must say 
either that one of the towers is 100 feet high and the other 
of no height at all (and so no tower), or that they are each 
of them 50 feet high (p. 68n) . In the latter case, as the 
imaginary tower does not concern us, we may accept the 
estimate of the tower in question, which is as required by 
the geometric mean. Or, if Nozzolini insists on retaining 
the additional tower, we may say that he has altered the 
problem, which was about a single tower. And we may 
repeat, if the one estimate can deal with two towers, why 
cannot the other ? 
What has in the above two instances been quoted of 
Galileo, was made in a postscript to his only other letter. 
In the letter itself, wTitten before he had information of 
these, he replied only to Nozzolini's earlier letters. After 
commenting on Nozzolini's reference to commutative and dis-
tributive justice, which had no weight with him, and repeat-
ing his own argument from extravagant instances by another 
extravagant supposition (of a bagful of coins being esti-
mated double and very little), and raising Castelli's first 
objection in a slightly different form in ignorance of Castelli's 
having already made it, and denying that any gain and loss 
need be considered, as they do not enter when other quanti-
ties not values are estimated, he broaches a broader treat-
ment of the subject. He points out that Nozzolini's funda-
mental error in measuring errors of estimation was in 
considering only the absolute magnitudes of the errors and 
in taking no account of the relations between the estimates 
and the things estimated. This procedure leads to all 
sorts of absurdities, among which is the possibility that 
most ignorant appraisers may have the preference given 
them over appraisers of the greatest experience and perspi-
cacity. For if anyone should estimate the value of a nut 
(ten of which are sold for a farthing) at a crown, he would 
by everybody be considered a most etravaga~t apl?rais~r ; 
but if anyone should make an error of a crown m estImatmg 
the value of a jewel worth four or five thousand, he would by 
everybody be considered a most accurate appraiser. Galileo 
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believed that Nozzolini would not judge otherwise; and 
yet his reasoning would require him to consider the former 
the better appraiser. And to show that we cannot really 
judge enors of estimation without relation to the size of 
the things estimated, he supposes the case of one who in 
estimating the height of a mountain makes an error of 100 
yards, and of another who in estimating the weight of a 
bullock makes an error of ten pounds. Here he points out 
that it is impossible to compare these enors, for the data 
supplied are insufficient. But if we add that the true height 
of the mountain is 1,000 yards, and the true weight of the 
bullock is 100 pounds, then it is possible to compare the 
errors; but we cannot say the enor of the former is the 
greater on account of 100 being greater than ten, as there is 
no comparison between 100 yards and ten pounds; or if 
we judge simply by the absolute nun1bers, we might change 
the latter statement and say the appraiser of the bullock 
ened by 120 ounces, and then, as 120 is greater than 100, 
his enor would, from the smaller, become the greater; 
which is absurd. The conect answer is that the two errors 
are equal (provided, we must add, they were on the same 
side), because in each case the error is of 10 per cent.4 
, Galileo did not make the proviso in the parenthesis, but it 
is understood in his argument. Of course Nozzolini would agree 
with him in the above. Nozzolini's real difference with Galileo 
lay in holding that an equal percentage of error above and below 
the true quantity makes an equal enor. Sometimes, however, 
he placed the equality in the difference, or distance, from any 
true quantity. If a single tower 100 feet high is estimated at 
120 feet and at 80 feet, he says the errors are equal for both these 
reasons, that the estimates each depart 20 feet from the true 
height, and that they each depart 20 per cent. from the true 
height. But these reasons are by no means the same, for, though 
here coinciding, they may diverge. This may be shown by 
repeating Galileo's back-and-forth argument, adapted to the 
present case. If a tower 100 feet high is estimated at 80 feet, 
and if another tower 80 feet high is estimated at 100 feet, the 
error in each of these estimations is of 20 feet, and Nozzolini 
must say they are equal. In fact, in the last paragraph of his 
last letter on the subject he expressly says that in the arithmetic 
method of measuring, nothing is considered but the distances 
(or differences), and that it is as much to go from the more to the 
less as from the less to the more, there being the same distance 
from 8 to 4 as from 4 to 8, just as it is the same distance from my 
house to yours as from yours to mine. According to this, the 
distance from 100 to 80 being the same as from 80 to roo, the 
12 THE PROBLEM OF ESTIMATION 
In measuring errors of estimation against Nozzolini's 
contrary opinion, Galileo insists that the unit of measure-
ment is indifferent, as shown by the above comparison 
between estimates of a height and of a weight. Taking 
another instance, Galileo offers as self-evident the proposi-
tion that if one person estimates the height of a tower at 
150 feet, which afterwards is measured and found to be 
100 feet high, and if another estimates the weight of a calf 
at 150 pounds, which afterwards is put on the scales and 
found to weigh 100 pounds, their errors are equal, although 
the measures are different in kind. He concluded that 
the measurement of errors of estimation is generically 
different from the measurement of concrete things, because 
error is an abstraction. All measures, he maintains, must 
be of the same species with the things measured, as we 
measure times by a time, weights by a weight, values by a 
value. And so errors must be measured by an error, which 
is a ratio between the estimate and the true quantity, and 
not a concrete quantity itself. We cannot measure errors 
by so many pounds, feet, or cro'vvns: we must measure 
them by the proportions of the pounds, feet, or crowns in 
the erroneous estimates to the pounds, feet, or crowns in 
the thing estimated. He therefore defines the measure of 
error in estimation as, abstractly, the general relation or 
habit which the false estimate has to the true quantity of 
the thing estimated (pp. 66, 67). Hence, he repeats, all 
reference to commutative and distributive justice is not to 
the point; and he opines that, had the question originally 
been put about errors in estimating the height of a giant, 
supposed to be 10 feet, and one estimate was supposed to 
be 100 feet and another I foot, Nozzolini would never have 
argued as he did, and would have seen that those errors are 
equally exorbitant. But if Nozzolini persists in his opinion, 
Galileo warns him, he will have to maintain many ridiculous 
things-as that he makes a better estimate of a heap of 
1,000 coins who says he thinks there may be two or three, 
errors must be equal. But again, according to the usual way of 
reckoning percentages, while the former error is of 20 per cent., 
the latter is of 25 per cent. Therefore the same Nozzolini must 
say the errors are unequal-and this time he would be wrong. 
Into such inconsistency did his application of an arithmetic 
process to a case of geometric proportion lead him. (Reasoning 
similar to Galileo's in this matter was employed, without know-
ledge of Galileo's precedence, by the writer in The Measurement 
of General Exchal1ge- Value, pp. 351-2, cf. 236-9, 250-3.) 
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than he who judges them 2,000; or worse yet, he must 
hold that he who estimates Monte Moreilo to be 10,000 feet 
high (over twice its height) is a worse judge of height even 
than he who says it is a hole in the ground; for Galileo 
never thought of Nozzolini's scheme of bringing other 
mountains into the question. In fact, he says that for 
Nozzolini to equalise, in the original problem, the error of 
the estimate of the hundred-crown horse at 1,000, he must 
suppose the horse to have a harness put on worth 810 
crowns and then the horse and the harness together (worth 
gIO crowns) to be estimated at ten crowns. This suggestion 
is little more absurd than the method Nozzolini did adopt 
to avoid the difficulty. 
Lastly, Galileo refers to Nozzolini's appeal to the forum 
of the butchers, and points out that the butchers used the 
arithmetic mean through ignorance, as they did not perceive 
that equal differences above and below the true value do 
not spell equal errors; a reason for which was that, being 
skilled in such matters, they generally made but small 
mistakes, and in small mistakes the difference between the 
arithmetic and the geometric means is trifling (e.g., between 
lIO and go, while the arithmetic mean is 100, the geomehic 
mean is over gg); whereas, were they confronted with a 
case where somebody estimates a calf of 100 pounds at 
200 pounds and another estimates it at an ounce, they never 
would have given the prize to the latter. Herewith Galileo 
left the subject. 
But Nozzolini had the last word, writing two more letters, 
one of them the longest in the lot. Herein, after insisting 
on Aristotle's authority, he traversed ail of Galileo's criti-
cisms, mostly repeating only what he had already said. 
But to the last criticism about the butchers he replied that 
no matter how small the difference between the arithmetic 
and the geometric means in small errors, the right mean 
ought to be adopted (p. 74B). It is difficult to see what he 
was driving at by this; for it could hardly be maintained 
that the butchers must have adopted the right mean, and 
as they adopted the arithmetic mean, therefore this is 
the right one. The real reason why the butchers, and other 
people in similar situations, adopt the arithmetic mean, 
and will continue to adopt it, is because it is the simplest 
and most convenient. 5 Simple methods of measuring are 
• So, to vary the example, children will in all probability always 
maintain that a lesson-mark of 80 out of a possible 100 is twice as 
bad as one of go. Yet their error can easily be shown by con-
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constantly used in practice, even by persons who know 
that some other more complex method is more precise, 
provided the former is precise enough for practical pur-
poses-and Galileo showed no sign of wishing to interfere 
with the practice of the butchers.6 Where precision is 
absolutely required is in theory. So it was Nozzolini, and 
not the butchers, from whom we have a right to demand 
precision. 
Another rejoinder was a general one to Galileo's method 
of arguing from extravagant cases. Extravagant cases, 
very conveniently for his own contention, he would throw 
out altogether, notwithstanding that he had admitted con-
sideration of them at the beginning, before he perceived 
the havoc they would make with his side of the question. 
For justification he appealed to the procedure in dialectical 
disputes; for in them, he said, if one party denies that 
snow is white or that fire is hot, he is regarded as a fool 
with whom no argument can be profitably made. And so, 
he says, if anyone should estimate a hundred-pound pig 
as weighing an ounce, or should consider a mountain a 
hole in the ground, his estimate should be rejected as that 
of a fool who cannot be argued with. He holds that from 
extravagant cases we cannot judge of the nature of a thing, 
citing in example that because a drop of water is round 
sidering the case of eleven scholars, the first of whom receives the 
mark of go, the next a mark twice as bad, the third a mark three 
times as bad, and so on. The tenth, according to the children, 
will receive the mark of zero. What will be the mark of the 
eleventh? Again, it is evident that 50 is half as good a mark as 
100. Then the arithmetician must say that zero is half as good 
a mark as 50. But obviously the mark half as good as 50 is 25. 
This is in accordance with the geometric measurement. 
G In their wagers the only case in which the arithmetic mean is 
likely to give a different result from the geometric is where two 
estimates are equally above and below the measured weight; 
for then, while the geometric mean would award the prize to the 
one who made the higher estimate, the arithmetic mean would 
divide it between them. But here the superiority of the higher 
estimate would in most cases be so inappreciably small, that it 
would generally fall short of the probable error in the measure-
ment of the true weight; wherefore even theory would sanction 
the practice of using the arithmetic mean in such cases. And if 
the condition is first stated, as is usually done, as being that the 
one who comes nearest to the measured weight shall be considered 
the winner, there is no room for dispute about any other mean 
but the arithmetic. 
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(a very small instance), we cannot infer that a barrelful 
of water has the nature of roundness (p. 72A). This is a 
rather unfortunate example, as we should do exactly what 
he denies: we should infer that a barrelful, or a whole 
oceanful, of water, if as free in space as is a drop of rain in 
the air, would assume the spherical shape, just as, and for 
the same reason that, the drop does. He admits that he 
had himself entertained the supposition of some such 
extravagant estimates, as of the hundred-crown horse being 
estimated at only ten crowns; but now he says he had all 
along supposed the estimator had some reason for his 
estimate, as that he suspected some disease in the animal. 
A more humiliating admission is another which he now 
makes, to the effect that the person who should estimate a 
heap of 1 ,000 coins on the table before him at two or three 
makes a greater error than the one who estimates them at 
2 ,000, although the former's estimate is nearer the truth. 
But he demands the privilege of throV\o'ing out all such 
foolish estimates, and of considering only the more judicious 
closer ones. He overlooks that Galileo did not merely 
make such suppositional estimates himself, but had shown 
that Nozzolmi 's principle required him, Nozzolini, to main-
tain that such foolish estimates, because nearer the truth, 
are better than others that are not foolish, and had pre-
dicted that Nozzolini could not hold fast to his principle. 
\Vhen one disputant employs against another the reductio 
ad absurdllm of his views, it would be strange if the other 
could avoid its effect by simply demanding that his opponent 
must not introduce absurdities. But Nozzolini, rejoicing 
in this method of rebuttal, went on and likewise threw out 
all Galileo's use of other quantities, in which there is no 
gain or loss, on the ground that he had to consider only 
the problem as originally proposed, which concerned. itself 
only with values, forgetting that he himself had been the 
first to introduce other quantities with his reference to the 
butchers. 7 
Beside these rejoinders, Nozzolini makes three or four 
new arguments, which are left for us to tackle. One is an 
appeal to a more technical forum than that of the butchers-
to the fact that when two or more official appraisers of 
7 But he would allow no reciprocity on Galileo's part. His 
incomprehensible argument referred to in Note 3 was ignored by 
Galileo. He now repeats it, says it is the best, and he will stand 
on it alone, and claims the victory because it was not refuted 
(p . 75). 
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some property in litigation differ, the arithmetic mean 
between their appraisals is everywhere, and always has 
been, the one legally employed (p. 7IB). To this no different 
reply need be made than to that other appeal to other 
people's opinion and practice. Then he cites the case of 
archery and of similar contests (rifle practice to-day) to 
hit a mark, and finds confirmation of his view in the fact 
that the person who comes nearest to the bull's-eye (whether 
above or below it) is considered the best shot. Here he 
cites a case where practice is theoretically correct; but it 
is one essentially different from the subject of estimation. 
For estimates can err only above and below the mark, while 
shots may go astray in any direction; and, which is the 
principal thing, the limits of error in shooting at a mark 
are the same in all directions, being nowhere; but in estima-
tion, while the errors above may go up without limit, the 
errors below quickly reach a limit when the estimate falls 
to zero. Now, it 1S precisely the geometric mean which 
sends its extremes at each remove in such wise that the 
lower one never reaches zero before the upper one reaches 
infinitv; whereas the arithmetic mean sends its lower 
extreme dO\'tTI to zero as soon as the upper extreme has 
reached double the quantity aimed at. Thus, while in 
errors of archery and the like, where the limits on both, as 
on all, sides are equally distant, or distanceless, the arith-
metic mean is the proper one to employ; in errors of estima-
tion, which have a definite lower limit and none but an 
infinite upper limit, the proper mean, in theory at least, 
whatever be the practice, is the geometric mean. Again, 
he argued that if a thing weighs 60 pounds, and both the 
wrong estimates are on the same side, say 55 and 50, we 
give the decision in favour of the nearer, and so judge them 
by their distance; and just so, when the estimates are on 
opposite sides, say 55 and 70, we should do the same, judge 
them by their respective distances,-or rather, he asks, 
why should we not? Here he is betraying signs of dotage; 
for he overlooks that Galileo had over and over again shown 
why we should not; and even in the first supposition, where 
the difference of proportion accompanies the difference of 
distance (wherefore Nozzolini cannot rightly say we use 
the latter only), there is a begging of the question in his 
assertion; for, according to the opposite contention, we 
can no more correctly say that an error of 20 per cent. 
above the truth is twice as great as an error of 10 per cent. 
above the truth, than we can rightly say that the latter 
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error is equal to an error of 10 per cent. below the truth. 
Lastly, in a supplementary letter, he introduces a principle 
never heard of before and never again since, which he can 
hardly word clearly, but which is something to the effect 
that in all questions of greaterness we go from the greater 
to the smaller, and in all questions of smallerness we go 
from the smaller to the greater; and so we must do in a 
question of estimates, that is, we must go, as he before 
contended, from the true value in opposite directions to the 
greater and to the lesser extremes; whereby he seeks to 
. Galil f h . . t· 1 1000. 10 convict eo 0 avmg to malll am t lat -- IS = -, 
100 100 
whereas, of course, Galileo had maintained that 1000 is 
100 
100 
It is a principle invented as an afterthought for 
10 
the purpose of supporting the conclusion desired; and it 
deserves no further consideration. 
Nozzolini had commenced with great moderation, but 
he ended by betting his eyes that the geometric proportion 
has nothing to do with measuring errors of estimation. He 
displays the signs we expect in a man who argues on the 
VrTong side--of floundering into greater and greater absur-
dities as he persists in his course. 
F.E. c 
II.-A VERAGES AND ERRORS. 
So lengthy a dispute over so useless a problem may seem 
puerile. But a problem may be useless in itself, and yet 
be profitable as an exercise in reasoning. The controversy 
we have been reviewing was not a mere logomachy: it may 
be viewed as a methodological essay. It can serve both for 
a model and for a warning, the former provided by Galileo, 
the latter by Nozzolini. And there are indications to-day 
that the one as well as the other is needed. Even some of 
its direct results have had to be rediscovered in our own 
time, as will be seen more than once; and it is a pity they 
were ever forgotten. Hence that controversy by no means 
deserves the contempt with which Todhunter alluded to it, 
as having been a waste of time, and still being without 
"any scientific interest or value." 8 To draw the lessons 
that may be learnt from it, let us first inquire into the nature 
of averages, and then into the nature of estimates and their 
errors, after which we may extend the investigation to more 
practical problems. 
THE CRITERIA OF AVERAGES. 
In drawing a mean or average the most definite purpose 
we have is to simplify our quantitative conception of things 
by obtaining one figure that can take the place of two or 
more and give the same result as they, numerically speaking. 
This may be illustrated in four examples. (r) Of two 
provinces with equal territory, if the population of the one 
8 History of the Theory of Probability, p. 6. He referred to 
Libri's Histoire des Mathematiques en Italie, Vol. IV. pp. 288-g, 
as saying that Galileo was occupied with this question (" non 
encore resolue ") a long time. Galileo, though he spent some 
time over methods of estimating distances and elevations with 
the eye, did not linger long over this problem of measuring 
estimates themselves. It is, indeed, a pity that he did not reply 
to Nozzolini's last letter. He might then have pointed out the 
distinction between shooting at a mark and guessing at a value, 
and have saved succeeding generations from error through 
ignoring it. 
AVERAGES AND ERRORS 19 
is IO,OOO and of the other 20,000, this is the same for the 
state as if the population of each were 15,000; for the sum 
of the population is 30,000, which is distributed over two 
provinces. 9 Thus the mean population of any country is 
measured by the arithmetic mean or average. It is not even 
necessary to know the individual items: if we know the 
whole population of a country and the number of provinces 
(or of square miles) in it, we get the average by dividing the 
former by the latter. (2) If the population of a country has 
increased at irregular rates, but with the result that it has 
increased lOO per cent., i.e., has doubled, in 100 years, 
the same result would have been obtained if it had increased 
regularly at the rate 1~2 = I '007, or 0'7 per cent. every year; 
for whatever may have been the 100 individual rates of 
increase (or even of decrease at times), their product is two, 
and this product is likewise obtained by I'007 multiplied 
by itself 100 times. Here, then, the average increase is 
the geometric average of the individual increases; and 
again it is not necessary to know the individual items, all that 
is needed being to know their number and their product. 
(3) If a merchant sells one article for 190 dollars and another 
for ten, the net result is the same as if he sold each for 100. 
Here again the mean to use is the arithmetic. If the articles 
were each worth (or their proper selling prices were) 100, his 
gain and loss would be equal and would nullify each other; 
that is, the result to him would be the same as if he neither 
gained nor lost on either article, as indicated by that mean. 
(4) If a merchant alternately gains and loses 90 per cent. in 
his successive business transactions, in every case venturing 
his whole business capital, what mean gain or loss will have 
the same result? Here the model is twofold, according as he 
begins by gaining or by losing. It may be thus tabulated: 
lOO I 190 19 36'I 3.61 6·859 0·686 
100 10 19 I'9 3·61 0'361 0·686 
It is seen that of every second venture the result is the same, 
being an ever growing loss, and the intervening divergent 
figures rapidly converge. As there are two lines of develop-
9 The same nUl11-ericatty, be it remembered; for in other 
respects it may be much better for a state that its population be 
distributed in one way than in another. And so when we com-
pare unequal territories by their average populations (on equal 
territories), we are doing no more and no less than what we do 
when we compare equal territories simply by their populations. 
The same remark applies to the other examples. 
cz 
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ment, it is impossible for the mean to have more than a 
recurrently equal effect, while in the intervals it must lie 
between the divergent figures. Evidently the arithmetic 
mean is inappropriate for this case; for the arithmetic mean 
between 190 and 10 is 100, which indicates that the capital 
would remain 100 after every venture, contrary to what does 
take place. The geometric mean between 190 and 10 is 43 ·6, 
indicating a loss of 56.4 per cent.; and now if every trans-
action showed such a loss, the result would be as follows: 
100 I 43.6 19 8.284 3·61 1·57 0·686 
Thus at every second remove the figures are the same as 
before, and in the intervening stages they are at the geometric 
mean between the other two; but ultimately this series 
approaches the same limits as do the others, and before long 
it will be practically indistinguishable from them even in the 
intervals where it does not exactly coincide with them. It 
may be objected that the supposition should be that the 
merchant divides his capital and alternatively gains and 
loses on the halves, oppositely in each case. Then the 
figures would be : 
50 I 95 9·5 18·05 1·805 3·43 0·343 
50 5 9·5 0·95 1·805 0·18 0·343 
1 
1 
100 I 100 19 19 3.61 3.61 0·686 
Again at every second period the result is the same as in the 
preceding suppositions, but in the intervals the results are 
the arithmetic means between the first divergences; which 
gives a jerky progress, with two stages on a level, followed by 
steeper falls. If it be further objected that at every venture 
the merchant should re-divide his capital into two halves, 
whereupon his capital would remain intact at 100, in accord-
ance with the arithmetic mean; the reply is that this returns 
the case to the second example, of the merchant making 
equal gains and losses on articles of equal value, which of 
course gives the same result however many times it be 
repeated. But we have desired to make a distinct example. 
And so, while this case is kept as first stated, the proper mean 
to use on it is the geometric. IO 
10 Also the harmonic mean may be the proper and necessary 
one in certain cases. Thus in the ancient problem of the fountain 
(found in the Greek Anthology, XIV. 13S-the statement here is 
slightly altered) the time required to fill the basin through two 
pipes together which singly half-fill it in different times, is 
obviously a mean between these times; and calculation shows 
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In all these cases the right choice of a mean is demonstra-
tive, and not subject to dispute; for the kind of mean chosen 
is determined by its yielding a known result. But in many 
cases there is no such definite criterion at hand. Then the 
choice may be determined by the resemblance of the subject 
to some demonstrative case; which resemblance may be 
found in the conditions set to, or the observed behaviour of, 
the extremes, or the terms in general. The mean to be 
chosen in the case of estimation can be determined only in 
this way. Thus it is to be noted that Nozzolini always 
identified this problem with our third example, and Galileo 
assimilated it to something like our fourth; for Nozzolini 
converted it into a question of gain and loss, and Galileo 
treated it as a question of business capacity. But Galileo 
went further, and pointed out an underlying distinction 
between these two kinds of subjects for averaging. In the 
one there are no limits on either side of the true position, and 
in the other there is a limit at zero on the one side and on the 
other side the only limit is infinity. In the former, any 
figure above or below the true position may have a cone-
sponding figure on the opposite side equidistant from the true 
position; and we may add, if there is a limit on the one side, 
there must be an equidistant limit on the other. In the 
latter, the limits zero and infinity are equally related to the 
true position only as extremes in a proportion, 0: 'in = m: Xl ; 
wherefore similar equality must be sought in all the inter-
mediate terms that cones pond to each other, x : m = m : y. 
This we may generalise, and say the former conctition is 
suitable for the arithmetic mean or average, the latter for the 
geometric. 11 
that it is the harmonic mean. Note that the lower extreme (the 
shorter time in which one of the pipes half-fills the basin) can 
never be quite as small as half the mean (the time in which it in 
conjunction with the other pipe will fill it); and so the harmonic 
mean is applicable to the case, while the unsuitableness of the 
arithmetic and geometric means is easily seen by using extra-
vagant suppositions, as of one pipe taking a day to do what the 
other will do in an hour. Here the only purpose the harmonic 
mean can serve is to facilitate the calculation the next time we 
are confronted with such a problem. 
11 We might likewise work out some corresponding condition 
for the harmonic mean. This is omitted as not needed. Some 
hints of it may be found in The Measurement of General Exchange-
Value, Chapter VIII. For the criteria see there especially 
pp. 245-8· 
J 
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Thus in our fourth example it would have been possible to 
suppose the merchant at every other venture to gain lIO per 
cent., or any higher percentage, but we cannot suppose him 
in the intervening ventures to lose any more than 100 per 
cent., remembering that we are making these supposiLions 
as indications of his business capacity; for this cannot sink 
below nothing, and if he were supposed to lose 100 per cent. 
of his capital, he "lOuld have no capital to start with for 
another venture, and the series would come to an abrupt end 
after the first or second venture. But in the third example 
there is no such limit. We might change the figures and 
suppose that the merchant sells the hundred-dollar article 
for 300, making a gain of 200, and then we can ask how he 
should dispose of another hundred-dollar article to make an 
equal loss, or to make up to the purchaser for his first unjust 
sale. Here, to be sure, there is no price that will satisfy the 
question; but it is easy for us to answer it by saying he 
should give away the second article and 100 dollars to boot,12 
There is nothing ridiculous here. But if anyone has made an 
error of 200 dollars in estimating at 300 an article worth lOO, it 
would be ridiculous to say he could equal this on the other 
side by estimating the same or an equally valuable article at 
100 dollars less than nothing. There are no more limits to 
losses than to gains; for a man can get himself into the position 
of having less than nothing by running into debt. But there 
is a limit to errors of estimation below the true value, as no 
man can estimate a valuable article at less than nothing. 
We may note, further, that Nozzolini always obtained his 
result by slightly altering the problem, converting it from 
one of estimation into one of gain and loss. In many cases 
slight changes in the way of stating a problem, or in the 
attitude assumed toward it, or in the use expected to be made 
of it, will involve a change in the solution. Another instance 
may be cited. Consider two cities each of 10,000 inhabitants, 
and suppose 9,000 migrate from the one to the other. The 
one has lost 9,000, the other has gained 9,000. The one has 
been reduced from 10,000 to 1,000, the other has been 
increased from 10,000 to 19,000. Which of these changes is 
the greater? and what average are we to use in measuring 
them? Now, if these two cities are both in the same country, 
and we have in mind the effect of the changes, not upon the 
cities themselves, but upon the country at large, it is evident 
12 If in this transaction the price be conceived as - lOO, the 
arithmetic mean of the sales, ~ (300 + - roo), is still = 100. 
2 
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that in mere numbers the country at large has neither gained 
nor lost; and so, no effect being produced, the changes have 
nullified each other, and therefore are equal. So conceived, 
the case comes under the first example above given and 
resembles also the third, and the arithmetic mean is the right 
one to employ. But suppose again that the cities are in 
different countries, or in different ages, and, without migra-
tion between 1.hem, the one has dwindled from 10,000 to 
1,000 and the other has grown from 10,000 to 19,000. We 
now have to consider, not the combined effect upon any 
whole of which the cities are parts, but the effects upon the 
cities themselves, individually and independently. And now. 
we cannot say the changes are equal. Equal changes ill 
opposite directions would be that of a city dwindling from 
10,000 to 1,000 and that of a city growing from 1,000 to 
10,000; but this last is equal to that of a city growing from 
10,000 to 100,000; and as the second city in the supposition 
has grown from 10,000 only to 19,000, it has not grown as 
much as the first has dwindled. Therefore the mean by 
which to judge these changes is the geometric. 
A little over a century after the controversy we have been 
reviewing, Daniel Bernoulli in his Specimen Theorice NOvr8 
de Mensma Sortis 1~ and Buffon in his Essai d'Arithmetiqrle 
morale 14 made a similar use of the geometric mean. 
Bernoulli, to whom the distinction between "moral" and 
" mathematical" expectation is due, and Buffon argued to 
this effect: if two men of equal fortunes stake half their 
fortunes on a throw of dice, the one loses 'more than the other 
gains. Now, from the standpoint of the wealth of the 
country of which they are citizens, there is evidently no gain 
or loss, numerically considered; and so, when we draw the 
average wealth of the parties after the play, we must use the 
arithmetic mean. But from the point of view of the indivi-
duals the case is different; for the one who has lost half his 
fortune, compares his present state with his previous state, 
and his previous state was twice as good; and so does the 
other, but his previous state was two-thirds as good as his 
present state, and therefore he looks upon (or feels) his gain 
as a gain of only one-third, since what he has gained is the 
third of his present state. I5 In other words, the esteem-
13 Arts. 5 and 13. This work was written in 1730-1, and pub-
lished in the Commentarii Academice Petropolitance, 1738, Vol. V. 
14 Sections II-I3. This work was written in 1760, and first 
published in 1777. 
1$ Todhunter pointed out that Buffon at least did not do full 
24 THE PROBLEM OF ESTIMATION 
value of the money which a man owns or commands has an 
inverse relation to its amount: as his fortune increases, the 
esteem-value of his money falls, and as his fortune decreases, 
the esteem-value of his money rises, and it rises faster than it 
falls at every arithmetically equal remove from the same 
initial position; so that losses are estimated in money of 
greater esteem-value than are gains. If the losses and gains 
(or the stakes in a play) are small compared with the person 's 
fortune, the difference is imperceptible; but it becomes 
apparent when they are comparatively large.I6 H ereby is 
justice to his case. The loser has lost a fortune equal to his 
present fortune, while the winner has gained only one-third his 
present fortune. Todhunter says that, representing the original 
fortune by a and the stake by b, Buffon estimated the gain by 
the expression ~b and the loss by~, whereas the loss should 
a + a 
be estimated by ~b: History of the Theory of Probability, 
a-
p. 345. Bernoulli and Buffon have been followed, among others, 
by Laplace, who introduced the distinction between a person's 
" moral" and "physical" fortune, Thiorie a1~alytiqe des Pro-
babilites, 1812 (in his (E1I.,vres Completes, 1847, Vol. VII. 
pp. 474-88, cf. p. xxii. of the Introduction); Lacroix, Traite 
elementaire d1~ Calcul des Probabilites, 2nd ed., 1822, p. 127; 
Quetelet, Lettres sur la Thiorie des Probabilites, 1846, let. viii. ; 
Fechner, who brought the principle under Weber's law, Psycho-
Physik, 2nd ed., Vol. I. pp. 236-8, Vol. II. pp. 549-50; Jevons, 
Theory of PoliticaL Economy, 1871, p. 154. On the other hand 
Venn in his Logic of Chance, 2nd ed., 1876, pp. 135--7,408-12, does 
not accept this reasoning. He points out that the pleasure of 
the game has been overlooked, as also the temperament of some 
people, who are bored with the monotony of mediocrity and 
delight in excitement. This explains why gambling always has 
been, and probably always will be, popular, in spite of the loss 
of " moral fortune" which attends it; but it does not disprove 
that loss. That loss is a payment for the amusement obtained-
and it may be an overpayment through ignorance on the part of 
the players. Cajori, in his History of Mathematics, 2nd ed., 
p. 223, remarks that Bernoulli's theory has become classic, " but 
no one ever makes use of it." So much the worse for those who 
might but do not. 
16 In all the above by a man's fortune must be meant, not 
merely his actual capital, but in addition to that the capitalised 
value of his earning power. A man possessing property worth 
20,000 dollars, who earns 10,000 a year, may lose his whole 
capital without feeling much loss. As Bernoulli pointed out, 
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explained the well-known phenomenon that people grieve 
more over losses than they rejoice over arithmetically equal 
gains; and cynics are mistaken when they sneer at this. 
In the case of om two gamblers, individually considered, as 
the one has lost more than the other has gained, the net effect 
is a loss; and this is shown by drawing the geometric mean 
of their final positions. Bernoulli calculated the loss of what 
Laplace, who accepted his reasoning here, called their" moral 
fortune" at 13 per cent., because ""'ISO X 50 = 87 nearly; 
and this lies 13 below 100.17 Bernoulli, Buffon and Laplace 
reasoned as Galileo had done. 
Different ways of viewing a problem, however, need not 
lead to the use of different averages. An instance in point 
is that of drawing the average height of the men of a country 
or of a race. Our purpose may be merely to compare the 
stature of the men of one country or race with the stature of 
the men of other countries or races, or of men to-day with 
men of earlier times. Such a use of the average has most 
resemblance to that in the first model above given; for we 
may suppose that all the various heights of all the men of 
one country are to those of another as they would be if all 
the men of each country were unifonnly tall and yet together 
had the same combined height that they actually have. We 
may conceive of all the men in each country standing on top 
of one another, forming two upright columns, and then, 
provided their numbers are equal, the comparison of their 
heights is the comparison desired, and the same result is 
given by comparing the arithmetically averaged heights of 
even a beggar has some fortune, which is the capitalised value of 
the gifts he annually receives. Without this correction it is 
wrong to say that 10,000 is as great a sum to a man owning 
20,000 as is half a million to a man owning a million. The former 
is likely to be much better able to replace his loss than the latter. 
Hence Franklin was not quite right when he said, in r768, in 
connection with universal suffrage, that "the all" (evidently 
meaning all the property) of a poor man is " as dear to him " as 
the all of a rich man is to him, Works, Spark's ed., Vol. II. 
p. 372 (and again so reported by J. Baynes in Sir Samuel Romilly's 
Memoirs, 3rd ed., Vol. I., p. 447). Franklin's dictum was con-
troverted on this ground by Home Tooke in his Letter to Lord 
Ashburton, quoted in the Edinburgh Review, Vol. XXXI. p. r83. 
17 Going back to the point of view of the country at large, we 
now see that it too has suffered a loss, as it has got a worse dis-
tribution of its wealth. But this cannot be shown in the merely 
numerical calculation of its wealth. 
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the individuals in the columns; and if the numbers are 
unequal, the proper correction is made by using these 
averages. In the case of races, the total heights are beyond 
our powers of ascertaining, and then we must use a number 
of each race sufficiently large to serve as samples, and must 
average them arithmetically. Most statistical averages are 
drawn for this purpose of comparison, especially in time 
series, to see whether there has been improvement or 
deterioration, with a view to finding causes, whereby we may 
check the latter and forward the former. And whenever 
such combination of the items is possible, the arithmetic 
average is properly indicated. But an entirely different 
purpose for drawing anthropometric averages was invented 
by Quetelet. Quetelet wished to obtain the type of the men 
of a country or of a race. This type is conceived as something 
really existing, and if we could know it otherwise (by revela-
tion, say,) we might use it to see which kind of average fits it, 
and thereby determine our choice of the average proper for 
this case. But as we can learn it only by first drav.rjng an 
average, the kind of average to use is not determinable in 
this way. We are thrown back on the other criterion 
provided us by Galileo and Nozzolini in their controversy. 
If the heights of men behave like estimates, the geometric 
average should be used. If they behave like gains and 
losses, the average to use is the arithmetic. The heights of 
men have one resemblance to estimates: they never fall to 
zero; but they are very different from estimates in another 
respect, in that they have never been found to exceed a 
certain figure, which is hardly more above the general run of 
human stature than the lowest recorded limit is below it. 
They come under the class, therefore, of things v.rith limits 
equidistant on the opposite sides; and the proper average 
to use for finding the typical or normal height of man would 
still seem to be the arithmetic. 
The last example discloses a defect in part of the reasoning 
above employed, which needs to be corrected. We have 
found the resemblance of these later examples to our definite 
models to consist in the behaviour, so to speak, of the terms. 
If they behave like the arithmetic terms around their average, 
or if they behave like the geometric terms around their 
average, the arithmetic or the geometric average is to be 
chosen accordingly. But this implies that we know the 
average already, which sometimes is contrary to the suppo-
sition; for in other cases, notably those of change or varia-
tion, knowledge of the total effect brings them under one of 
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the models. Now, in the last example we supplied for the 
average what we there called "the general run of human 
stature." This is something knowable when we have a large 
assortment of data. In mathematics it has been called, in 
our language, the "mode," which is a meaningless word. 
The German Fechner named it the" dichtester Wert," or the 
" thickest value" ; and it is a pity we have not some equally 
significant word-the "mean of greatest thickness" has 
been suggested, which, however, is too clumsy. But in the 
absence of a better word we must put up with this one. The 
mode, then, is found by arranging the quantities under 
treatment according to their sizes, and if, as is generally the 
case when great numbers are collected, they cluster most 
thickly around some one position, this is the mode. Now, it 
may be found that the numbers in the different groups of 
quantities thus alTanged taper off equally, or about equally, 
on each side of the mode. This is the behaviour of arith-
metic terms, and indicates that the arithmetic average of 
them should be employed. But it may also happen that they 
taper off more thinly and spread out more above than below 
the mode; and this is the way geometric t erms around their 
average behave. In theory, for arithmetic temls, if they be 
grouped in numbers that fall within certain equal intervals-
for instance, if the heights of men be measured only by inches, 
so that all heights falling say between 4 feet IIt inches and 
5 feet l inch are grouped together; then, on the supposition 
that the group just mentioned is found to be the mode for 
some people or race, the intervals equidistant above and 
helow it will contain equal numbers of items. But this will 
not be the case with geometric t el ms. To foml groups con-
taining as many items above as the corresponding groups 
contain below the mode, the upper intervals must be gradually 
enlarged as they recede from the mode. On the lower side, 
then, the intervals must be contracted, in order that they may 
still be equal geometlically. For instance, on the supposition 
that the stature of men followed the geometric arrangement, 
the mode remaining the same as before, if the lower interval 
around 2 feet 6 inches has shnmk to 2 feet 5~ inches--2 fee t 
6! inches, then the corresponding upper interval would have 
its position and bounds set thus: its lower bound = 2~' 
= 9 feet II inches, and its upper bound = 22i~ = 10 feet 
I inch approximately; so that this interval would be twice 
as far removed and four times broader. 
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What we have been doing, is to study the dispersion of 
the data, and we find that there may be an arithmetic and 
a geometric dispersion. IS The stature of men is found to 
conform rather to the arithmetic dispersion; and this is 
the reason why the arithmetic average is the proper one to 
use in averaging the heights of men (also for Quetelet's 
purpose). Were it possible to measure our mental capacities 
quantitatively with any exactness, Galton's investigations 
of human intelligence indicate that it more likely follows 
the geometric dispersion; for his researches disclose that 
men of the greatest genius are to men of mediocre ability as 
these are to idiots or witless men. 19 If this be so, the proper 
average for averaging degrees of intelligence would be the 
geometric. To prove that actuality conforms with theory 
in this subject, an infinite number of data would have to be 
collected. In practice not even a very large number, mathe-
matically speaking, is ever collected. The data actually 
collected, therefore, can be expected to conform only 
approximately with the theoretical requirements. If the 
mode in our collections agrees more closely with the arith-
metic average, this average should be employed; and the 
geometric, if it agrees more closely with the geometric. 
It may, however, happen that the mode can be only roughly 
outlined, and then if (as is likely) the two averages fall close 
together, the accuracy of the discrimination may be greatly 
impaired. It may also happen (which is not unlikely with 
a small assortment of data) that the dispersion is so irregular 
that no mode is discernible, or there may be no mode to 
discern, according to the nature of the SUbjects. Then this 
criterion has failed us, and we must do the best we can without 
any, employing analogy with known cases where we can, 
or else in practice adopting the most convenient average, 
which is the arithmetic. Instances are known in which 
two or more modes appear, which may be taken to indicate 
that the data belong to different species, e.g., to different 
18 By examining the behaviour of harmonic terms we might 
find also a harmonic dispersion. But with this we are not 
concerned. 
19 Cf. Hereditary Genius, end of Chapter Ill. Galton expresses 
the matter in an arithmetic progression; but his whole work 
shows that the progression is rather the geometric. When he 
wrote that work in r869, he had not knowledge of geometric 
dispersion. Cf. William James: "As the genius is to the 
vulgarian, so the vulgar human mind is to the intelligence of a 
brute," Psychology, Il. p. 348. 
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races of men, when their stature or other measurements are 
studied. 20 
Doubtful cases are of frequent occurrence in statistics . 
Statisticians frequently have to deal with ratios. Now, it 
might be thought that because, when we deal with d1jJerences, 
we must use the arithmetic average, therefore when we 
deal with ratios, we should always have to use the geometric 
average. But this is not necessarily so. If ratios express 
variations-increases or decreases,-then the geometric 
average must be used. Even in the case of human stature, 
if our object is to measure its growth, as in the case of a 
boy who has grown irregularly in five years from 4 feet to 
6 feet, the proper average of the individual rates of increase 
is the geometric. In other cases perhaps there is a pre-
sumption in favour of the geometric average; but necessary 
evidence is lacking. 
To study ratios, we must first of all distinguish them 
from mere fractions, since they are expressible in the same 
form as fractions. Fractions proper express the compara-
tive number of parts in a common whole. Ratios express 
the comparative relations between distinct quantities. 
With fractions there is no difficulty. If we have occasion 
to use the arithmetic average between 6, 8, and 9 inches, 
we still must use the arithmetic average between these 
quantities when expressed as fractions of a foot, viz. t, t, 
and!; and the result will be the same. But in social science 
there is need, among other things, of expressing the ratio 
of the annual deaths in a country's population to that 
population, thereby obtaining what is called the country's 
death-rate, which is usually taken to be the numerator when 
the denominator has been reduced to 1,000. Here the deaths 
are not parts of the population; wherefore the death-rate, 
though expressed in the form of a fraction, or as so many 
thousandths, is not a mere fraction, but is a ratio proper. 
Again, in anthropometry there is need of expressing the 
ratio of the breadth of the head to its length, which ratio, 
in a similar manner generally expressed as so many hun-
dredths, is called the cephalic index. Such cephalic indices 
as 70, 80, 90, and the like an~ not parts of 100, but they are 
relation'3 to 100. Now, evidently the death-rate must lie 
20 So Quetelet, op. cit., p. 143. Adolphe Bertillon has been 
able thereby to distinguish two races in the Department of Doubs, 
near the eastern border of France, La Thlorie des Moyennes en 
Statistique, in the Journal de la Societe de Statistique de Paris, 
1876, pp. 289-93· 
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between 0 ann I, or as usually expressed between 0 and 
r,ooo; fl)r the deaths cannot sink below zero and cannot 
rise above the population. As for the cephalic indices, it is 
conceivable that they might rise above roo, as we know 
no reason why the breadth (from right to left) of somebody's 
head should not be greater than its length (from front to 
back); but no such cases are found, nor are cases found of 
the cephalic index falling much below 60. Thus there are 
limits above and below, within which the death-rate and 
the cephalic indices range, the latter having only empirical 
limits, and the former having additional extreme limits. 
These cases, therefore, belong to the class where the proper 
average may be either the arithmetic or the geometric, 
according to the position of the mode in a large collection 
of such figures. Statisticians have not yet taken the trouble 
to find which of the two is the proper one, and perhaps 
many of their subjects will not yield clear results. They 
have by common consent adopted the arithmetic average, 
as being the easiest, like the butchers to whose example 
Nozzolini appealed. Moreover, at least in the case of 
cephalic indices, they have been bothered by having two 
different methods at their disposal. 
To calculate the cephalic indices of thousands of skulls, 
and then to draw the arithmetic average of them, is a labo-
rious task. To shorten the labour, many anthropologists 
have adopted the method of adding together all the breadths 
and all the lengths, and of then drawing the ratio between 
these as the one common or average ratio of the lot. This, 
however, gives a slightly different result from the preceding, 
sometimes above, sometimes below, though it may some-
times agree. Bertillon has given instances. Using only 
two skulls for simplicity, he pointed out that if the one is 
r80 mm. broad and 200 long, and the other II2 broad and 
r60 long, the index of the former is 90 and of the latter 70, 
between which the arithmetic mean is 80; but if we 
divide the sum of the breadths by the sum of the lengths, 
292 by 360, and multiply by 100, we obtain for the mean 
index a higher figure, 8I·I. Again, if the one has the measure-
ments 144 and 160, and the other 140 and 200, the indices 
are likewise 90 and 70, with the mean at 8o; but if we 
divide their combined breadths 284 by their combined 
lengths 360, and multiply by roo, we obtain for the mean 
index a lower figure, 79. Lastly, if the measurements be 
144 and 180, and 136 and 193, yielding the same indices 
and the same mean, the latter method also yields the me;! n 
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index 80. The proper method, Bertillon asserts, is to average 
the indices separately, in the first way; for then, he says, 
their dispersion can be studied. 21 I t would seem more 
correct to say that we should obtain as many indices sepa-
rately calculated as we can, and by arranging them in the 
order of their magnitudes study their dispersion for the 
purpose, first of ail, of discovering which .is the proper 
average to draw. It might be found that the proper average 
is not the arithmetic, which Bertillon has simply assumed, 
but the geometric. In the instances cited the geometric 
mean between 90 and 70 is 79'3, which perhaps is the best of 
all.22 But in practice the geometric average, even with the 
aid of logarithms, is a very troublesome one. Therefore 
even if it were the theoretically correct one, it might be 
advisable in practice to employ one of the other two methods, 
since these in practice give results very slightly different 
not only from each other but from the geometric average. 
Still, as the true one, the geometric average could serve 
as a norm for deciding between the other two; for" mathe-
maticians and anthropologists," says one of the most recent 
writers on statistics, "difier as to which method is more 
correct. "23 What, then, should be done? 
. a' a" aliI . . . 
Letting l}' b'" b"" . . . represent the cephalIC mdIces 
(in their original form) of n number of skulls, we express the 
three methods in these three formulre : 
I (a' a" a'" ) 11, l} + b" + F' + . . . to n terms , (a) 
a' + a" + a"' + . to n terms 
b' + b" + b"' + ... to n terms' (b) 
n I a' a" a"' V l} . b" . b'" ... to n terms, ( c) 
The first is the simple arithmetic average of the several 
ratios, and the third is the simple geometric average of them. 
The second is of a rather recondite nature. It can be shown 
to be two things and very approximately a third thing. 
21 La Theorie des Moyennes en Statistique, pp . 304-5. 
22 Indeed, the cephalic indices go, 80, 70, etc., have a resem-
blance to the lesson-marks of school-children, which, we have 
seen in Note 5, ought to be averaged geometrically. 
23 Zizek, Statistical Averages, W. M. Persons's translation, New 
York, I913, p. 19_ 
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(r) It is the weighted arithmetic average of the ratios with 
weights according to the figures in the denominators; for 
it is equal to 
a' 
p 
a" a"' 
b' + lI' . b" + V" . b"' + ... 
b' + b" + bill + ... (d) 
which is the formula for such a weighted average. (2) It is 
the weighted harmonic average of the ratios with weights 
according to the figures in the numerators; for it is equal to 
at a" a"' 
a'/b' + a" /b" + alii /b"' + . 
a' + a" + a'II + ... 
(e) 
which is the formula for such a weighted harmonic average. 
And (3) it can be shown, both by theory and by trial, to be 
in ordinary cases very approximately equal to this formula, 
"Z vOJ,/ (~) Va'b' (all) va"~" (alII) va'"b''' V b' . b" . bill ... (f) 
which is the weighted geometric average of the ratios with 
weights according to the geometric means of both the 
numerators and the denominators in the individual ratios. 24 
I( is of course also equal to 
!-. (a' + a" + a"' + .. . to n terms) 
n 
~ (b ' + b" + bill + ... to n terms) n 
which is the ratio of the arithmetic average of the numerators 
to the arithmetic average of the denominators: something 
which need not further concern us, any more than the fact 
that the third is equal to 
V~a~I---a~II-.--a~II~I-.---.-t~o--n~t-e-rm--s 
Vb' . b" . b"'. . to n terms 
2i It should be noted. that if we change the figures in some of 
the ratios, or in all of them differently, but without altering the 
.. • 2 r xa a 
ratios themselves (substltutmg for mstance4 forz ' or xb forb , 
and the like, but variously), this mere c9ange of the figr~s does 
not affect the result in the first and thIrd formul<e, but It does 
affect the result in the second, since it alters the weights of the 
ratios differently. Again, of course, if all the figures are changed 
in the same proportio?, no effect on the result is produced even 
in the second; for weIghts are relative. 
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which is the ratio of the geometric average of the numerators 
to the geometric average of the denominators. The first 
three facts have generally not been recognised by mathe-
matical statisticians, if even by mathematicians. Fechner, 
for instance, has named the second formula the " summary 
mean," as if it were something distinct from the other 
means, although he perceived that in it the ratios with 
greater figures have greater weight. 25 It is extremely 
important that the true nature of this expression should be 
recognised. 
Now, in the case of the cephalic indices, when the second 
method is employed, leaving aside the fact that its advocates 
are employing, quite unconsciously, the harmonic average 
of the ratios weighted according to the breadths of the heads, 
and also (approximately) the geometric average of them 
with weights combining the breadths and the lengths, but 
confining our attention to the arithmetic average, we see 
that they are really using this average of the ratios weighted 
according to the lengths of the heads! Evidently there is 
no rhyme or reason for using such weighting as this. But 
if the arithmetic average itself is a wrong one for the case, 
perhaps it with a wrong weighting may give a better result 
than it would give with the right weighting, since two 
26 Kollektivmasslehre, 1897, pp. 164, 353, 357. On pp . 35~1 
Fechner compared the second formula with the third; but it 
did not occur to him to compare it with f. Likewise Walras, 
making no inquiry into weighting, distinguished a formula for 
index-numbers of prices like the second, as a " multiple-standard 
combination," from methods of averaging price-valiations 
arithmetically or geometrically, as if it were something distinct, 
D' une M itlwde de Regularisation de la Valeur de la M onnaie, 
pp. 15-16 of the offprint from the Bulletin, Vol. XXI., of the 
Societe Vaudoise des Sciences Naturelles, 1885. And many other 
economists have done the same. Even the mathematician 
Cauchy, in his Cours d'Analyse, 1821, Vol. I. , 1st theorem, 
although he demonstrated that the above second formula is an 
average of the given ratios, yet did not point out what kind of an 
average it is. This was done in The Measurement oj General 
Exchallge- Value, pp. 504, 5Il, 519 (resting the proof of the 
approximation of formula j to formulre b, d, and e on the fact that 
the geometric average is always less than the arithmetic and 
greater than the harmonic, between the same terms with the 
same weights). But already Professor Irving Fisher had noticed, 
in connection with price-variations, the identity of b with d only, 
The Role oj Capital in Economic Theory, Economic Journal, 
December, 1897, pp. 517, 520. 
P.E. D 
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wron~s may neutralise each other, while one wrong alone 
remams wrong. We shall have occasion for this remark 
later, whether it be applicable here or not. What statis-
ticians should do, therefore, is to find whether the simple 
geometric average is the right one for these cases, and if it 
is, then let mathematicians find which of the two practical 
methods gives results in the long run closer to the results 
given by the geometric average; and if it should turn out 
to be the second method, the second method should be 
adopted, in spite of its curious weighting, for practical pur-
poses. Or if it turns out that the simple arithmetic average 
is the right one, even then the second method may continue 
to be used, as the most convenient, and not appreciably 
erroneous for ordinary practice. At all events statisticians 
will then know exactly what they are doing. 
Thus the theoretically true method, even though not 
adopted in practice, may serve as a guide to practice. It 
is only by first getting the theoretically true method that 
we can know how near to it our practical methods come. 
The theoretically true method, therefore, is important, even 
though we do not employ it in practice. 26 
26 In De Morgan's Essay on Probab1:lities, 1838, pp. 156-7, 
occurs a curious passage with regard to the death-rate and 
similar ratios (which he speaks of simply as "fractions "). 
Different calculations of the death-rate may give different results, 
which need to be averaged. He supposes three such results to be 
12, 13, and 17, or in decimals 0'6, 0'591, and 0'567. The simple 20 22 30 
arithmetic average of these is 0'586, and their average by the 
second formula above, which he did not recognise as an arithmetic 
average with weights according to the .denominators (the deaths), 
is 0'583, being smaller merely because It happens that the smaller 
ratios have received the greater weights. Then he asserts that 
neither of these is right, and the right (or most probable) result is 
obtained by multiplying each numerator and denominator by 
the denominator and dividing the sum of the new numerators by 
the sum of the new denominators, which in this case gives 0'581, 
being still smaller for th~ s3;me. reason ~nhanced. Now tI:is, 
though he did not recogmse It, IS the anth~ehc average WIth 
weights according to the squares of. the .denommators (the deaths). 
No reason is apparent for such welghtmg, any more than for the 
weighting in the second average. Note that if the calculations 
of the deaths and of the population were made by six different 
operators, the ratios can be combined in six different ways 
12 13 17 
(e .g., one other would be 22' 30' and 20)' and each of the three 
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The upshot of this inquiry into averages is the discovery 
of two criteria for their use, the second of which has some 
subdivisions. The first criterion is a known result, with 
which the mean or average must agree. The second criterion 
comes into play when the result is the object sought, and it 
consists in a resemblance between the ways the t erms behave 
and the ways terms behave around arithmetic and geometric 
averages when these are known. H ere there are three 
different ways of behaviour: either (r) the terms extend 
both above and below without any conceivable or assignable 
limits, and then the arithmetic average must be used; or 
(2) there is a definite lower limit at or above zero and no 
upper conceivable or assignable limit, and then the geo-
metric is the right one to use; or (3) the t erms either cannot, 
or at least so far as we find in experience do not, fall below 
some figure, and do not, or cannot, rise above some other 
figure, which two figures serve as limits either necessary in 
the nature of the things or found in practice to exist; and 
then, when enough data are provided for examining their 
orderly dispersion, if their mode is found nearer to the arith-
metic average, the arithmetic average is the proper one to 
use, and if their mode is found nearer to the geometric 
average, the geometric average is the proper one to use; or 
else this criterion fails, and we are left to be guided by 
analogy or by convenience. 
It is important to note that the examination of the dis-
averages just used would most likely give a different result in each 
case. But if we use the simple geometric average, it is indifferent 
which combination be used, the same result being given in all. 
This result for the above figures is 0·58S. Another peculiarity of 
De Morgan's treatment of this matter is that he offers the method 
he so dogmatically recommends, as " the method of least squares" 
(and so again in his article on Least Squares in the Penny Encyclo-
pcedia and in his Theory of Probabilities, § r24, in the Encyclopcedia 
Metropohtana, Vol. n ., p. 452), although it is the fust average 
(the simple arithmetic) which always gives the least sum of the 
squares of the residual errors in such cases, while the method he 
recommends gives, in this case, the greatest sum of all! What his 
method does, is to give the least sum of the squares, not of the 
errors simply, but of the errors multiplied by the denominators. 
This, however, may be argued for on the analogy of the reduction 
of errors in measuring, say, a mile; for here we do not draw the 
arithmetic average of the errorS expressed as fractions of a mile, 
but of the errors expressed absolutely (or as those fractions 
multiplied by their denominators). But it is questionable whether 
this analogy holds. 
D2 
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persion for this purpose is needed only in these last ambiguous 
cases. If the data behave in either of the first two ways, 
the average is determined by the second criterion with as 
much certainty as it is by the first criterion, and there is no 
need of reference to the mode in their dispersion. Take for 
instance the second model above given: if all the lOO rates 
of increase that have contributed to the doubling of the 
population in a century were known, we could arrange them 
in the order of their magnitudes and find the number of 
rates falling in each magnitude, and it might turn out that 
they exhibited the geometric dispersion; but if they did 
not, we should still use the geometric average for finding the 
average annual rate of increase. And it is quite possible 
that with so small a total number of terms as lOO, their 
dispersion would not contain a clearly defined mode, or one 
nearer to the geometric than to the arithmetic average; 
but we have no concern whatever it may happen to be. The 
same certainty as to the appropriateness of the geometric 
average appertains to the fourth model, and likewise to the 
case of estimates-the estimates we have so far been dealing 
with,-although this belongs under the second criterion. 
It is possible that if a thousand persons should independently 
estimate the length of a given line, we might find their 
estimates to fall in geometric dispersion. But it is not 
necessary to wait for this experiment before deciding that 
the geometric average is the proper one for averaging esti-
mates of this sort. The appeal to the mode in the dispersion 
of the data is only a last resort in dubious cases-and of 
course only in case of sufficient importance to make it worth 
while. 
ESTIMATES AND OBSERVATIONS. 
Coming back to estimates and their errors, we must note 
first of all that the word" estimate" is used in two different 
meanings. In the one meaning it refers to valuations men-
tally made, or drawn at sight or by the aid of other senses-
in short, to guesses, at least to such as are made with care. 
In the other meaning an estimate is a measurement, or the 
result of many measurements, or in astronomy they are 
observations, since astronomical observations are frequently 
accompanied by measurements. And the errors committed 
in these two kinds of estimates may be distinguished as 
errors of estimation and errors of observation, the former 
being errors of guesses, the latter errors of measurements. 
I 
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Errors of estimation are the ones we have been dealing with, 
and Galileo has shown that they must themselves be measured 
or estimated geometrically. But errors of observation are 
entirely different: they must be measured arithmetically. 
For, although the former can and do go much further above 
than below the true position, the latter need not deviate 
more above than below. Surveyors in measuring and re-
measuring a given distance, say about a mile, let them 
measure it no matter how carefully, never get results that 
are not slightly discrepant, within limits of at least a few 
inches; but there is no reason to suppose their errors are 
more above than below the true distance; 27 wherefore 
when they average their measurements in order to eliminate 
their errors as much as possible, they very properly use 
the arithmetic average. These considerations show that 
while estimates proper are to be averaged geometrically, 
measurements are to be averaged arithmetically. If you 
measure a line with instruments many times, you should 
use the arithmetic average of the measurements; if you 
estimate a line by the eye many times, you should use the 
geometric average of the estimates. 
Whether Galileo had occasion to draw an average between 
different observations of the same quantity, and which 
average he used, it is not easy to gather from his works; 
but there is one passage which indicates that he would not 
have hesitated to use the arithmetic average. In his 
Dialogues, published in r632, near the beginning of the 
third, he maintains that in adjusting various discordant 
calculations of the distance from the earth of a new star, 
27 In measuring a line with a ruler our errors, so far as caused 
by the expansion or contraction of the ruler under changes of 
temperature, may be greater in excess than in defect, because 
expansion and contraction are subject to the geometric scheme, 
since there is an absolute zero temperature and no superior limit. 
But our position in the heat scale is so high compared with the 
variations to which our rulers are exposed, that the difference in 
their expansion and contraction above and below the standard 
chosen is infinitesimally small and quite negligible. For a similar 
reason, if whenever we look at a thermometer we fir5t guess the 
temperature, our guesses would probably be no greater (appre-
ciably) above than below the true figure. Here we should be 
practically aiming, so to speak, at a single mark, the other end 
of the scale being out of our experience; wherefore the arithmetic 
average should be used of such guesses. Thus guesses also are 
of a two-fold nature. 
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based on twelve observations in different latitudes, the most 
probable result is obtained by retaining all the observations 
and by employing the smallest possible emendations that 
will bring them into agreement; and he based the last on 
the consideration that the errors of the observers were as 
likely to be above as below the truth, and as great on the 
one side as on the other, and more likely small than great. 28 
All these assumptions underlie the principle of using the 
arithmetic average in correcting observations. But whatever 
his practice or want of it, his successors soon had to employ 
an average in reducing their observations, and they rightly 
adopted the arithmetic average. And they used the arith-
metic average so much, and their example was followed 
by civil engineers and others to such an extent, that it came 
to be forgotten that there were or might be cases that call 
for the geometric average. 29 The suitableness of the geo-
metric average for estimates proper seems to have been 
re-discovered in I879 by Galton. Galton started from 
Weber's law, which had twenty years before been thoroughly 
elaborated by Fechner. Because nerves react, from a certain 
initial position (after crossing the threshold of consciousness) 
in arithmetic progression as the stimuli increase in geometric 
progression, Galton argued that our estimates of weights 
by handling bars, or of shades of colour by looking at them, 
should be averaged geometrically. He remarked that" the 
ordinary law of frequency of error based on the arithmetic 
mean," which" asserts that deviations in excess must be 
balanced by deviations of equal magnitude in deficiency," 
requires that" if the former be greater than twice the mean 
itself, the latter must be less than zero, that is, must be 
negative"; but "this is an impossibility in many cases, 
to which the law is nevertheless applied by statisticians 
with no small success, so long as they are content to confine 
its application within a narrow range of deviation." He 
would, therefore, extend the use of the geometric average 
to sociological subjects as well,30 thus reversing the course 
28 Opere, Vol. II. pp. 302 A and B, 3II, and 3I2 A. 
29 The want of knowledge of the distinction between errors of 
observation and errors of estimation is especially conspicuous in 
the opening passage of Chapter VII. of De Morgan's Essay on 
Probabilities. 
30 The Geometric Mean in Vital and Social Statistics, in Pro-
ceedings of the Royal Society, I879, XXIX. pp. 366-;. Galton 
won precedence by a narrow margin; for, apparently in inde-
pendence of him, the next year in Italy, in a paper on Il Calcolo 
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of history, since Weber's law of vital phenomena had received 
its first hint from Bernoulli in the field of sociology and 
economics. Galton was followed by Professor Edgeworth, 
who a few years later wrote: "The estimates which different 
persons (or the same person at different times) might make 
of a certain weight would be likely to err more in excess 
than in defect of the true weight, and in such wise as to 
render the geometric mean of such a series of estimates 
the proper method of reduction." 31 But the re-discovery 
has not yet made its way into general recognition and 
acceptance. 32 
dei Valori Medii e le sue A pplicaziolti statistiche, in the A rchivio 
di Statistica, Anno V., 1880, also as a pamphlet, Rome, 1883, 
pp. 31-5, Messedaglia reviewed the Galileo-Nozzolini controversy, 
and accepted Nozzolini's solution for the purpose of measuring 
gain and loss in buying and selling and Galileo's for the purpose 
of measuring the precision of estimates, since estimation can err 
with equal facility more in excess than in defect; and immediately 
thereupon he noticed the distinction between this proper geometric 
way of measuring estimates and the usual arithmetic way of 
measuring observations, and explained it by the subjectivity of 
the former and the objectivity of the latter, and also by invoking 
Fechner's exposition of Weber's law. But there Messedaglia 
left the subject. 
31 Memorandum to the first Report of the Committee on Index-
Numbers of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science, published in the Report of the Fifty-seventh (1887) 
Meeting of the Association, 1888, p. 283. Again, in his Memo-
randum to the second Report of the Committee, in the Asso-
ciation's Report of the Fifty-ninth (1889) Meeting, 1890, p. 201, 
alluding to a hypothetical error in certain data of 25 per cent., he 
adds in a parenthesis" (an error which, it possible in excess, is 
almost inconceivable in defect)." He could not, however, find 
proof of geometric dispersion in examination-marks, although he 
expected it there, and suggested the use of the geometric average 
for averaging the marks of different subjects, The Statistics of 
Examinations, in the Journal of the Royal Statist-ical Society, 
September, 1888, pp. 607, 625-
32 An example illustrating how the distinction continues to be 
overlooked is furnished by Merrirnan, who in his text-book on 
The Method of Least Squares, § 138 (still in the latest revised 
edition, 19II), sets a problem about 1,600 persons guessing the 
contents of a vessel, and after giving the (presumably arithmetic) 
average of their guesses expects his students to solve a question 
in connection therewith in the same way as all the other problems 
in the book, all the others being about observations or measure-
ments. 
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We, however, having seen abundant reason provided 
by Galileo and Nozzolini, for this distinction, are in a posi-
tion to accept it unreservedly. And now some further 
study of the difference between the behaviour of observa-
tions, dispersing arithmetically, and of estimates proper, 
dispersing geometrically, needs to be made. 
Galton gave this subject to the mathematician Dr. 
McAlister to work out mathematically, which was done, 
and the result was published in sequence to Galton's own 
paper, under the title of The Law of the Geometric Mean. 
Whether Dr. McAlister performed the task completely 
and satisfactorily, does not appear to have been examined 
by other mathematicians. It cannot be examined here. 
All that can be done is to note the difference between 
the curve of observations and the curve of estimates. 
t'· 
t 
FIG.!. 
For by representing obser-
vations and estimates as 
abscissce and their fre-
quency as ordinates, a 
curve may be drawn; and 
such a curve, in the case 
of observations, is well 
known because of its bell-
shape or resemblance to a 
gendarme's hat. It is more 
or less elongated accord-
ing to the accuracy of the 
observations. A common form of it is shown in Fig. 1. 
It is a symmetrical curve around the axis drawn vertically 
upon the point t, which represents the true magnitude, 
so drawn that the horizontal lines relate to each other 
thus: 
at = tb; 
for these lines represent, on each side of the axis, the amounts 
of the errors, which in the case of errors of observations are 
assumed to be equal on both sides of the true magnitude. 
This magnitude t is a distance from some point on the base 
line to the left, which need not be indicated in the figure, 
because it has no influence on the proportions of the curve. 
But in drawing the curve of estimates it is necessary to intro-
duce this point (with its vertical line), because all the esti-
mates have reference to it. The curve of estimates will 
therefore be like that drawn in Fig. 2, on the supposition 
that the errors in defect of the true magnitude are somewhat 
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like those in the preceding case. The difference now shows 
itself most strikingly in the curve on the right side of the 
axis, since on this side are represented the errors in excess, 
which extend as much beyond the true magnitude as the 
errors in defect fall short of it, proportionally to 0, having the 
relation 
oa : ot = ot : ob. 
It will be noticed that, in Fig. 2, if the magnitude which 
is estimated be enlarged by pushing the zero point further 
to the left, then, on the supposition that the curve on the 
left remains the same by the estimates becoming more 
accurate, the curve on the right will be drawn in toward 
o' ~--------------------~~--~~ 
O~------------------~--~--r..-+----~ 
o 
FIG. 2. 
the axis, and if that magnitude be increased infinitely by 
removing the zero point altogether, the curve on the right 
will become in all its points equidistant from the axis as the 
curve on the left, reducing the whole to the same symmetrical 
shape as in Fig. I; for now we have virtually changed the 
estimates into observations around a single point, having 
done away with any reference to the line ot, and having only 
the position of t to consider.33 In observations, it is true, 
we always measure some magnitude ot, but on examining 
our instruments in the neighbourhood of t, as also in com-
paring our observations afterward, we have no use for the 
line ot; but in forming and comparing estimates we must 
always keep the reference to the line ot. An estimate, in 
fact, is always a ratio, since it has no meaning except in 
relation to the true magnitude (determined by measure-
ment); but a measurement has independent validity, since 
33 Cf. above/note 27. 
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it can be corrected only by another measurement. 34 Com-
mon parlance bears out this distinction; for we mostly 
dissociate errors of measurement from the magnitude 
measured, but in en-ors of estimation we always relate the 
errors to the magnitude estimated.35 
We have seen above that in theory the dispersion around 
the mode, which in the figures is obviously the axis, gives 
equal numbers of items at corresponding intervals on each 
side, the difference between the arithmetic and geometric 
dispersions consisting in the fact that in the former the 
intervals are equal in breadth, but in the latter the intervals 
above (to the right) are broader than the intervals below 
(to the left) and progressively so as they depart from the 
mode. 36 In the case of observations we must suppose 
34 Although a measurement does not give the exactly 
true magnitude, it is so much more precise than an estimate, 
that its indication is always conceived as the true magni-
tude in comparison with the estimate. Similarly, however, 
measurements made with a rough instrument can have their 
average controlled by measurements made with a more precise 
instrument. "We can appeal from kitchen scales to an 
atomic balance," as Professor Edgeworth has well said, in 
the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, September, r888, 
p. 60!. 
35 We may add the curve of harmonic dispersion: 
o'~------------------~~~~~ 
O"I---------------~,(_+~/__:_,,--+_----=~ 
o~I---__________ ~~~+--~--+_----~------=~~~ 
o 
FIG. 3. 
This must be drawn so that 
oa : ob = ot - oa : ob - ot ; 
'f .. b oa X ot Th . whence, 1 oa IS glVen, 0 = t' e figure gives the pro-
20a - 0 
portions correctly, but cannot vouch for either side separately. 
36 In the calculus of the probabilities of errors of observation 
use is made for various purposes of the areas contained between 
the base and vertical lines and the curve, because the observa-
tions are equally distributed on both sides. As this is not the 
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(r) that errors are equally likely to be above as below the 
true magnitude, so that in the long run there will be an 
equal nwnber of them on opposite sides of the true position, 
and (2) that equal errors are equally likely on the opposite 
sides. "Ve must believe these two things because we have 
no reason for the contrary, and because the supposition is 
supported by experience of the fact that in large numbers 
of observations so-called residual (or reputed) errors do so 
behave around the average of the observations. 3 ? In the 
case of estimation the first supposition still holds: we have 
no reason to believe that estimates will be more numerous 
on one side of the true position than on the other. But in 
estimates the second supposition must be interpreted as 
referring to geometric equality, or else be stated in the form 
that greater errors in excess are equally as numerous as the 
(arithmetically) lesser errors in defect to which they (geo-
metrically) correspond. As for the first supposition, which 
is unequivocally common to them both, this involves that 
the mode must coincide with what is called the" median," 
or midmost item in the series, and both the mode and the 
median must coincide with either the arithmetic average, 
in arithmetic dispersion (of observations), or with the geo-
metric average, in geometric dispersion (of estimates). 
This, remember, is the theoretical requirement. But the 
theory itself requires that this condition shall be fulfilled 
only in an infinite series. Short of infinity, the theory 
declares that it will be very closely obeyed in a very large 
series or collection of data, and that the discrepancy of fact 
from the theoretical condition will increase as the number of 
the data collected decreases. In practice, therefore, we 
cannot expect the arithmetic average in its proper subjects 
or the geometric average in its proper subjects in every 
particular case exactly, and in some cases even approxi-
mately, to conform to the mode and still less to the median; 
or, which is the same statement reversed, we cannot expect 
the mode or the median to coincide exactly with the proper 
average of the subjects, or even with each other. Now, when 
they do not coincide, it is these averages, the arithmetic 
case in geometric dispersion, in which the estimates are pro-
gressively thinner from the left to the right, no such use can be 
made of the areas in calculating the probabilities of errors of 
estimation. 
37 Residual errors are not true errors; but their behaviour in 
conformity with the theory of true errors adds inferential strength 
to the theory. 
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and the geometric, each in its proper subjects, which are 
the summarising quantities, the single ones that may stand 
for and take the place of the manifold quantities, because 
yielding the same numerical results as they yield, or the 
indicative quantities, as yielding most nearly what we wish 
our calculations to yield (this last may be affirmed on the 
analogy of the first); and it is not the mode or the median 
that can serve these purposes of the averages. The mode, 
and the median too, can serve, in dubious cases (and only 
in such is their service needed), to help us find which of 
the two averages is the correct one to use; and then their 
work is done. They cannot be properly used to oust and 
to replace those other averages. Yet in practice, since the 
mode and the median diverge as a rule but slightly from 
the proper averages, they can, and have been, used for 
convenience in their place (just as the arithmetic average 
has been used in place of the geometric); but with them, 
on the whole, the saving of labour is so small, and they. 
especially the median, are so capricious, that it is poor 
policy on the part of statisticians to recommend their 
use. 38 
8S That is, as substitutes of the other averages; for they may 
serve other purposes. It may be questioned whether even 
mathematicians have done well in choosing the median of the 
errors to measure the" probable error" in observations, instead 
of the arithmetic average of the errors. The fact that in a series 
of observations there are as many errors beyond as within a 
certain error does not import that in a repetition of observations 
the errors will fall equally around that one rather than around 
the arithmetic average of the previous errors; and the fact that 
mathematicians have chosen the arithmetic average of all the 
observations to get the one most probably true, would seem to 
require them to use the same average to get the error most likely 
to be exceeded and to be fallen short of. Otherwise they might 
as well have chosen the median of the observations as giving the 
most probable true value; for they could have argued thus: 
The observations hitherto made are equally numerous on each 
side of a certain magnitude, therefore it is probable they will 
continue to be equally numerous around that magnitude; but 
it is probable that observations fall in equal numbers on opposite 
sides of the true magnitude; therefore that (median) magnitude 
is most probably the true magnitude. But they do not argue 
this way in this case. Then why should they argue so in the 
other? But of course, as they have almost unanimously chosen 
to use the median for the" probable error," too little advantage 
could be obtained to make the change advisable. 
AVERAGES AND ERRORS 45 
Still another point 'with respect to observations and esti-
mates, especially the former, needs to be cleared up before 
we pass on. When dealing with the criteria of averages, 
we could not speak of the criterion of the average proper 
for observations without anticipating the distinction here 
drawn between them and estimates; and now having drawn 
tllis distinction, there is need of reverting to the criteria 
of the averages proper in them. The criterion of the geo-
metric average proper for estimates-that it must be used 
of them because they have a lower limit and no upper limit 
and consequently disperse more above than below their 
mode-has never been disputed, since it has rarely been 
considered at all. But in the case of observations, the 
criterion enjoining the arithmetic average because their 
limits are equidistant from their mode and consequently 
they disperse equally above and below, has apparently 
been thought too simple; for something else has sometimes 
been put in its place. 
Errors of observation have been found to disperse them-
selves around their mode or median like the chances of 
black and white balls coming out together in various com-
binations, from half-and-half up to all-of-one-kind, from 
an urn containing an infinite number of black and white 
balls in equal proportion-a condition which can be pro-
duced by putting the ball back in the urn after every draw, 
as then there is no limit to the drawing. Mathematicians 
have investigated the law of such chances, and have found 
them to agree with the numbers in one of the lines of Pascal's 
arithmetical triangle and with the co-efficients in the develop-
ment of a binomial raised to a power equal to the number of 
balls in the combination; and Gauss discovered the formula 
of the curve following the dispersion of these combinations 
around the central most probable half-and-half combina-
tion. And the law of such combinations, transposed, has 
been called the" law of error." It is a pity it has been called 
so, because it really is a law of chances, and it is a law of 
error only in a different way. It is a law of chances, sub-
jectively, belonging to chances, as resulting from the con-
sideration of chances; while it is a law of error only objec-
tively, as governing errors, because these, when accidental 
and unbiassed, can be conceived as resembling even chances. 
It is, too, a law of only one kind of errors, whereas we have 
seen that there are two kinds, and the other is not subject 
to this law. The law of the one kind of errors was originally 
worked out for astronomical observations, which in practice 
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conform to the law of chances; for as measurements they 
in the long run fall equally and equidistantly on both 
sides of their mode, and their small reSIdual errors are more 
frequent than their large residual errors. The latter fact 
is not essential to the propriety of applying to them the 
arithmetic average; but the former fact is. The fact that 
the limits of errors of observations are equidistant on 
opposite sides of the true position, is the whole and sole 
justification for the application of the arithmetic average 
to observations and their errors. 
Now, this conception of the subject has not always been 
entertained; for another justification or so-called proof of 
the propriety of the arithmetic average for this purpose 
has been thought to be supplied by what is known as a 
" doctrine, principle, or method of least squares." Observa-
tions of a single magnitude are reduced by the simple arith-
metic average. But two or more magnitudes often have 
a definite relation to each other, as for instance the internal 
angles of a triangle, which together must equal two right 
angles, so that when surveyors measure the three angles of 
such a figure they know what the sum of their measurements 
ought to be. Or, again, two ways of measuring the same' 
thing ought to agree, as when the elevation of a place above 
the sea is measured from another place the elevation of 
which has been measured, and then is measured from a 
second place the elevation of which has been measured, 
these two sets of measurements ought to agree. Such 
measurements (individually made with several observations 
reduced by their arithmetic average) hardly ever do agree 
or fit together exactly. Therefore they need to be adjusted 
by correcting, obviously not one of them alone, but all of 
them. In such adjustments an average cannot be used. 
But the arithmetic average has three properties-this 
may be said notwithstanding that one of them belongs to 
it only as it agrees with the median. (r) The sum of the 
differences between the arithmetic average and all the items 
above it is equal to the sum of the differences between it 
and all the items below it (or the algebraic sum of all the 
differences is zero). (2) The sum of the differences between 
the median (and consequently the arithmetic average so 
far as it agrees with the median) and all the items, taken 
absolutely, is a minimum. (3) The sum of the squares of 
the differences between the arithmetic average and all the 
items is a minimum. Each of these properties of the arith-
metic average (or the median) can be used in adjustments; 
AVERAGES AND E RRORS 47 
for the aim may be to make the differences required by the 
con-ections to behave in anyone of these three ways. 
Reversely, when any of these methods of adjusting the 
measurements of several magnitudes is applied to the many 
observations of a single magnitude, it reduces to the arith-
metic average (or in one case to the median); so that the 
arithmetic average is safe in any case (except that in the 
second it depends upon its agreement with the median). 
Legendre and Gauss discovered the third method. Before 
them the first had mostly been used, even by Laplace, who, 
after Legendre's publication of the third method in 1806, 
adopted and elaborated it . Which is the best, or the most 
probable? A good illustrative example has been given by 
Whewel1. He supposed a quantity known to increase 
unifonnly (as the rising of a star) to be observed at equal 
intervals, and the measurements to be, say, 4 1/8, 12, 
14 1/8. These must be reduced to an arithmetic progression, 
and he instances three, viz., 6, 10, 14, and 4, 9, 14, and 
5, 10, IS. In the first the differences between the measure-
ments and the con-ected figures (that is, the reputed or 
residual en-ors) are such that their algebraic sum is zero ; 
in the second, their absolute sum is the least of the three; 
in the third, the sum of their squares is the least. 39 The 
first con-ection implies that the observer has made two large 
en-ors and one very small one; the second, that he has 
made one very large error and two very small ones; the 
third, that he has made one large error and two small ones. 
Obviously, on the assumption (always required) that all 
the observations were made with equal care,40 the last 
distribution of errors is the most probable one. Here is a 
conjunction of the most probable result with the least 
squares. If mathematicians can prove that this conjunction 
is not accidental here, but is necessary, occurring in all 
possible cases, they prove the method of least squares. In 
effect, the method of least squares introduces a more even 
low range of corrections, rather than many very small ones 
and a few great ones; and so it conforms with the assump-
tion that equally careful observations are more likely to 
contain small than large errors. But mostly the mathe-
99 PhiloSOPhy of the Inductive Sciences, 2nd ed., Vol. II. pp. 
408-g. The figures are slightly altered. 
(0 If the observations were made with unequal care, they would 
have to be given unequal weights; and then the three methods 
require that the sums of the differences so weighted should behave 
as stated; which is only an extension of the simple case. 
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matical proofs have rested upon a mathematical need of 
converting negative errors or negative observations into 
positive quantities, which can be done first by squaring 
them; which need goes back to the formula of the curve 
around the Y-axis, since in it there must be a square the 
root of which can be both positive and negative,4l All this 
is not very convincing. But all the proofs have presupposed 
the very kind of dispersion which calls for the arithmetic 
average. Herschel criticised Gauss for basing his proof 
of the method of least squares upon the use of the arithmetic 
average in reducing observations of a single magnitude, 
which, he says, is a "a thing to be demonstrated, not 
assumed." He then proceeded to give a proof of his own, 
and based it upon three assumptions, the third of which was 
the very assumption upon which the use of the arithmetic 
average in reducIng observations of a single magnitude directly 
rests.42 Others have argued that because the method of least 
squares is applicable to cases to which the arithmetic average 
is not applicable, and because wherever the arithmetic 
average is applied, there the method of least squares is ipso 
facto also applied, therefore the method of least squares is 
the more comprehensive, and the proof of it is the desired 
and long-missing proof of the arithmetic· average. 43 They 
_ forget that either of the other methods likewise comprehends 
the use of the arithmetic average (at least the first directly, 
and the second through the median). The arithmetic 
average, on the other hand, comprehends all these three 
methods (or at least two of them). Each of them, therefore, 
is only denotatively more comprehensive than it, while it 
is connotatively more comprehensive than either of them. 
41 The figures given above are curves of observations and 
estimates, all positive, and the Y-axis, or zero origin of the abscissre, 
is on the left, and the secondary axis erected on t is the axis of 
the true position of the magnitude observed or estimated. But 
as curves of errors (in which form Fig. I is generally given), the 
axis t is the Y-axis, or zero point of no error, the errors to the 
right being positive and those to the left negative. It is to fit 
this conception of the curve that Gauss's formula for errors of 
observation was invented. 
u Essays, 1857, pp. 397, 398. 
as "There is no doubt Whatever," says Jevons, "that the 
method of means [i.e., the use of the arithmetic average] is only 
an application of the method of least squares," Principles of 
Science, 3rd ed., p. 386. Cf. Venn, Logic of Chance, 2nd ed., 
p. 336 n. 
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They forget, too, that the rendering of the least squares is 
only a propeliy of the arithmetic average, so that when they 
give precedence to it, they commit a hysteron proteron, 
very much as if metaphysicians should speak of a property 
possessing a substance, or, to use a more homely similitude, 
as when humorists speak of the tail wagging the dog. The 
use of the arithmetic average, when it is properly used, 
according to the criteria examined in the precedmg section, 
is not based upon, proved by, or even confirmed by the 
method of least squares: 44 quite the contrary, upon it is 
based, by it is confirmed, and, if it be proved, by it (with 
something else) is proved the method of least squares.45 
H Merriman, in his Method of Least Squares, § 80, says this 
method "confirms" the use of the arithmetic average, and 
refers to § 44 as doing so. But that article merely argued back 
from the method to the average, going over in reverse order the 
argument in § 41 which proved" the principle of least squares " 
by resting it on " a fundamental law "proved in § 26 by a demon-
stration which rests on the primary supposition of equal dis-
persion, stated in § 24, which is independently the foundation 
upon which the use of the arithmetic average rests. It is plain 
that the method of least squares confirms the use of the arithmetic 
average only as the conclusion of a long chain of arguments 
confirms an earlier conclusion much more evidently proved 
already. 
45 Better than that in the preceding note is the statement of 
H. ]acoby, in An Elementary Lecture on the Metlwd of Least 
Squares, The School of Mines Quarterly, Columbia University, 
Vol. XlXV. (1904), p. 294, that because Legendre's method of 
adjusting observations of several magnitudes, when applied to 
the observations of a single magnitude, reduces to the arithmetic 
average, "this is a further strong addition to the evidence of 
plausibility attaching to Legendre's theorem." But even so, of 
course, the plausibility of Legendre's method is not increased 
over that of the other two (or at least the first), but needs some-
thing else to prove it. It looks as if the method of least squares 
was invented before it was known that the least sum of the 
squares of residuals is a property of the arithmetic average; and 
when this property of the arithmetic average was discovered 
through the method of least squares, it gave the appearance that 
this method was primary and provided the basis supporting the 
arithmetic average in its use in reducing errors of observation. 
To substantiate this suggestion would require more research than 
can be given to it by the writer. The subject of averages has 
received little attention on the part of mathematicians, and still 
less on the part of the historians of mathematics. 
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And when the arithmetic average is directly applied, that 
is, to single magnitudes of any sort-observations or any-
thing else,-the fact that it gives the least sum of the squares 
of the differences between itself and the items has nothing 
to do with the propriety of using the arithmetic average 
when it is proper to use it. The principle of least squares is 
observed when we average the population of a country 
per square mile. As well say it underlies, supports, and 
strengthens the use of the arithmetic average in that case, 
as to say it does so in the case of averaging observations. 46 
It has been necessary to go into this matter so fully in order 
to clear the ground of misrepresentations. The use of the 
arithmetic average in reducing observations needs nothing 
so complex and mysterious as the method of least squares to 
rest on. And the use of the geometric average for reducing 
estimates and other things like estimates, also needs nothing 
'6 Fechner noticed that the median has the property that the 
absolute sum of the differences (or the first powers of the differ-
ences) between it and the items is the least possible; and the 
arithmetic average has the property that the sum of the squares 
of the differences between it and the items is the least; and some 
other average (the formula of which he could not find, but a 
method for obtaining it he worked out) has the property that the 
cubes of the differences between it and the items is the least; 
and there may be still another whose biquadratics give the least 
sum, etc., etc. Hereupon he inferred that as the arithmetio 
average is better than the median, therefore the average giving 
the least cubes is better than the arithmetic, and the average 
giving the biquadratics still better, and so on. And to get an 
application for this sequence, he remarked that the median is 
good enough when the observations are inexact, and the arith-
metic average is required for more exact measurements; where-
fore he concluded that in general the averages giving the higher-
powered least sums are the proper ones for observations of greater 
and greater accuracy: Ueber den Ausgangswerth der kleinsten 
Abweichungssumme, in the Abhandlungen der koeniglich sachsischen 
GeseUschaft der Wissenschaften, Vol. XVIII., Math.-Phys. Classe, 
Vol. XI., Leipsig, 1878, pp. 51-3. There is no sense in all this, 
except that in adjustments possibly the methods using the least 
sums of those higher powers might smooth off the corrections 
still better than the method of least squares, although this is not 
evident, as they might smooth them off too much. Neither 
Fechner nor anyone else has ever shown what the property of 
yielding the least sum of differences raised to any power has to 
do with the probability, in reducing observations of the same 
magnitude, of approximating to the true magnitude. 
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of that sort to rest on. Their uses are perfectly simple and 
plain. 
THE MEASUREMENT OF ERRORS. 
The averaging of observations and estimates is one thing, 
and the averaging of their errors is another; for of course 
errors are different from the observations and estimates 
which contain them. Yet, as observations and estimates 
are different from each other, and are to be averaged differ-
ently, so the errors contained in them are different, and are 
not only to be averaged differently, but are to be measured 
or reckoned differently. An account, then, of the methods 
of reckoning errors is necessary. 
Errors can be conceived in at least two ways-a geometric 
and an arithmetic. The geometric is the one exhibited by 
Galileo, being involved in his usage. According to it the 
definition of error is this: A (geometric) error in an estimate 
is the ratio 01 the difference between the true value and the 
estimate, the true value being the sztbtrahend, (I) to the true value 
when the estimate is less than the true value, and (2) to the 
estimate when the esti1'nate is greater than the true value, or 
always to the greater figure, whether it be the estimate or the 
true value. If we represent the error by R, the estimate by 
5, and the true value by V, the definition is expressed thus: 
S-V S-V 
R = -V- when V > 5, and R = -5- when 5 > V.47 
For example, something having the true value of 14, an 
estimate of 13 contains an error = 13 - 14 = - 2 or 
14 I4 
- 7'I4 per cent.; an estimate of IS, an error = IS - 14 
IS 
I 7 - I4 
= + -or + 6j per cent. ; an estimate of 7, an error = "----'-~ ~ 
= - ~ or - 50 per cent.; an estimate of 28, an error 
I4 
28 - I4 14 . 
28 = + 28 or + So per cent.; an estimate of I, an 
47 If only the absolute figures are desired, the first should 
v-s 
read, R = -V- when V > S. 
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error = I - 14 = _ 13 or _ 92.8 per cent. ; and an estimate 
14 14 
196 - 14 182 
of 196 (= 142), an error = 6 = + -6 or + 92.8 per 19 19 
cent.48 Here the same or opposite signs indicate the same or 
opposite sides; and equality or inequality of percentage, in 
absolute figures, indicates equality or inequality of error, but 
not proportional inequality (as will be shown later), according 
to this geometric method of reckoning error, although it may 
do so according to other methods of reckoning it. 
The arithmetic method of reckoning error was similarly 
outlined for us by Nozzolini, who gave it in two different 
forms, the one of which is wrong except when it can be 
reconciled with the other. The full arithmetic definition of 
error is this: An (arithmetic) error is the ratio 0/ the difference 
between the true value and the estimate, the true value being the 
subtrahend, to the true value. It is represented thus: 
5-V 
R=-V-' 
Nozzolini, we have seen, sometimes treated it as simply a 
comparison of differences, represented thus: 
R=S-V; 
which means that an arithmetic error is the difference between 
the true value and the estimate. This is correct when we are 
dealing with errors around only one true value, as then this 
one true value is the common denominator in all the fractions, 
and may be dropped. It is sufficient in practice when the 
difference between the measurement and the true value is the 
&8 That this method of reckoning geometric error is correct, 
is shown by the fact that an estimate of 13 has to the true value 
14 the ratio ~~ = 0'9286, which being subtracted from unity 
indicates a diminution of 7'14 per cent., which is represented as 
an error by - 7'14 per cent., as above; and the true value 14 has 
to an estimate of 15 the ratio ~~ = 0'9333, indicating (a diminu-
tion of the true value or) an augmentation of the estimate of 
6i per cent., that is, an error of + 6i per cent. In general, with 
the symbols above used, for a lesser estimate we have; - I 
s-v V s-v 
= -V' and for a greater estimate I - 5 = - 5- ' 
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main thing (as when engineers dig a tunnel from opposite 
sides of a mountain and wish the two sections to meet in the 
middle; for here it is the absolute difference which concerns 
them, and not its relation to the length of the tunnel). But 
the second definition always rests on the first, which contains 
it. With the same example as before of a thing having a 
true value of 14, the estimates below the true value have the 
same errors as before, but above the true value the estimates 
have different errors, one of IS having an error = IS - 14 
14 
I ~-~ = + - or + 7·I..J. per cent., one of 28 an error = -------' 14 14 
196 - 14 = + I or + 100 per cent., and one of 196 an error = ~---'-
14 
= + 13 or + 1300 per cent. Here, too, the same or opposite 
signs indicate the same or opposite sides; and equality or 
inequality of percentage, in absolute figures, indicates 
equality or proportional inequality of error, according to this 
arithmetic method of reckoning error, proper of course only 
when the arithmetic average is the proper one to use.49 
Another definition of arithmetic error, however, has been 
given by Dr. Bowley in his Elements of Statistics. 50 He 
speaks simply of error, having in mind only the arithmetic 
method of conceiving of error. His definition amounts to 
this: Error is the ratio of the difference between the estimate 
and the true value, the estimate being the subtrahend, to the 
estimate. His formula, with the symb?ls here used, is 
V-S 
R= S 
He adduced the example we have been using. The true 
value being 14, an estimate of 13 contains an error = 14 - 13 
13 
= + I~ or 7.69 per cent., and an estimate of 15 an error 
= 14 - 15 = _ ~ or _ 6·66 per cent. He unfortunately 
15 IS 
49 We might also make a definition of harmonic error. ef. 
above, notes II and 18. 
50 Third ed., p. 20I. The definition was given in an article of 
his in the Journal of the Royal Stat1'stical Society, December, 1897, 
p.856. 
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neglected to take the precaution of trying his method on 
extravagant instances. An estimate of 7 would have an 
error = l4 - 7 = + I or + lOO per cent., and an estimate 
7 
l4 - 28 I 
of 28 would have an error = 8 = - - or - 50 per 
2 2 
cent. Obviollsly these results are wrong. When an esti-
mate decreases from the true value to half the true value, 
it has decreased to 50 per cent. of the true value, and its 
error has grown to 50 per cent.; and when an estimate 
increases from the true value to double the true value, it has 
increased to lOO per cent. above the true value, and its error 
has grown to lOO per cent. In the former case, an error of 
IOO per cent. below the true value is evidently the error of 
an estimate at zero, but, according to Dr. Bowley, this would 
have to have an infinite percentage; while an estimate of 
one, instead of an error of - 92.8 per cent., would have an 
error = l4 - I = + 13 or + 1300 per cent. This scheme 
I 
also does not permit of dropping the denominator when 
dealing with several estimates about the same object. 
Moreover, the signs are contrary to the usual practice; for 
we conventionally treat excess as positive and deficiency as 
negative. 
Dr. Bowley goes on and gives some examples of the uses 
that can be made of his formula of error. It may be profit-
able for us to follow him at least through the first. He 
supposes two trade unions to return respectively 555 and 45 
members as out of work when the true figures are 565 and 50, 
so that the errors are in the first ~ and in the second ~ 
III 91 
according to his definition of error. He desires" the error 
in the sum " of these estimates; and he lays down a rule 
that" the error in an estimated sum [ = a sum of estimates] 
is equal to the sum of the errors in the parts when each is 
multiplied by the ratio of the corresponding part to the 
sum " (p. 203). Accordingly" the error in the sum" here 
is obtained so, 
~ X 555 +! X 45 = 2 or + 2'5 per cent. 
III 600 9 600 40 ' 
This is not satisfactory. The total estimates are 600 and 
the total true values 615, so that, according to Dr. Bowley's 
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. l' 615 - 600 I 
way of reckomng error, the tota error IS 600 = 40' 
and the two methods tally; for what is desired is, obviously, 
the error in the two estimates added together compared with 
the two true values added together, which is the same as the 
error in the arithmetic mean of the two estimates compared 
with the arithmetic mean of the two true values. But instead 
of operating directly in this latter way, Dr. Bowley has sought 
the true result by using only the errors and the estimates. 
In reality he has been doing something which he does not 
state. The resultant ~ lies between ~ and ..!, and so is 40 III 9 
a mean of some sort between them; and what Dr. Bowley 
is really after is to find the way of obtaining this mean 
between the two errors, or what kind of a mean it is. Here 
we are dealing with oversights, which can hardly err above 
the truth, but below the truth may be admitted to err in 
arithmetic progression, so that no question need be raised 
about the use of the arithmetic mean. But the simple 
. h t' b 2 d I. t I ant me lC mean et we en - an - IS no - . 
III 9 40 
uneven weighting must be used. Now, the 
performed by Dr. Bowley is the same as this, 
I (2 I) I 600 III X 555 + Si X 45 = 40 ; 
Evidently 
operation 
and this is nothing but the arithmetic average between the 
errors with weights according to the estimates. It is as if 
2 Dr. Bowley argued: there are 555 errors of - because the III 
estimate with this error is 555, and there are 45 errors of ~ 
9 
because the estimate with this error is 45, wherefore the 
weight of the former is 555 and of the latter 45. Dr. Bowley 
is one of those who think that uneven weighting is of little 
importance in drawing averages except when the figures are 
few and very divergent (pp. 13-18, 205)-and he is more or 
less right with regard to practice. The exception occurs 
here, and uneven weighting is obviously a necessity. Only 
Dr. Bowley has kept concealed (or is it that he did not know?) 
that he was using a weighted arithmetic average. But 
though these two operations agree, it does not follow that 
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they must be correct. Were only one mistake involved, there 
would be little likelihood of agreement. There is need of 
two mistakes to make agreement in error possible. It may 
be shown that, apart from the wrong use of the signs, which 
does not affect the case, another mistake has been committed 
in addition to a wrong measure of error, namely a wrong 
system of weighting. 
The total error, according to the proper arithmetic method, 
. 600 - 6IS I 
IS 615 = - 41' or - 2'44 per cent.; and the single 
errors are respectively 555 - 565 = _ ~ and 45 - 50 
565 II3 SO 
= -~. The problem, then, is to find the weighted arithmetic 10 
2 I I 
average between - - and - - that is - - . This is II3 10 41 
given in the following operation, 
6~S (- I~3 X 565 + - I: X 50) 114 
Here the weights are according to the true values (not 
according to the estimates), and this would seem to be the 
right system of weighting, or at least a better one; for the 
errors are not on the estimates, but on the true values. 
Otherwise the weights would vary with the estimates and 
might be smaller on the larger object, whereas it seems 
reasonable to hold rather that the weights should be fixed 
according to the true values, an error on a larger figure being 
more important than an error on a smaller, no matter what 
the estimates may be.50' If, however, we think the estimates 
ought to count in the weighting as well as the true values, 
there is no tallying between these two methods of reckoning 
the same total error. 
The correct arithmetic process may be generalised. Let 
the true values be represented by VI> V 2, V3, ... to n terms, 
and the estimates by sI> S2' S3' ... to n terms. 51 Then the 
60' Dr. Bowley himself Femarks: "The greater error in the 
returns of the smaller union has little effect on the total" ; 
which seems to imply that the effect on the result should be 
according to the true values. He has said nothing about the 
sizes of the unions, but only about the sizes of the returns. He 
must mean here "the greater error in the smaller returns." 
61 There may be a larger number of estimates than of true 
values, if one or more values have two or more estimates. The 
true values must then be repeated for every additional estimate. 
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arithmetically combined arithmetic errors of the totals is 
(SI + S2 + Ss+ ... to nterms)-(VI + V 2 + Va+ ... to n terms) 
VI + V2 + Va + . . . to n terms 
The individual arithmetic errors are SI - VI 
V ' I 
Ss - Vs 
- -- , and so on. And the arithmetic average of these, 
Vs 
weighted according to the true values, is 
(¥) VI + (~)V2+ (~) Vs + ... to n terms 
VI + v 2 + Vs + ... to n terms . 
It is evident that this formula is equal to the preceding 
formula. 
When, now, we try Dr. Bowley's scheme on geometric 
errors, we no longer have such plain sailing. It is impossible 
to construct geometric formula:! of averages corresponding 
to the two just given. We must try the two methods on 
numerical examples. We shall now find agreement only in a 
special case. 
Let us suppose two towers, 500 and 600 feet high, to be 
estimated as 600 and 500 respectively. The individual 
600 - 500 + r 
errors, geometrically reckoned, are 600 = '6 or 
500 - 600 r 
+ r6t per cent. and 600 = - '6 or - r6t per cent. 
We have seen that (r) the arithmetic mean between these, 
which is 0, indicating 0 per cent. of error, or no error, is 
correct. In effect (2) the geometric mean between the 
. J500 600 r. di t h h . estImates, -6-x -- = -, m ca es t at t e mean estt-00 500 r 
mate has the ratio to the truth of r to r, showing that it is 
correct and there is no error; for the equal errors (geome-
trically reckoned) on opposite sides (geometrically) nullify 
each other. 52 The same result is obtained (3) if we seek the 
geometric error in the geometric mean of the two estimates 
compared with the geometric mean of the two true values, 
for this is 547'72 - 547'72 = o. Evidently the agreement 
547'72 
62 Here, too, it happens that the comparison of the combined 
heights and the combined estimates, the two sums being equal, 
indicates absence of error. 
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of these three ways of obtaining the desired result will always 
take place when there is such alternation of two values and 
two estimates. For, using the same symbols, we have the 
condition SI = v2 and S2 = VI> and if VI be the greater value, 
S2 must be the greater estimate, and the two errors are 
SI - VI and S2 - vI, which on substitution of equals become 
VI S2 
SI - VI and VI - SI, between which two (r) the arithmetic 
VI VI 
mean is 0, indicating no error; and (z) the geometric mean 
of the estimates, /SIS2 = /SIV I = r, likewise indicates no V V 1V 2 V VIS 1 
error; and of course (3) VS I S 2 - VV 1V 2, whatever be its 
denominator, is = 0 under the condition, for this makes 
SlS2 = V 1V 2• And if V 2 be the greater value and SI the 
greater estimate, the result is the same after some mere 
inversions of the terms. It can be shown also that the 
condition may be enlarged to the extent of requiring only 
SlS2 to be = V 1V 2' and then all the three methods will agree 
in indicating the absence of error in the whole result. Under 
this broader condition the common indication of no error 
is obvious in the case of the two last methods, and needs to 
be proved only of the first. We desire, then, to prove that, 
SlS2 being = V I V 2' the arithmetic mean of the (geometric) 
errors is zero. Again there are two cases, for (unless all the 
terms are equal, in which case there is no difficulty) either 
VI is greater than SI' and then S2 must be greater than V 2 
and the 'geometric means are as above, or v2 is greater than 
S2' and then SI is greater than VI' and the geometric errors 
are SI - VI and S2 - V2. In the first case the arithmetic 
SI V 2 
mean between the errors is = (SI - V I )S2 + (S2 - V 2)V I 
Z V I S 2 
and in the second case it is (SI - V I )V 2 + (S2 - V 2)SI. But 
zV 2 SI 
from the condition we get S2 = V I V 2 and v2 = SIS2. By 
SI VI 
substitution of these equivalents, and with further help 
from the condition, the formulre reduce to SI - VI + V I - SI 
ZV I 
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and SI - VI + VI - SI both of which are = o. Further, 
2S 1 ' 
with three or more values and estimates, subject to this 
condition (viz. S1S2S3 .•• = V IV 2V3 . •. ), although the 
second and third methods will evidently continue to agree, 
the first will not agree with them, and so will be incorrect. 
In other cases (the more usual complex ones) the first 
method fails entirely, and the third agrees only partially with 
the second, which remains the correct method. Suppose the 
same two towers, 500 and 600 feet high, to be estimated as 
550 and 450 respectively. The first geometric error is 
550 - 500 = + ~ or + 9'09 per cent., and the second is 
550 Ir 
450 - 600 I 6 = - - or - 25 per cent. The arithmetic mean 
00 4 
between these is - 7'95; but this does not correctly indicate 
the geometrically reckoned whole error. 53 The correct result 
is obtained in the second way, by drawing the geometric 
mean between the estimates stated in terms of their true 
values, thus J55 0 X 4650 = .v0·82 5 = 0'9083, or - 9'17 per 
500 00 
cent. This can again be obtained as follows. Reduce both 
the true heights to unity; the corresponding estimates then 
are 1'10 and 0'75, and the geometric mean between these is 
.vI·IO X 0'75 = .vo·825, as before. The reason why the 
arithmetic mean between the geometric percentages of errors 
does not in such cases give the right result is because, as 
already stated, the geometric method of reckoning error does 
not correctly give the proportion of one error to another. 
This is easily seen; for the estimate 121 is known to be twice 
as erroneous as the estimate IrO of a true value 100 (for 100 : 
IrO = IrO : 121); but the percentages of error, viz. 10 and 21, 
do not correctly indicate the proportional magnitudes of the 
errors. What is equal here is the excess of IIO above 100 
110 - 100 121 - IrO 
and the excess of 121 above IrO, for -- - - = . 
IrO 121 
Errors are to be compared by analysing them in this way.53. 
53 Nor is it correctly indicated by the added heights compared 
. h h dd d' . 1000 Wlt tea e estlll1ates, smce 1I00 = 0'90909, Or 9'09 per cent., 
the same (so it happens) as the first error alone. 
63a Cf. The Meas~trement of General Exchange-Vame, pp. 250-3. 
60 THE PROBLEM OF ESTIMATION 
Hereby another proof of the above result is obtained. The 
estimate of the second true value below 600 that equals in 
error the given estimate of the first true value above 500, is 
the estimate 545'45, for 550 : 500 = 600 : 545 '45 . But the 
given estimate of the second true value is still lower, so that 
its unbalanced error is 450 - 545'45 = - 0'175, or an error 
545'45 
of - 17'5 per cent. But this error is distributed over two 
estimates, the other of which is correct, since it has been 
balanced. This error is the error of an estimate 0·825, when 
the true value is unity. The other estimate, being correct, 
is unity. The geometric mean between these is VI X 0·825 
= 0'9183, as before. Furthermore, the correct result in the 
instance before us, and in all instances in which the product 
of the true values is greater than the product of the estimates, 
is given by the third method also, which consists in seeking 
the geometric error in the geometric mean or average be-
tween the estimates compared with the geometric mean or 
average between the true values' for this is 497'48 - 547'72 
, 547'72 
= - 0'0917, or - 9'17 per cent., as before. We may generalise 
this, continuing to use the same symbols. The formula of 
the- second method, giving the correct result in geometric 
percentage of error, is 100 ( /Sl S2_ I) ; and the last method, V V 1V 2 
when the product of the true values is the greater, has the 
formula 100 (V~ - v'~), which is evidently equal to 
VV1V2 
that 54; but when the product of the estimates is the greater, 
the formula is 100 (v'~~), so that in these cases 
SlS 2 
this method does not agree with that. The two agree, of 
course, also when SlS2 = V 1V 2 ; for this is the condition in the 
preceding paragraph over again. What is here proved of 
two values and two estimates can evidently be proved of any 
number of values and the same number of estimates. But 
beyond these methods and the cases to wh~ch they are 
applicable the correct result cannot be obtamed by any 
64_ For in these cases, with the product of the true values the 
greater, the geometric method of reckoning error is the same as 
the arithmetic. 
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assignable mean or average drawn merely between the 
(geometric) errors, with any weighting suggested by and 
confined to the figures given. No geometric mean can be 
drawn between a positive and a negative quantity. If we 
replace the negative error by its estimate, the geometric 
mean between r'0909 and 0'75 (= .vr·09 X 0'75 = .vo·Br) 
= 0'9045, indicating an error of - 9'55 per cent., which is 
wrong, though only to a trifling extent. 
Thus only in the simple but rare cases where there are two 
estimates of two values such that the product of the estimates 
is equal to the product of the values, can we correctly get the 
geometrically combined result by drawing an arithmetic 
mean between the geometric errors-for a geometric mean 
between them is impossible. Here is a difference between 
the behaviour of the geometric average and of the geometric 
mean. The geometric mean when it is applicable (between 
two sets of two figures whose products are equal) gives a 
correct indication of the result. But the geometric average 
(between two unequal sets of two figures, or between three 
or more sets, whether equal or unequal, provided they do 
not form two equal groups) does not give a correct indication 
of the result. This breakdown of the geometric average 
(between many quantities), in spite of the correctness of the 
geometric mean (between two evenly weighted quantities), 
will trouble us again. 
But there is a problem in connection with errors of esti-
mation involving unequal quantities and uneven weighting, 
in which the weighted geometric average works as smoothly 
as does the simple geometric mean. This is a problem in 
which the different quantities or magnitudes are joined to 
each other endwise on opposite sides of a single true position, 
and so form one geometric progression. Such a problem 
is presented when the estimates of a single magnitude are 
given and their comparative errors are supposed to be known, 
and the true magnitude is sought. This is a widening of one 
of the problems included in the seventeenth-century contro-
versy. The original question did not leave room for variety 
of weighting. For, as posited, the problem was to apportion 
the errors of known estimates around a single known value; 
and no question of any but even weighting could come in. 
And when it was altered into the form of deriving the true 
value from the estimates and the errors, the errors were 
assumed to be equal, so that it still could employ only even 
weighting. We may now, however, assume the errors to be 
unequal, wherefore we shall have to weight the estimates 
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unevenly. In this connection there is no failure of the 
weighted geometric average to give the correct result. 
To begin with the simplest case, let us suppose B. 's estimate 
of a certain value to be twice as erroneous as A. 's estimate of 
the same. This means that B. 's error is twice as great as A. 's, 
or that it takes two of A. 's errors to equal B. 's one. Therefore 
if we suppose another person to repeat A.'s estimate (and 
consequently A.'s error), we have three estimates, two of 
which are alike; and the errors of these two together (not 
necessarily their sum, yet the last being conceived as begin-
ning where the first left off) are equal to B. 's one error. Thus 
A's estimate must be weighted as two to B. 's estimate as one, 
that is, estimates must be weighted inversely according to their 
errors (or directly according to their accuracy). This rule, of 
course, holds for this kind of problem, and not necessarily for 
others. It is different from the system of weighting we 
found necessary for Dr. Bowley's problem also when applied 
to estimates. There we found that the weights should be, 
not according to the estimates or their errors (although those 
were supposed to be known), but according to the true values; 
for that problem involved more than one true value. So 
again in the problem of reducing observations (and the same 
in the case of reducing estimates) in order to get the most 
probable value (the most probably nearest approach to the 
true value), the different observations are weighted in some 
proportion to the care with which they were made, and not 
according to their errors; and so, if they are all made with 
equal care, they are weighted evenly, notwithstanding that 
some may be much more erroneous than others.54a 
The weighting being as described, if we suppose the two 
64a In most practical cases, if, after the probably truest value 
has been ascertained in this way, the observations (or estimates) 
Were to be weighted inversely according to their probable errors 
and the operation of averaging them thus weighted were to be 
repeated, so little would be gained in accuracy as to make this 
additional operation not worth the very much enhanced trouble. 
Theory shows that in an infinite serie~ of observations (or esti-
mates) the weighted reductions would not differ at all from the 
unweighted; and when there are many observations (or 
estimates), the difference between them would be very slight. 
When the observations (or estimates) are few, it may be ques-
tioned whether this second operation ought not to be performed. 
And yet in these cases, as no precise result can be obtained, it 
would be difficult to prove that the second operation yields a 
nearer approach to the true value than the first alone. 
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errors of estimation to lie on the same side of the true 
value, there is little difficulty. It is merely a question of 
geometric progression, and not of geometric averaging, and 
so does not interest us. Vve are interested in cases where 
the estimates lie on opposite sides of the true value, so that 
the true value, lying between them, is some average between 
them-between the estimates, not (of course) between the 
errors. Let us suppose A. 's overestimate of an article to be 
zoo and B.'s underestimate of it to be 50; and the supposi-
tion still being that the error in B. 's estimate is tWIce as 
great as the error in A. 's, the problem is to find the true 
value of the article. If we were dealing with observations 
and the arithmetic average were employed, the answer 
would be E (200 + 200 + 50) = ISO, indicating that 150 
3 
is the true value. According to this, A. 's error would be 
+ 50 and B. 's - 100, which at once yields the doubleness 
of B. 's error over A. 's, in absolute differences. Or if we 
reckon them in percentages, we should have A.'s error 
zoo - 150 I 
= = + - or + 33t per cent., and B.'s error ISO . 3 
50 - 150 Z 662 lik . . di t· 
= = - - or - 3 per cent., eWlse III ca mg ISO 3 
the doubleness of B.'s error. But we are dealing with esti-
mates proper, and we have learnt that a lower estimate 
contains an error greater than its absolute figure or per-
centage arithmetically reckoned indicates, so that if the true 
value were 150, B.'s error would be more than double A.'s. 
The geometric average is .vzoo X zoo X 50 = I z6 nearly, 
whereby A.'s error is shown to be + 74 and B.'s - 76, or 
nearly equal in absolute figures; but as the error of the 
lower estimate counts for more than the other, it may be 
twice as great. When we reckon the errors in percentages 
by the geometric method, we get A. 's zoo - Iz6 error = ----
ZOO 
37 50 - Iz6 
= + 100 or + 37 per cent., and B. 's error = Iz6 
~~O closely, or - 60 per cent., which is not double the 
other, though nearer to being so. But again we have seen 
that, while equality in this reckoning indicates equality of 
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error, inequality does not indicate proportional inequality 
of error. We must now find how to calculate the doubleness 
and other manifoldness, geometrically reckoned, of one 
estimate over another on opposite sides of the true value, 
when their comparative erroneousness is known. 
For this we must begin with the easier task of comparing 
estimates on the same side of the true value. Let v as before 
be the true value, s a given estimate, and x (which we desire 
to find) an estimate twice as erroneous, that is, containing 
an error twice as great. These three lie in geometric pro-
gression in the order named, v,s, x, in which x =~. Now, 
v 
two equally erroneous estimates (with the same symbols 
accented) on opposite sides of the true value form the 
2 
geometric progression s', v, x', in which x' =~. In this 
s 
last any value of s' may be substituted. Hence an estimate 
2 ~ on one side of the true value is equalled in error by an 
v 
v2 v3 
estimate on the other side ~I = 2' Therefore, as this 
s v s 
2 
estimate ~ is twice as erroneous as the estimate s on the 
v 
same side, and as it is equalled on the other side by the 
v3 v3 
estimate 2' an estimate 2 on either side of the true value 
s s 
is twice as erroneous as the estimate s on the other side. 
Applying to our example, we replace v by Iz6 and s by zoo, 
and we find in effect that an estimate on the other side twice 
. . Iz63 h' h as erroneous as an estimate zoo IS --2 = 50, w 1C agrees 
zoo 
with the supposition, and shows that the error - 76 con-
tained in the estimate 50 is twice as great as the error 
+ 74 contained in the estimate zoo. 
To generalise the problem, we may proceed with the 
supposition that B.'s estimate is thrice as erroneous as A.'s. 
Then on the same side the estimates form the geometric 
progression v,s, x, y. Here we already have the value of 
x in s, and by substituting that value for x in the progression 
3 
s, x, y, and resolving, we obtain y = s 2' If B. 's estimate is 
v 
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four times as erroneous, we may abbreviate the progression 
to this, v, x, Z, and by substituting the value of x in s, we 
. S4 
obtam Z = 3' 'Ye now have sufficient basis for the mathe-
v 
matical induction that the powers of S and v increase by 
unity with every additional erroneousness supposed. In 
general, then, on the same side of the true value an estimate 
1t times as erroneous as a given estimate S is :':~l' And 
now, by the same reasoning as before, this estimate ~I" 1 
V -
on either side of the true value is equalled in error by an 
V"+l 
estimate - on the other side; and therefore, to a given 
s" 
estimate S on either side of the true value, the estimate on 
,,+1 
the other side that is n times as erroneous is ~. 55 Here, 
S 
of course, n may stand for a broken number, or fraction, as 
well as for an integer. 
Now, when an estimate S2 is n times more erroneous than 
estimate SlJ these estimates are the same as if we had n 
estimates like Sv and one estimate S2' or n + I all told; and 
the geometric average between these, which yields the true 
n-tl/ -
value of the article, is 'V Slns2' In effect, the estimate n 
. V"+l 
times more erroneous than the estimate SI bemg -,.-, the 
S 
,.+~ v"+ 1 geometric average between these, SI" . -,,- , is = V. 
SI 
But the extension of this problem to the averaging of 
three or more estimates again leads to confusion. When 
the numbers are odd, it is impossible to have equal numbers 
of estimates on the opposite sides (unless one is correct, 
when it may be ignored). Even when the numbers are 
55 E.g., a lower estimate three times more erroneous than the 
estimate zoo, when the true value is Iz6, is 3r~· ; and one four 
times more erroneous is I9t, while one equally erroneous is 79t· 
All these form the geometric progression I9~- : 3rt: 50 : 79t : 
Iz6 : zoo. The figures going from rz6 to the left represent 
estimates respectively one, two, three, and four times as erroneous 
as the estimate zoo. 
P.E. 
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even and the estimates fall equally on the opposite sides, 
it is impossible to get the proportional weights for more 
than two of them at a time. But the difficulty is the same 
in the case of observations, even with the use of the arith-
metic average. 56 The fact is, however, that any two alone 
of the estimates (or observations) are sufficient, with the 
known comparison of their errors, to indicate the true value, 
and the indication yielded by any other two, provided their 
comparative errors have been correctly stated, will be the 
same. As there is no need of using more than two opposite 
estimates (or observations), there is no need of incurring the 
difficulty. 
Indeed, this whole problem, like the one cited from 
Dr. Bowley's book, seems futile, since we never can know 
the erroneousness of estimates (or of observations) without 
first knowing the true value itself. The method of solving 
it can be of use only in cases where we have some reason for 
believing the errors of two estimates (or observations) to 
have a certain proportion to each other; for then the result 
obtained for the true value would have the same amount 
of plausibility in its favour. In practice, however, all that 
we can know is that two or more sets of estimates (or 
observations) of the same magnitude have different" prob-
able errors," that is, errors of certain amounts equally likely 
to be exceeded as not whenever other estimates (or observa-
tions) are made in the same ways. These probable errors 
cannot be treated like true errors, as they have a law of 
their own. Now, to repeat, in averaging many estimates, 
just as in averaging many observations, of the same magni-
tude, we must attach to them equal weights, provided they 
have been made with equal care and with equally good 
instruments, and independently of one another. But if we 
possess two calculations of estimates of the same magnitude, 
the one set made by experts and the other by less experienced 
persons, we shall probably find less dispersion in the former 
than in the latter, which would be a sign of the greater 
accuracy of the former. In the analogous case of observa-
tions, when we possess two calculations on the same magni-
tude, the one set made with instruments of greater precision 
than the other, the dispersion in each set is used to calculate 
56 But if the errors are all equal (arithmetically or geometri-
cally) in pairs, every one on one side having another corresponding 
to it on the other, there is no difficulty about averaging them all 
together simply, either arithmetically or geometrically. 
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the probable error of its result; and now in drawing the 
average between the results of two such sets the usual 
practice is to weight them inversely according to the sq'uares 
0/ their probable errors,57 This operation should rest on the 
assumption that the two sets err on opposite sides of the 
true position. Such a distribution cannot be known, but 
the assumption can be made on the general principle that 
errors are as likely on the one side as on the other; and, 
too, if they do happen to be on the same side, we do not 
know on which side it is, and so even in this case the chance 
is as good of decreasing as of increasing the error, while in 
the case of their happening to be on the opposite sides 
(equally likely), the chance is improved of decreasing the 
error. \\nen there are three or more sets with different 
weights, they must still be averaged, on the general principle 
of probabilities, in spit e of the fact that this cannot be done 
in the case of true errors; but there is no difficulty about 
averaging any number of equally good sets. As for estimates, 
they ought to be treated in the san1e manner, with substitu-
t ion of geometric methods. Only in these cases there is 
little need of such treatment, since for great er accuracy we 
had better betake ourselves to measurements. 
57 Cf. Merriman, The flIethod of Least Squares, §§ 63, 88, 
F2 
IlL-DEVIATIONS AND VARIATIONS. 
IF the treatment of errors of estimation were the only use 
we had for the geometric method, its difficulties would be 
of little moment. But this is not the case. Characteristic 
of errors is it that they are deviations from a central posi-
tion, either known or conceived as the true position. Allied 
to them are variations, which differ from them only in 
that variations are changes from one position to another 
equally good." Deviations are conceived as going in opposite 
directions from a centre. Variations may meet and cross 
one another while moving in opposite directions between 
distant positions. But just as deviations may have their 
starting points separated, so variations may have their 
starting points brought together, and then they move like 
deviations in appearance, but with the important difference 
just noted, that in deviations the central position is viewed 
as their proper resting place, while in variations we know 
no reason why the position from which they start is better 
than the position in which they end. 
Deviations and variations are common subjects in statis-
tics. Here the central position is viewed, for deviations as 
a type or norm from which the objects depart, and for 
variations merely as a common starting point artificially 
made. And the purpose of drawing averages may be, for 
deviations to find the type or norm, and for variations, not 
to find the common starting point, which is known, but to 
find the average amount of the deviations, in order to learn 
how much the objects have varied all taken together or as 
a whole. And all the deviations and variations dealt with in 
statistics fall into at least the two kinds we have been 
discoursing upon. There are deviations and variations 
which depart from a starting position (roughly indicated 
for the former by the mode or median, and afterward more 
exactly by the average adopted) about equally on both 
sides; and there are others which depart from it more 
above than below it, as reckoned in the usual arithmetic 
way. Deviations and variations that disperse equally on 
the opposite sides are mostly deviations of single quantities; 
those which disperse more above than below are mostly 
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ratios between independent variables, although this is not 
a necessary or proved distinction. It is obvious that t he 
arithmetic average is the right one to use of deviat ions and 
variations that move in the former way, and the geometric 
of those which move in the latter way. 
A great many of the deviations and variations dealt with 
in statistics, like the heights of men already noticed,. behave 
in the former way, and are fit subjects for the arithmetic 
treatment. In ignorance of any other kind of errors, statisti-
cians have generally likened all the deviations and valiations 
they deal with to errors of observation, the principles of 
which have been elaborated to their hand, as we have seen, 
by astronomers and mathematicians. Astronomers have 
rightly ignored any other kind of error, since their science 
is confined to observations, in which the errors move in 
arithmetic dispersion. Statisticians likewise have little 
use for errors of estimation, but they are concerned with 
other objects of which the deviations or variations may 
move in geometric dispersion. Hence, in confining them-
selves to the use of the arithmetic average, they have done 
what astronomers have not done: they have applied it to 
cases to which it does not belong. On account of their usual 
practice hitherto of using only the arithmetic average, it is 
difficult as yet to enumerate many of the subjects which ought 
to be treated geometrically. But at least one subject 
immediately suggests itself. 
AXIOMETRy.58 
The subject which immediately suggests itself is very 
prominent in statistics and economics. It is the deviations 
of prices at a later period from what they were at an earlier 
period, when they had a level which it is desirable to main-
tain-and it is desirable to maintain any price-level that 
is more or less settled. It is, however, the whole price-level 
that it is desirable to maintain, not the prices of individual 
commodities, which should be allowed to vary according 
to the rule of demand and supply, the former determined by 
people's needs, the latter by their ability to produce the 
commodities. Therefore price-changes are variations rather 
than deviations, and their individual positions in the price-
level which it is desirable to maintain, are merely the starting 
58 This term is proposed for the measurement of general 
exchange-value, especially of money. 
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points of their possible and even desirable variations. We 
often speak of averaging prices, as if prices were single 
objects (like the heights of men); which is perhaps one 
reason for the tendency to average them arithmetically. 
But prices are not single objects; they are ratios-the 
ratios of the values of commodities to the value of the money-
unit. Strictly speaking, there is not even a level of prices, 
as an absolute object, like the level of the ocean in a calm. 
A level of prices exists only in comparison with another level 
of prices at another period, which other level of prices may 
be the same with, or different from, the level at the first 
period. 59 Jevons has said that "there is no average of 
prices at anyone period" ; 60 this is too broad a statement. 
But the truth is, we do not really average prices in axiometry ; 
and the only meaning of an average of prices would be to 
determine the amount of preciousness of commodities, or 
the relation of their value to their weight or bulk-an 
object of little interest. 6I In axiometry what we really do 
is to average the variations of prices. The common starting 
point, if we have constructed it, from which we begin to 
measure the deviations of prices, is purely arbitrary. At any 
period of time all commodities have various prices; but we 
can find of the commodities various amounts that have the 
same price. Then at the next period these amounts of the 
commodities have more or less differing prices. To average 
these second prices is really to average the deviations of the 
prices from the common starting price. These deviations of 
the prices are nothing but the variations of the plices; so 
69 Cf. The Measurement of General Exchange- Value, pp. I58-g. 
The process of comparing price-levels is rather like trying, on an 
always billowy sea, which has a fiat bottom, and in which the 
quantity of water constantly varies, to obtain its levels (such as 
they would be if it were still) by averaging the various heights 
of different sections of the waves above the bottom (the zero base). 
The waves would vary in extent according to the winds, and their 
averages above the bottom would vary according to changes in 
the quantity of water. If the proper averages were correctly 
drawn, their variations would represent variations in the never-
existing level or plane surface of the water, and yet would be just 
as truthful as if the level did exist. 
60 A serious Fall in the Value of Gold ascertained, I863, reprinted 
in Investigations in Currency and Finance, p. 23. 
61 Cf. The Measurement of General Exchange- Value, pp. I65 n., 
200-1. For brevity this work will hereafter be referred to as 
M. G. E .-V. 
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that, without performing the labour of reducing all commo-
dities to a common price (which would properly have to be 
repeated every year, or whatever other interval is chosen 62), 
the same result is obtained by simply averaging the price-
variations. 
Again, however, suppose we have performed that labour of 
reduction, and starting with all prices alike, we average their 
deviations at the next period. This process must not be 
likened to the process of averaging observations. The 
purpose of averaging observations is to get an average 
observation that is most probably nearest to the true position 
(a magnitude of some sort) of the object observed. The true 
position is conceived as, so to speak, the bull's-eye at which 
the observations have aimed (as the astronomer aims his 
telescopic instruments at a star) ; but the observations have 
not exactly hit it, and have deviated, if unbiassed or acci-
dental, almost equally on both sides, and the average of them 
is believed to bring them back most closely to the true posi-
tion aimed at . But in averaging price-deviations we do not 
desire to get back to the starting point; for that we know 
already. We desire to get the average deviation. It has 
some resemblance to the practice indulged in by observers of 
averaging their errors-that is, their reputed errors, as 
measured from the average (not from the real and true, but 
otherwise unknown, position). Astronomers and surveyors 
perform this, to them secondary, operation only to get the 
" probable error," as they call it, of their averaged observa-
tion, by which they mean the probable amount of accuracy 
of their observations. All this they do with observations 
the errors of which are believed to be unbiassed and only 
accidental. And yet this similitude does not go on all fours, 
as in calculating the" probable error" the errors on opposite 
sides are averaged separately. A better analogy is the 
following. 
Suppose a great number of shots are aimed directly at a 
distant bull's-eye while a strong wind is blowing sideways 
across the path of the bullets. The wind deflects them all to 
a more or less equal extent toward the side of the bull's-eye 
to which the wind is blowing. It thereby extends the deflec-
tions of the bullets that are already accidentally deflected on 
that side, and it lessens the deflections of the bullets that are 
62 Otherwise a various and haphazard weighting is introduced 
for every comparison made between subsequent periods, contrary 
to the intent of the operator. Cf. M. G. E.- V., pp. r88-9. 
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already deflected on the opposite side, and may even reduce 
-their deflections to nothing or carry them over to the other 
side. When, therefore, we average the lateral positions of 
the hits, the average will no longer approximate to the bull's-
eye, but will lie at a greater or less distance to the lee side of 
it according to the strength of the wind; and this distance 
of the average of the hits, or the average hit, from the centre 
of the bull's-eye, will measure approximately the bias caused 
by the wind of the given intensity. The same result would 
be obtained by averaging directly the lateral errors of the 
hits, this average giving the same bias of the wind in a much 
shorter process. 63 This operation, in either of its two forms, 
of measuring the bias that has deflected all the hits more or 
less alike, is the only one in connection with errors of observa-
tion that has complete resemblance to the statistical problem 
in economics of averaging price-variations, in either of its 
two corresponding forms. The level of prices or the exchange-
value of money remaining the same, prices must vary by 
both rising and falling equally (but remember there are 
different ways of reckoning equality): their rises and falls 
must compensate one another, or else the price-level and the 
exchange-value of money have not remained unchanged. 
If they vary more on the one side than on the other-falling 
more than they rise, or revers ely, rightly reckoned-they 
may be said to show a bias, which is the change of the price-
level, or inversely of the exchange-value of money, caused by 
whatever is the cause of change in the exchange-value of 
money (roughly a change in the quantity and mobility of 
money relatively to the quantity and mobility of commodi-
ties). It may be added that liflemen measure the bias 
caused by various intensities of the wind blowing in various 
directions, in order to be able to allow for it, after measuring 
the intensity and direction of the wind when they shoot, by 
aiming the ascertained angle to the windward side. In 
economics what corresponds to this is an inverse operation, 
or one like measUling the deflecting power of the wind by 
measuring the bias of the hits on the target. For here the 
causes are more complex even than the effects, so that we 
63 Only approximately correct is the result because it is plus 
or minus what would have been the true error of the average 
from the centre of the bull's-eye, had there been no wind. But 
this error may be small on the supposition of a great number of 
fairly accurate shots. In astronomical observations the bias of 
the wind is replaced by the bias of refraction, according to the 
height of the "star above the horizon. 
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cannot argue from them to the effects, but we must measure 
the effects first and directly. The deviation of the whole 
price-level being thus measured, it may now be allowed for, 
by altering contracts accordingly; or an attempt may be 
made to counteract it-to prevent its increase, and to bring 
it back to the starting point-by decreasing or increasing the 
currency as soon as a rise or a fall of the price-level manifests 
itself. But this is a use to be made of the measurement of 
variations in the exchange-value of money, supposed to be 
already accomplished, and lies beyond our subject; as also 
does the consideration of the causes of the variations that are 
measured. The averaging of price-variations in order to 
measure the inverse variation in the exchange-value of 
money, is one measurement; and the measurement, what-
ever may be its nature or procedure, of the causes of such 
variations, is another distinct measurement. 64 The former 
is our present subj ect. 
But properly the similitude of averaging prices is not to 
what is done in connection with observations, but to what is 
or should be done in connection with estimat es. Only these 
have not been so thoroughly studied by others ; wherefore 
it is incumbent on statisticians to study, not so much the 
averaging of estimates, which is not their affair, but directly 
the averaging of price-variations. 
Still, to the extent that the subject of estimation has been 
developed, it may be of some use as a model. For price-
deviations have many of the peculiarit ies possessed by the 
aberrations of estimates. Thus, as it is possible for an esti-
mate to be made as high as any quantity whatever, so it is 
possible for a price to rise to any quantity whatever; and 
as it is impossible for an estimat e t o be made as low as zero, 
and certainly not lower, so it is impossible for any price to 
8~ It has escaped the attention of many economists that if 
they are to argue from the caus.es of price-variations to the price-
variations, they would have to be able first to measure those 
causes quantitatively. But, •• ith the possibly single exception 
of Professor Irving Fisher, they have not yet even reached the 
stage of entering upon the subject of this kind of measurement, 
since they have not yet come to agreement about the nature of 
those causes. Difficult as is the measurement of price-variations, 
much more difficult would it be to measure their causes with 
anything like equal accuracy. We may, therefore, place much 
greater reliance upon the direct measurement of price-variations, 
than we could gain by bringing in any reference to their causes. 
Cf. M. G. E.-V., pp. 22-3. 
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sink to less than zero and even to zero, for then it would 
cease to be a price and the article would go out of the 
market.6s Now, when in the case of two articles at first 
priced the same (for some quantity of one article is always 
equivalent to some quantity of another) the price of the one 
rises and the price of the other falls, we have almost exactly 
the same problem and its modifications that those seven-
teenth century disputants had with their hypothetical case of 
estimates higher and lower than a true value. For we may 
wish to know whether the rise of the one is greater than the 
fall of the other; or, the rise being given, what the fall must 
be to equal it, and reversely; or again, the two deviations 
being given, what is their combined effect upon the price-
level, that is, what common variation of the two prices 
together would have the same effect-which common varia-
tion must evidently be a mean of some sort between the two 
given variations. These are not idle questions like those 
debated so violently by N ozzolini and reluctantly by Galileo; 
for if the price-level has changed, we want to know it, so as 
to adapt ourselves to it, and, too, to counteract it, if possible. 
Thus that academic dispute of nearly three centuries ago has 
a direct bearing upon a very important problem, with which 
not only scientific but also practical people are to-day much 
cemcerned. 
If we confine our attention to only two prices, of two articles 
of equal importance, almost everything that was advanced 
in that old controversy would seem, mutatis mutandis, to 
have application. If one price rises to more than double 
what it was, it cannot be equalled by any fall of the other 
price, according to the arithmetic mean, just as, according 
to the harmonic mean, if the one falls to less than half its 
previous price, it cannot be equalled by any rise of the other; 
but whatever the rise or the fall of the one, it can be equalled 
by some fall or rise of the other, according to the geometric 
mean. Again, if the one price rises from 80 to roo and the 
other falls from roo to 80, these obviously are an equal rise 
and fall; but equality is assigned to them only by the 
65 Above, in note 12, it was said that we might suppose a boot 
to be given with an article and conceive this boot as a negative 
price. But that supposition does not take place in ordinary 
commercial transactions. J evons noticed that we pay to get 
rid of some things, and such things he considered to have negative 
value, Theory of Political Economy, 4th ed., p. 127. But such 
things do not appear in the market, nor are they consumed. 
et. M. G. E.- v., p. 248. 
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geometric mean. The question is not one of equal differ-
ences or distances, but of equal ratios, equality of difference 
coinciding with equality of ratio only in cases like the last. 
No one can read the arguments of Galileo and Castelli without 
being convinced of their superiority to the arguments of 
Nozzolini. And the same arguments apply here. They 
apply here, however, only on the assumption above made---
an assumption involved in that other problem itself, but here 
not easily carried out (we shall return to it later)-that the 
two deviations, and consequently the two articles, are equally 
important, so as to permit them to be weighted evenly .66 
It will be objected that in the case of prices we are not 
concerned with only two articles, but with a whole marketful 
of them, and now the contingency exists that any rises and 
falls of some prices can be balanced by the falls and rises of 
other prices even according to the arithmetic average (and, 
it may be added, according to the harmonic, t oo), since now 
anyone extravagant rise (or fall) can be met by falls (or 
rises) of several other articles. Yet even so there is a possible 
case, which would admit of no balancing, as when all the 
prices happen to come under t wo groups (or under three, the 
third being of prices that have not changed), in the one of 
which the prices rise (or fall) extravagantly, and in the other 
the prices fall (or rise), but cannot fall (or rise) so far as is 
required by the arithmetic average (or the harmonic). 
Apart from this, which must be allowed to be an improbable 
case, the argument against the arithmetic average (and the 
harmonic) is that it would be strange if, the geometric mean 
being the right one to use in the case of t wo plices, the 
arithmetic mean or rather average (or the harmonic) suddenly 
became the right one t o use in the case of three or four or 
more prices- or at what number is the jump to be made? 
The dispute we have reviewed over errors of estimation might 
very readily have been extended to more estimates than two. 
Can we believe that Galileo, after demonstrating (for this is 
not too strong a word) the correctness of the geometric mean 
for measuring the errors of two estimates, would have 
adopted the arithmetic average for measuring the errors of 
many estimates? The law of continuity, which GaWeo 
recognised, forbids. 
It would seem as if it could be laid down as axiomatic, that 
the same mean or average must be applicable to any possible 
number of items. Two price-deviations are possible items. 
88 Cf. M . G. E.- v., pp. 248-g. 
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Therefore a mean or average right or wrong for two such 
items, it would seem, must be right or wrong for any other 
number of them. But now a curious phenomenon shows 
itself, of which a hint has already appeared. This is, that 
in the case of the geometric average, although it would seem 
to be the theoretically right one for any number of price-
variations as well as for two, yet it works with perfect 
accuracy only of two (equally important) price-variations. 
The axiomatic test, then, can be stated only as a negative 
one. A mean or average not applicable to the case of two 
price-variations cannot be the right one for the case of many 
price-variations-that is, the theoretically right one, although 
in practice it may approximate to a theoretically right one. 
The justification for trying a problem of averages on two 
objects first, as is so often done by statisticians and others 
(we have seen Bertillon and Bowley doing so), is of course 
that such are the simplest cases. If the average in question 
will not work with two objects, it is not the theoretically 
correct average. But if it will work with two objects, we 
need to go on and apply it to the more complex cases of many 
objects. Two objects form a perfect negative test: they 
may disprove an average. They are not a positive test: 
they cannot prove an average-or of any kind of average it 
must first be proved in general that they can. This is 
provable of the arithmetic and harmonic averages,67 but not 
of the geometric average. 6B The geometric average, if in any 
subject it passes the first ordeal, needs to be examined 
further in application to many objects. 
67 In a paper on the method of least squares in the Berliner 
Astronomisches jahrbuch, I834, Encke tried to prove that method 
by demonstrating that b.ecause the arithmetic mean is correct 
for reducing two observations, therefore the arithmetic average 
is correct for reducing three or more observations. A generation 
later Venn in his Logic of Chance, Chapter XIII. § I3, expressed 
the opinion that, although we must adopt the arithmetic mean 
for reducing two observations, we have a wider choice of inter-
mediate values when we come to reducing three or more. It was 
probably to allay such doubts as this in his day, that Encke made 
his demonstration. It needs hardly to be said that he had little 
difficulty. 
68 This distinction was first pointed out in M. G. E.-V., pp. 
239-42, cf. 5I9-20. That work may be said to be founded on 
this distinction, since otherwise it would have proved the geometric 
average, and the subject would have been disposed of in short 
order. CL p. 255. 
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It is well known that when the problem of measuring 
variations, or deviations, of prices came up for scientific 
investigation, the arithmetic average was at first adopted 
without hesitation and without examination, and continued 
to be so used till Jevons perceived that it was a case for 
proportions instead of differences, since variations of prices 
are changes of ratios, and accordingly recommended the 
geometric average. 69 It is clear from J evons's first state-
ments on the subject, that he had a con-ect idea of the 
geometric deviation involved. He said that not the arith-
metic but the geometric average must be used in his inquiry 
about the change going on in the value of gold, because the 
alterations of prices with which he was dealing had a wide 
range, "varying from more than 50 per cent. of decrease 
to more than 100 per cent. of increase"; and he instanced 
as almost exactly such, cocoa and cloves, the former of which 
had risen from 100 to ZOO, and the latter had fallen from 
100 to 50, so that, in his words, " the price of one is doubled, 
of the other halved-one is multiplied by two, one divided 
by two"; just as, in the seventeenth-century problem, the 
true value was multiplied in the one estimate by ten and in 
the other it was divided by ten; wherefore Jevons, like 
Galileo, considered that "on the average" the prices of 
these articles had remained as they were before,70 their 
opposite deviations really being equal and compensating 
each other. Only Jevons did not state this last proposition 
about the geometric equality of the opposite deviations, did 
not generalise and formulate it, did not reach the bottom of 
the subject. And as far as he did go, he did merely for one 
set of deviations, but hastily and without demonstration, 
what Galileo had more fully done for another. We may 
therefore say, that the first advocate of the geometric mean 
or average for the measurement of deviations, when they are 
proportional, was a greater genius even than J evons. It is 
another instance, also, of astronomy leading the way for 
statistics. And it is curious to note a further parallelism in 
the fact that Jevons's position was disputed by Laspeyres 
as Galileo's had been disputed by Nozzolini; and Laspeyres 
converted the question into one of gain and loss, just as 
Nozzolini had done. We shall have occasion later to revert 
to this nineteenth-century controversy. 
89 First in the pampblet A serious Fall, etc., in I nvestigations, 
p. 23· Later in his Theory of Political Economy, rst ed., pp . Br, 
B3, he defined exchange-value as a " ratio of exchange." 
70 Investigations, pp. 23-4-
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Jevons did not confine his recommendation of the geome-
tric average to index-numbers. "In almost all the calcula-
tions of statistics and commerce," he wrote, " the geometric 
mean ought, strictly speaking, to be used."?1 This is an 
exaggeration, but the amount of truth in it has been too 
little heeded by statisticians. At most they admit that the 
geometric average has an advantage in smoothing off extra-
vagant fluctuations, and therefore some of them advise its 
use when it differs much from the arithmetic. 72 This is, 
as it were, a concession made by the arithmetic to the 
geometric average, whereas in truth the concession should 
be the other way: the arithmetic average may be used 
where it does not much differ from the geometric. That is, 
this concession can be made to the arithmetic average, on 
account of its convenience, in subjects where the geometric 
is the theoretically correct average; but where the arithmetic 
average is the theoretically correct one, no concession on its 
part need ever be made to the geometric average, for the 
geometric average, being the more difficult, should never be 
used except where theory demands it. Thus the procedure 
of these economists who concede the use of the geometric 
average for extravagant cases, is really an unconscious 
tribute to the theoretical correctness of the geometric 
average. A similarly unconscious recognition of it is made 
by some economists, who, of late, have advocated the 
drawing of logarithmic diagrams, and for this purpose the 
use of logarithmically ruled paper. 73 For, when two or more 
companion curves are drawn in this way, the eye naturally 
makes a res~tme of them by imagining a line halfway between, 
or even this is actually inserted by the operator; but the 
arithmetic mean or average (represented by this line) 
between logarithms gives the geometric mean or average 
between the natural figures. 74 Using logarithms also, 
71 Principles of Science, 3rd ed., p. 361; cf. Invest7:gations, 
p. 128 n. 
72 E.g., Bowley, who calls it a " tentative rule," Elements of 
Statistics, pp. 128-9; followed by Zizek, Statistical Averages, 
P·197· 
73 E.g., Bowley, op. cit., pp. 188-96; 1. Fisher, The" Ratio" 
Chart for plotting Statistics, Quarterly Publications of the 
American Statistical Association, June, 1917. The latter's 
bibliography shows that Jevons (see Investigations, p. 128) was 
the first to use and recommend this kind of charting. It fitted 
in with his recommendation of the geometric average. 
74 Note that in this connection Bowley says: "For the pur-
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Fechner has converted the Gaussian law, originally applied 
to the arithmetic average, into a law applicable to the 
geometric average of deviations. He did so for the reason 
that the deviations on large objects are absolutely greater 
than the deviations on small objects, although they are not 
necessarily so proportionally, as, to use an instance he cited, 
the deviations of the sizes of men compared with those of 
fleas. For the measurement of all deviations, therefore, 
including the average stature of men, which we have seen 
to be correctly averaged arithmetically, he thought the 
geometric average to be the strictly and theoretically 
(" prinzipiell streng," strictly according to theory) correct 
one, although he would concede the use of the arithmetic 
average when the deviations are comparatively small, since 
then it is inappreciably different from the geometric. 75 But 
the reason he gave is not enough. For the use of the geo-
metric average it needs to be shown , not only that the 
deviations of large objects are greater than those of small 
ones, but that the deviations above the normal position 
are or can be greater than the deviations below it . This 
Fechner did not take into account, and so he applied his 
method to such objects as the dimensions of visiting cards 
and of pictures. He merely experimented with the geometric 
average, without any correct theoretical guidance, and with-
out any satisfactory theoretical or practical results. 
Credit for first perceiving the resemblance of prices to 
estimates and thereby getting an insight into the true nature 
of their variations, belongs to Profesor Edgeworth. After 
adopting, in r 887, in the passage already quoted, Galton's 
re-discovery of the geometric nature of estimation, and 
referring to Fechner's and Weber's law, he continued: "This 
law of prizing may well extend to prices"; and he added: 
" There exists a simple reason why prices are apt to deviate 
more in excess than in defect, namely that a price may rise 
to any amQunt, but cannot sink below zero." 76 In this he 
poses of price index-numbers it is ratios which are important 
and which the diagram should represent," p. I90. 
75 Kollektivmasslehre, pp. 82-3, and so pp. 24-5, 77-82, 9I , 95, 
3°7,339-64. The opinions of this posthumously published work 
he had reached twenty years before, for their outline is found in 
his paper Ueber den Ausgangswerth der kleinsten Abweichungs-
summe of I878, pp. 14-I5. 
76 Memorandum to the first Report of the British Association 
Committee, p. 283. He remarked that Venn had just called this 
kind of rising and falling" a one-ended phenomenon." It may 
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adduced a better reason than Jevons had given for the 
geometric average in connection with prices, or rather gave 
it more explicitly. But he went on and invoked another. 
" It appears," he wrote, "that prices group themselves about 
a mean, not according to a symmetrical curve like that which 
corresponds to the arithmetic mean, but according to an 
unsymmetrical curve like that which corresponds to the 
geometric mean." 77 And he added some "empirical 
evidence" in support of this statement. 78 This last is not 
so good a reason as the one first quoted, which Professor 
Edgeworth did not bring into immediate connection with the 
geometric average. The primary reason for the propriety 
of the geometric averaging of price-variations is because 
prices have a lower and no upper limit to their movements. 
All that can subsequently be discovered about their multiple 
dispersion may be interesting, but it is superfluous. The 
criterion of dispersion we have seen to be needed only for 
dubious cases. TIus is not a dubious case. The geometric 
average is here determined by a perfectly good criterion. 
To repeat an illustration already used: Professor Edgeworth, 
we can have no doubt, would not ascribe the reason for our 
employing the geometric average in averaging the annual 
rates of increase of a country's population over a number of 
be noted that Quetelet had noticed (on very insufficient data) 
that prices deviate more above than below their mean, Lettres 
sur la Theorie des Probabilites, pp. 72-3 ; but he inferred from this 
only that the causes at work for raising prices are more energetic 
than those for lowering them, p . 183. 
77 Memorandum to the First Report, ibid. In his Memorandum 
to the second Report, p. 208, he claims that, so far as he knew, 
he was the first to advance this theory of prices; and he referred 
to it again as his discovery in New Methods of Measuring Varia-
tions in Gen.eral Prices, in the Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, June, 1888, pp. 35I, 356. 
78 Memoran.dum to the first Report, pp. 284-6. Professor 
Wesley C. Mitchell has likewise given an analysis of over 5,000 
price-variations, which supports it, in I ndex Numbers of Wholesale 
Prices, in the Bulletin of U.S. Labor Statistics, No. 173, 1915, 
pp. II-24 ; where his table No. 2 presents a specimen of almost 
p erfect geometric dispersion around the median. But very 
curiously Professor Mitchell calls it, p. 18 " a distribution accord-
ing perfectly with the so-called' normal law of error,' "like errors 
of observation, etc., as if it exhibited arithmetic dispersion, while 
on pp. 20-1 he recognises that it is not" perfectly symmetrical" 
although it is "regular." On p. 82 he. too, notes that prices can 
rise without limit, but have a limit to their fall. 
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years to the fact, if fact it be, that such annual rates group 
themselves around their average according to an unsymme-
trical curve which is the regular curve representative of 
geometric dispersion. And if the ulterior study of dispersion 
is not needed in this case, it is not needed in the case of price-
variations. Because of not resting at the simple, true, and 
sufficient reason, Professor Edgeworth has unfortunately 
been led astray into studies of dispersion involving the 
calculus of probabilities, which, however interesting in 
themselves and useful for their own purposes, are not per-
tinent to the study of averaging price-variations for the 
purpose of measuring variations in the exchange-value of 
money; but which Professor Edgeworth has come to consider 
basic to this study. There will be need of going into this 
question more fully later. 
WEIGHTING. 
Prices not only have some resemblance to estimates, and 
through them to observations, but they have some difference. 
They are properly variations, while estimates and observa-
tions are deviations. For this reason their dispersion around 
a centre is of no importance. The problem, as has been 
shown, is not to get from them the original centre: it is to 
get an average of their departures from a common starting 
point, or more simply, an average of their variations. This 
average may form a new centre for new departures-or rather 
a new level for new risings and fallings. 
Among the various problems we have reviewed, one having 
partial analogy with the problem ofaxiometry is the 
problem of getting the true position when the estimates and 
their errors are both known. For here what corresponds to 
the estimates are the prices, and what corresponds to the 
errors are the deviations or variations of the prices. Prices 
and their deviations are here the two factors given, and 
sought is the value around which the deviations compensate 
each other and balance, just as in that other problem the 
position sought is one around which the erroneous estimates, 
properly weighted, equal each other and balance. But 
between the present problem and that problem a great 
difference comes in with the question of weighting. There 
the weighting is given with the other two elements, since it is 
inversely according to the errors. Here no such weighting 
can be employed; for the variations of the prices have 
influence on the weights only as they affect another set of 
P.E. G 
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factors, which exist here but have no existence there. These 
other factors are the full values of the articles whose varying 
prices are being averaged. The full value of any kind of 
article itself depends upon the price of the article and the 
quantity of the article (or the number of its units so priced) 
that come under consideration. This element of quantity, 
and the full value which it produces with the price-element, 
have nothing analogous to them in the problem of the errors 
of estimates or observations; and so they very seriously 
differentiate the problem of averaging price-variations from 
the problem of averaging errors of estimates and observa-
tions-and, it may be added, from the problem of averaging 
estimates or observations in any of its forms. 
But the principle of weighting is the same at bottom in all 
kinds and instances of averaging. In the words of Professor 
Merriman, "weights are merely numbers denoting repeti-
tion." 79 Certain items are to be averaged: several of them 
may be the same quantity or magnitude; then, instead of 
treating such equal items as so many distinct items, we 
combine them into one item several times repeated, and the 
coefficient representing its repetition is its weight. 80 Thus 
in the problem of finding the true position from two known 
estimates and their known errors, the estimate with the 
smaller error has to be repeated in order that its error may 
equal and so compensate the larger error of the other estimate. 
In averaging estimates or observations of which the errors 
are unknown, in order to obtain the nearest approach to the 
true position, the estimates or observations must be treated 
as single items (and then if two are alike, they are combined 
into one item twice repeated, and so on), provided they have 
been made with equal care and therefore can be considered 
as equally good. But if some have been made with greater 
care, or with finer instruments, we may consider them as 
being twice or thrice as good as the others, and so we may 
treat the former as equivalent to two or three of the latter, 
and weight them accordingly. 81 The question of weighting, 
then, is a question as to the nature of the single items that 
are to be averaged. 82 In price-variations what are the single 
items? 
It might seem at first sight as if simply every price-
quotation were a single item, and since every commodity 
79 The Method of Least Squares, § SI, cf. § 39. 
80 Cf. M. G. E,.- V., pp. 87-8. 
81 Cf. Venn, Logic of Chance, p. 346. 
82 Cf. M. G. E.- v., pp. 89--90. 
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(any kind of commodity) has one price-quotation attached 
to it, it would seem as if price-variations of every kind of 
commodity were the single item in question. This is the 
way the question struck the first inquirers into price-varia-
tions, wherefore they used simple averaging with even 
weighting. But a price-quotation is the quotation of the 
price of a generic name for many articles; and one such 
generic name covers a few articles, and another covers many. 
The few and the many articles themselves consist of so many 
pounds or bushels or other denominations of measures; 
but these as such have nothing to do in the economic world 
of values-that is, they do not themselves appear in that 
world, though they act, so to speak, as substances underlying 
it. The generic name of a commodity, covering so many 
pounds or bushels at a certain price, covers so many value-
units of those singly-named articles, and these value-units 
evidently are the single articles variously repeated. A 
single price-quotation, therefore, may be the quotation of 
the price of a hundred, a thousand, or a million dollar's 
worths, or pound's worths, of the articles that make up the 
commodity named. I ts weight in the averaging, therefore, 
ought to be according to these money-unit's worths. 83 Or, to 
reach the same result more briefly: the weights of com-
modities are directly according to their importance; and the 
importance of every commodity is proportional to what may 
be called its full value, or its quantity multiplied by its price. 84 
This may be rendered still plainer by an example. Sup-
pose wheat is classified into two grades and their prices 
quoted separately, and barley is quoted only as one commo-
dity. Suppose, fUliher, the full value of wheat is, grade A 
five millions, grade B five millions, and of barley five millions 
83 Cf. M. G. E.- v., p. 93, cf. pp. 80-1. 
84 A warning may be needed against misuse of the word 
" importance" in this connection. It is used simply as a con-
venient term for summing up so many money-units' worth. 
There is no reference to utility, whether total or final. Utility 
has no more to do with measuring price-variations than with 
measuring temperature. Utility may be among the causes of 
exchange-value; but knowledge of causes is not necessary for 
measuring effects. Objective ratios of exchange can be meas.ured 
without such knowledge, even by observers who have no notion 
of utility. Nor is there any reference to the fact that a more 
important commodity" absorbs more currency." It refers only 
to the fact that in a more important commodity there is a greater 
number of price-variations. Cf. M. G. E.- v., pp. 8-<), 94. 
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(money units of any sort being understood). Evidently we 
have three equal items. Now suppose the distinction 
between the two grades of wheat had not been made and the 
prices of wheat had all been thrown together. Then we 
should have had, wheat ten millions, barley five millions. 
Evidently the difference between the two cases is only 
nominal: two items have been merged into one, with only 
one price-quotation, giving the appearance of one item; but 
in truth we still have two items of wheat, or three items all 
told. Nor is the matter affected by the fact, or not, whether 
wheat admits of being classified into two grades. Let all 
wheat be alike: yet five millions of wheat is a single item 
over against five millions of barley, and another five millions 
of wheat is either another item, or it is the same item 
repeated. Therefore we should weight wheat as two 
compared with barley as one. For weights are proportional 
figures, and we naturally reduce them to their least common 
denominator. 
When the early investigators simply took each quotation 
of a price-variation as one item, we may suspect they were 
influenced also by the consideration of convenience. There 
is prevalent a stupid distinction between weighted and 
unweighted or simple averages, as if the former contained 
weights and the latter did not. The latter contain weights 
just as much as the former, only they are equal or even 
weights. 85 You cannot avoid the subject of weighting by 
adopting the simple average, for it has pursued you there. 
You must have either a right or wrong system of weighting, 
or rather a better or a worse. If you make an earnest 
attempt to adopt a good system, something can generally 
be said for it; but if you adopt even weighting, nothing can 
be said for it-except the lazy man's recommendation of 
superior easiness. It is, however, argued: all systems of 
weighting give nearly the same results in practice; therefore 
adopt the easiest, which is even weighting. It is like the 
argument also made for the arithmetic average compared 
with the others. All depends on the word "nearly." If 
index-numbers are ever to be put to any serious use, the 
closest possible approximation to the truth will be necessary. 
For it will be necessary to make the measurements from 
year to year, or even oftener, and to combine the results in a 
series; and if a method be adopted that gives a small error 
always or mostly on the same side of the truth, its errors will 
85 Cf. M. G. E.-V., p. 82. 
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accumulate from period to period. If, to avoid this danger, 
the ordinary system be kept in use of comparing every 
subsequent period with the same period as a base, this 
system with a faulty average or weighting, not excepting 
even weighting, produces a varying haphazard weighting, 
with variously resulting errors, in all comparisons between 
the subsequent periods, increasing in irregularity as the 
series advances,86-and it is principally for comparison with 
the immediately preceding period that these measurements 
are desired. 87 
Besides, we need first of all to examine the matter in 
theory, by which practice may afterwards be regulated. 
Theory demands precision, and can make no compromise 
with sloth. "A We of action," says Macaulay, " if it is to 
be useful, must be a life of compromise. But speculation 
admits of no compromise." 88 Now, in theory the considera-
tion of weighting is absolutely necessary. And it must be 
treated in close connection with the averages that are being 
investigated. 89 For subconsciously various kinds of weight-
ing obtrude themselves in company with various kinds of 
averages. The subject may be illustrated by the controversy 
between J evons and Laspeyres. 
J evons asserted that because the price of one article had 
risen 100 per cent. and the price of another had fallen 50 per 
cent., it would be " totally erroneous" to say the average 
variation of the two prices was a rise of 25 per cent., since 
the geometric mean between them indicates no variation 
at all, and the geometric mean of the ratios is the right one 
to use. 90 To this Laspeyres objected that as it later requires 
200 money-units to purchase the one article which 100 would 
have purchased before, and fifty to purchase another which 
100 would have purchased before, it now requires 250 to 
purchase what 200 would have purchased before, which is 
the same as requiring 125 to purchase what 100 would have 
purchased before, wherefore the prices of theEe two articles 
together have risen from 100 to 125, as indicated by the 
arithmetic mean, or by 25 per cent. 91 Obvious is the 
86 Cf. M. G. E.- v., pp. 189, 206-]. 
87 Cf. Mitchell, Index-Numbers of Wholesale Prices, pp. 36-] ; 
also Fisher, Purchasing Power of Money, pp. 203, 423-4. 
88 Essay on Mahon's History. 
89 Cf. M. G. E.- v., p. 275. 
90 Investigations, pp. 23-4. 
91 Hamburger Waarenpreise, 1850-1863, in J ahrbiicher fur 
Nationaloekonomie und Statistik, 1864, p. 97. 
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resemblance of Laspeyres's procedure to NozzoIini's, in imme-
diately converting the problem into one of gain and loss; 
while Jevons, like Galileo, treated it as a question of ratios. 
But Jevons for a moment went over into Laspeyres's camp 
to dispute with him on his own ground. He urged that we 
could with equal reason" suppose a certain uniform quantity 
of gold money to be expended in equal portions in the pur-
chase of certain commodities, and that we ought to take the 
average quantity purchased each year"; which" might be 
ascertained by taking the harmonic mean" of the prices. 92 
This suggestion was actually adopted by Messedaglia. 93 
Professor N. G. Pierson reviewed this debate, and because 
of the inconsistencies it involved, various results being one 
as good as another, concluded that the whole subject is 
insoluble. 94 Now, originally Jevons had no right, as Galileo 
had had, to use the simple geometric mean, unless he added 
the assumption that the two articles were equally important, 
and unless he gave the proper definition of what is to be 
meant by their equal importance. Laspeyres, on his part, 
did make a further assumption, namely that the same 
quantities of the two articles are purchased at the two 
periods, notwithstanding the changes in their prices. This 
assumption he had a perfect right to make, as such; only 
he should have drawn attention to it, and have noted its 
arbitrariness, which permitted it to be countered by Jevons's 
later equally arbitrary assumption of another sort. Thus 
Laspeyres's problem was different from Jevons's original 
problem, because Jevons had not made the assumption 
which Laspeyres made; and it was different from J evons's 
later suggested problem, because that rested on another 
different assumption. They argued at cross purposes; and 
they did so because they did not introduce the subject of 
weighting except in this secondary clandestine manner, and 
they never argued as to which kind of weighting is the more 
correct. Galileo, we have seen, advanced some incomplete 
suppositions, and then remarked that no solution could be 
made from them, because some essential data were not 
supplied. J evons set before himself a problem with just 
such insufficient data, and reasoned about them just as 
if he had given himself all the data needed; and when 
92 Investigations, pp. 120-I. 
93 It Calcolo dei Valori Medii, p. 39. 
94 Further Considerations on Index-Nu.mbers, Economic journal, 
March, 1896, pp. 129-30. 
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Laspeyres supplied some data, he supplied some others, and 
neither examined what the additional data ought to be in 
order to represent the ordinary state of things. The two 
commodities under consideration were really two classes con-
taining different numbers of individuals, whose prices, them-
selves averaged at each period, varied between the periods; so 
that the price-variations they were averaging were the price-
variations, not of two commodities, but of an unknown (or 
unposited) number of individuals distributed over two classes. 
Yet neither of the disputants (nor Messedaglia and Pierson 
after them) made the slightest attempt to ascertain or to 
define what and how many were those individual things 
whose plice-variations they were averaging. It was as if 
two anthropologists should hear that the average height of 
one group of men were so and so, and the average height of 
another group of men were so and so, and then, without 
trying to find out how many individuals were in each group, 
should dispute over the proper kind of average for averaging 
these averaged heights. It is pitiable to think that men of 
scientific attainment should argue in this way. 95 And yet 
others have continued to take sides in this dispute in the same 
old incomplete way; and his opponents have criticised 
Jevons rather for using the geometric average than for 
neglecting to inquire into the proper weighting. In all his 
writings only two passages can be found in which, in this 
connection, J evons referred to weighting, and then he showed 
indifference to the SUbject. He even entertained the idea 
of weighting his commodities inversely according to their 
price-variations! 96 In his practical work he was bothered 
by the high prices of cotton in I862, and although the 
geometric average was recommended as especially suitable 
for such extravagant cases, he actually doctored those prices. 
Had he noticed that the quantity of cotton had been even 
more extremely reduced, those high prices, properly weighted, 
would have given him no cause of uneasiness. It may be 
remarked that Laspeyres added at the end of his own argu-
ment: "What is true of two commodities, is true also of any 
95 Cf. M. G. E.-V., pp. 266-8, 275. 
98 Investigations, pp. 2I, 57. J evons was one of the first, if 
not the first, to mention the use of "ponderation " in the subject 
ofaxiometry ; and therefore he may well be excused for not 
being precise with regard to it, for making a wild suggestion, and 
for refusing to "attempt to decide" the questions involved. 
But we should advance beyond his first step. 
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number of commodities." He happened to be right; for 
this is true of the arithmetic average with which he was 
dealing, as also of the harmonic. But neither he nor Jevons 
perceived that this statement, as it stands in all its general-
ness, is not true; for it is not true of the geometric average. 
Jevons never saw, what we shall soon see, that he had no 
right to extend to the geometric average of many price-
variations, as he tacitly did, what he might have proved of 
the geometric mean in the case of two commodities; and 
Laspeyres never took him to task for this oversight. 
In measuring variations of the exchange-value of money 
we pass from one period to another. Now, at anyone period 
the importance of every commodity is measured by its full 
value, which is calculated by the quantity of the commodity 
that has been dealt with during that period multiplied by its 
price. If we are measuring the variation of the money of a 
country (not of anyone class of its population), we should in 
strict theory take into account all commodities (along with 
some other things, possibly, such as house-rent, but not 
wages), and the complete quantities of them that have 
appeared in the markets tliroughout the whole country. 
This is evidently impossible, and samples of the most simple 
and useful commodities have to be selected, and their quan-
tities have to be estimated more or less accurately. Some 
nice questions arise as to whether only what is consumed 
in the country, or only what is produced in it, or both 
together are to be counted; and also there are difficulties as 
to the single price-quotation that is to be given at each period 
to each commodity, since this, too, must be an average. 97 If, 
97 Throughout the country during the period a commodity is 
not sold at one price, nor even at one wholesale price in its prin-
cipal market. Various quantities of it are sold at different 
prices, and the full value is obtained by adding all the sums 
spent (at the same stage in its advance towards the consumer), 
and the average price is found by dividing the total sum (or the 
full value) by the total quantities. This result is the arithmetic 
average of the prices weighted according to the quantities sold 
at the prices. Between producer and consumer some goods pass 
through few and some through many hands. It would seem as 
if only one sale (say the first or the last) ought to be counted; 
but this has been disputed. As it is impossible to record all sales, 
estimates have to be relied on; which leaves room for error, and 
for the calculation of error by the doctrine of probabilities. This 
doctrine shows that, when the investigation has been conducted 
with care and without bias, because of the likelihood of the errors 
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further, instead of its being the money of the count ry that 
is being measured, it is the money of some class (say labourers), 
then a different selection of articles, with different quantities, 
and even with different prices (retail instead of wholesale), 
has to be made. Into these details it is impossible here t o 
enter, and it is not necessary; for they have no effect upon 
the problem of averaging price-variations, which is t he 
problem before us. This problem presupposes that the 
prices and the quantities are given,98 and it then proceeds 
to operate upon them. This problem is a large one in it self, 
and quite deserving of being isolated from the problems 
involved in the providing of its data. It is a mathematical 
problem, needing to be solved in theory first, while those are 
mostly practical questions, for practical men to decide. The 
theoretician may leave those problems to others. The 
others should take the solution of the problem of averaging 
from the theoretician, modifying it to suit their practical 
purposes. Being utterly distinct, this problem and the 
other problems should never be mixed. 
We then assume that (r) commodities, (2) their quantities, 
and (3) their prices are given, wherewith (4) their full values 
are also given, whereby their relative importance is measured 
and their weights in the averaging determined. The commo-
dities, as classes of things, must be the same at both periods. 
If a commodity exists at one period and not at another, it 
must be omitted from any comparison of these two periods; 
for its prices have not varied, it has merely appeared or 
disappeared. 99 The quantities, however, as well as the 
prices, are apt to vary between the two periods, involving 
also variations in the full values. But we are not averaging 
the variations of the quantities, nor of the full values: we 
are averaging only the variations of the prices. Yet the 
variations of the quantities, along with the variations of the 
prices, by affecting the full values cause variations in these; 
and the variations of the full values cause variations in the 
weights wherewith the price-variations are to be averaged. 
being on opposite sides and therefore neutralising one another, 
the effect of the individual errors upon the final result is likely 
to be small. 
98 This is the position taken by Professor Edgeworth at the 
beginning of his Memorandum to the first Report of the British 
Association Committee, where, p. 254, he wrote: "It is supposed 
that the prices of commodities, and also the quantities pur -
chased, at two epochs, are given." 
99 Cf. M. G. E. -V., pp. II2-13. 
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Thus, after ali, the variations of a commodity's price, in so 
far as it affects the commodity's full value, affects the weight 
to be assigned to that commodity's price-variation, and so 
restores a partial resemblance to the weights in the problem 
of estimates above cited, where the weights are entirely 
determined by the deviations, or errors, of the estimates, 
but inversely. Here, however, the influence, as far as it goes, 
is neither inverse nor direct, being itself affected by another 
factor. For here there is another factor, the quantities, 
which is entirely absent from the other problem. 
With respect to quantities, the present problem has more 
analogy with the problem of estimates set up by Dr. Bowley. 
For in Dr. Bowley's problem estimates of two or more 
different things were involved, and the quantities, or sizes, 
of these things had influence. But here stili another 
difference subsists. 
Commodities are to be weighted according to their im-
portance, or their full values. But the problem ofaxiometry 
always involves at least two periods. There is a first period, 
and there is a second period which is compared with it. 
Price-variations have taken place between the two, and these 
are to be averaged to get the amount of their variation as a 
whole. But the weights of the commodities at the second 
period are apt to be different from their weights at the first 
period. Which weights, then, are the right ones-those of 
the first period? or those of the second? or should there be 
a combination of the two sets? There is no reason for 
preferring either the first or the second. Then the combina-
tion of both would seem to be the proper answer. And this 
combination itself involves an averaging of the weights of the 
two periods. 
A hint of this difficulty appeared in Dr. Bowley's problem. 
And there we saw that a wrong system of weighting with a 
wrong average may give the right result. Possibly the same 
may take place here. Perhaps, then, a wrong average with 
a wrong weighting may serve us, even though the right 
average with the right weighting may fail us. It is all the 
plainer how tlose is the connection between the systems of 
weighting and the a verages. 100 
100 In their dispute above reviewed, Jevons simply treated 
the two commodities as equally important. Laspeyres posited 
that they were equally important at the first period only. Then 
Jevons in his reply posited that they were equally important at 
both periods. In this way they were able to use different evenly 
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INDEX-NUMBERS. 
In averaging the price-variations of varying quantities and 
full values of commodities, the whole ground is covered by 
three possible suppositions. (1.) The quantities may be the 
same in both periods, and the full values may vary with the 
prices. (H.) In spite of variations of prices, the full values 
may be the same in both periods, because of inverse varia-
tions of the quantities. (H1.) Both the prices and the quan-
tities may vary irregularly, and therefore also the full values 
vary. The first two suppositions are very improbable, as the 
third is the one which almost always takes place; for the 
usual course of things is that, the exchange-value of money 
remaining nearly stable, in most commodities a rise of price 
generally goes with a diminution of quantity, and a fall of 
price with an augmentation of quantity, or reversely (for 
here, that is, for our purpose, it is indifferent which is cause 
and which effect). These opposite movements may tend to 
keep the full values more stable than either of the factors. 
But there always is much irregularity. Now, the first two 
suppositions contain separately the elements into which the 
third can be analysed; and therefore, as logical method 
enjoins going from the simple to the complex, we may 
briefly review the matter in this order, since the first two 
suppositions, though not probable in practice, are possible 
in theory. 
Throughout the following let us represent quantities by q, 
prices by p, and price-levels by P. The quantities and 
prices of particular commodities may be distinguished by 
accents, and those of different periods by subscript numerals. 
Full values, then, which may be represented by v, are = qp. 
(1.) The quantities being the same in both periods, there is 
no need of subscripts for them. The case is formulated thus: 
P 2 _ q'P2' + q1P2" + ql'P2"' + ... to n tenns 
PI - q'PI' + q"pr" + qIIlPI '1I + ... to n terms 
_ '2,qP2 '2, V 2 
- 'iqPI = '2,v l " 
(1) 
weighted averages. But neither of them inquired whether the 
weighting they chose fitted the average they used. They may 
have hit upon a right combination, or not, but they put forth no 
effort to prove what was right or wrong in the matter. They 
did not posit all the possible, nor even the most likely, com-
binations of weighting. They refrained from any systematic 
inquiry into the subject. 
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It is evident that the price-level has varied according to the 
sums of the full values (and the exchange-value of money 
has varied inversely). A whole people (or a sample portion 
of it) has purchased the same quantities at different prices. 
This is the same as saying the average person has bought his 
portions of the goods, the same in both periods, at different 
prices. Obviously if he has bought them all with the same 
expenditure, their average price has not changed; if he has 
bought them with a greater expenditure, their average price 
has risen; and if he has bought them with a lesser expendi-
ture, their average price has fallen; and the rise or fall is 
proportional to the greater or lesser expenditure.l°I The 
case here is one of gain and loss. Suppose the total expendi-
tures are the same; this means that what you gain by the 
fall of one price you lose by the equal rise (arithmetically 
reckoned) of another, or by a distribution of it over several 
others. Or again, if the price of one article has risen 50 per 
cent. (in the usual way of reckoning percentage), it can be 
compensated by another falling 50 per cent., or by two others 
falling 25 per cent. each, or the one 30 per cent. and the other 
20 per cent., etc. It is Nozzolini's interpretation of the 
problem of estimation over again. But how about the 
average of the price-variations? Is this necessarily and only 
the arithmetic average, as that example would seem to 
require? No; for the weighting that has to be employed in 
the averaging brings in diversity. 
The equation of formula b above (p. 31) exactly to two 
other formulce and approximately to a third, can be imitated 
here. The formula just given is equal to this, 
P , P " P '" ~2 X q'p , + _2_ X q"p " + _2_ X q"'p '" + P 2 _PI 1 Pr" 1 PI'" 1 ... 
PI - q'Pl' + q"PI" + q'"PI''' + ... 
~v P2 
1 PI 
=~ (2) 
which is the formula for the arithmetic ave1'age of the price-
variations with weighting according to the full values of the 
first period. It is also equal to this, 
101 If the prices all vary alike, say by r, evelY P2 would be 
rp" and every V 2 would be rv1 , and the variation of the price-
level would be r. If the quantities all vary alike, say by s, 
every q2 would be sq" and the variation of the price-level could 
be obtained by dividing the result by s. 
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~ v? 
= ~V"l' (3) 
~ 2P2 
which is the formula for the harmonic average of the price-
variations with weighting according to the full values of the 
second period.102 It is also found by trial to be, mostly, 
apprQ}..'imately equal to this, 
P 2 _ 'J.q ¥I:~ (P2')Q' II p'IP'2 (P2") q" I/ PI"?)': (P2"') q'" Y PI"'P2'" 
P - P , . P 11 P "' ... , (4) 
1 III
which is the formula for the geometric average of the price-
variations with weighting according to the full values over 
both the periods. loa Thus Galileo's advocacy of the geometric 
average fares here almost as well as Nozzolini's advocacy of 
the arithmetic. For Nozzolini could advocate the arithmetic 
average here only with a weighting for which no reason can 
be given, and which is no better than another weighting 
which, used with the harmonic average, gives the same result, 
so that he must share the honours of the arithmetic average 
with the harmonic average; whereas the geometric average, 
itself apparently the right one, is used with the right weight-
ing, so that everything about it seems to be in its favour. 
Yet it fails, since it does not give with perfect accuracy the 
result known to be the right one. We have the paradox, 
that wrong averages with wrong weightings give the right 
result, while the right average with the right weighting does 
not. 
102 If the P/s are all the same, formula 2 reduces to ~VI2. 
l~V1 
If the P2'S are all the same, formula 3 reduces to {2~V2 . 
""V2Pl 
103 The full values of the two periods are compared, not by 
their arithmetic, but by their geometric mean. The reason for 
this is given in M. G. E.- v., pp. 10S-10, rr8-21, 387-8. For the 
proof of this formula's approximation to the others, see above, 
~ote ~S. Further cf. M. G. E.- V., p. 3So. The first two id en-
tificatlOns are repeated by Professor Fisher in The Purchasing 
Power of Money, pp. 36S, 397, cf. 393-S; but he apparently has 
no use for the similitude of the third additional formula (4). 
And the first alone is repeated by Professor Mitchell, Index-
Numbers of Wholesale Prices, pp. 92-3 and n. 
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The geometric average, however, does give the right result 
with perfect accuracy in one still more narrowed case, when, 
in fact, it is reduced to being the geometric mean between 
two equally important and hence evenly weighted price-
variations. If we deal with only two commodities, or with 
two groups of commodities, and if their full values over the 
two periods together are equal (geometrically measured, that 
is by their products), then it is demonstrable that the geome-
tric mean of their two price-variations with even weighting 
is the same as the arithmetic average of them with the weight-
ing of the first period, and as the harmonic average of them 
with the weighting of the second period. This may be 
represented simply as follows, 
JP2' P2" _ q'P2' + q"P2" PI' . PI" - q'Pl' + q"Pr'" 
on condition that q'Pr' . q'P2' = q"Pl" . q"P2".10a.. And so, 
after all, the geometric mean with the right weighting, where 
it is applicable, does give the right result. It is only the 
geometric average that is at fault. 
The reason for this agreement in the case of the geometric 
mean, depends on the well-known proposition that between 
only two terms the geometric mean is the geometric mean 
between their arithmetic and their harmonic means. And 
the reason why the geometric average, in formula (4), applied 
to more than two equally important price-variations (and 
even to two that are not equally important 104), is only 
103'· Theproof is given in M. G. E.-V., pp. 519-20, cf. 351-2. 
In this case the arithmetic and harmonic means are not subject 
to the objections brought against them in the case of estimations. 
Those objections apply to these averages only when used with 
the weighting proper to the geometric average. When used 
with their own proper weightings, they give the right result. 
104 For then we no longer have two single items, since one of 
the named items is composed of more than one real item. If 
the two articles are only slightly divergent in importance over 
the two periods (the prices diverging but slightly), the geometric 
average with its proper weighting will still be very close to the 
two others with their proper weighting; but it will diverge con-
siderably from them if the one article becomes three or four times 
more important than the other, and its discrepancy may even 
be very great with a still greater divergence of the relative 
weights: cf. M. G. E.-V., pp. 365-7. Something analogous to 
this is stated by Professor Fisher, Purchasing Power of Money, 
pp. 412-13 n., although what he there says is applied to the 
geometric average wrongly, because evenly, weighted. 
DEVIATIONS AND VARIATIONS 95 
approximately true (in ordinary cases), depends on the fact 
that between more than two terms the geometric average 
is not exactly (except for special reasons), but only approxi-
mately, the geometric mean between their arithmetic and 
harmonic averages, as anyone may see who will take the 
trouble to look into the matter, although this fact is often 
ignored. lo5 And anyone can find that the geometric average 
of all the terms is sometimes above and sometimes below 
the geometric mean of the other two averages of them; 
and the same he will find to hold of formula (4) compared 
with either of the three preceding formulce. And we can 
find this general rule, that if the prices of the preponderating 
commodities (those with the greater weights) rise above the 
average price-variation, formula (4) gives a result above the 
other three, and if they fall below that average, it gives a 
result below the others.1 06 Even so, that is, if it happens 
(which is not likely) that the prices of all the preponderating 
commodities vary in the same direction and the prices of 
all the less impOliant commodities vary in the opposite 
direction (compared with the variation of the price-level), 
the discrepancy of formula (4) from the others is found to be 
small, unless the opposite price-variations are excessive; 
and of course in the more usual cases of a mixture of the 
variations and the weights, such as occur in practice, some 
of the preponderating commodities rising and others falling 
in price, and some of the less important commodities falling 
and others rising, and none or few varying greatly, the discre-
pancy will be still smaller, and may even be reduced to 
nothing. And in a series of measurements extending over 
many periods, as the errors will sometimes be in excess and 
sometimes in defect, there will not be cumulation, but there 
will be neutralisation, of the errors, wherefore it is probable 
that the total error will increase in amount very slowly. 
105 It has been ignored even after the proof of it was first given 
in M. C. E. -V., p. 5I7. Thus as late as I9I3 Zizek and his 
American translator assert that" of the three means of the same 
set of values [no limitation being made to two values] the geometric 
is always the geometric mean of the other two," the arithmetic 
and the harmonic, Statistical A verages, p. I32 n., and again 
pp. I96-; n. In the last passage Zizek illustrates the proposition 
by an instance of two figures. Had he tried it on three figures, 
he would have seen his mistake. 
106 M. C. E.-V., p. 365. Unfortunately the rule, there given 
in italics, by a double slip inverts the true statement. Cf. 
pp. 32I, 52I. 
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(II.) The full values remaining the same at both periods, 
this supposition means that ' the community has the same 
total income in both the periods, and lays it out in the same 
sums to purchase the various commodities, whatever be the 
changes of their prices. I07 If, then, the price of a commo-
dity falls, the community buys more of it; if the price of a 
commodity rises, the community buys less of it-and so does 
the average person in the community. H ence we can 
examine the purchasing power of money directly by the total 
quantities which the same total incomes of the community 
can in this way purchase in the two periods. But a compli-
cation enters here, in that the comparison cannot be merely 
according to the quantities purchasable, since these have 
different preciousness, but it must be according to the 
exchange-values of these quantities; and it cannot be 
according to the exchange-values of these quantities at 
either of the periods alone, but it must be according to their 
exchange-values over both the periods together (of courSE: 
geometrically reckoned).I08 Therefore the ordinary units 
of quantity will not serve, and we must construct units, 
specially for each comparison, that have the same exchange-
value over both the periods. When this is done, we can 
measure variations in the purchasing power of money by 
-averaging the quantities purchasable of such units in very 
much the same way as before, getting three exactly equal 
formulre and another approximately equal to the three. 
But here things are inverted, and the arithmetic average of 
the quantity-variations must use weighting according to the 
units purchased in the second period, and the harmonic 
average must use weighting according to the units purchased 
in the first period; but of course the geometric average will 
continue to use weighting according to the geometric mean 
of the units purchased in both the periods. The formulre 
thus directly giving the variation of the purchasing power 
(or exchange-value) of money, can now easily be turned 
back into formulre of the usual sort giving the variation of the 
price-level. The first of the three equal formulre (for the 
arithmetic and harmonic equivalents may be omitted) has 
either of these two equivalent forms, 
107 If the total income increases or decreases, and the sums 
spent on every commodity are varied in the same proportion, 
the common variation may be divided out, leaving the same 
results as in the text. 
108 For the principle see M. C. E.- v., p_ 304; for the method 
and for the formulre that follow in the text here, see pp. 305-IO. 
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P2 ql'V~ + ql"V~' + ql"'...;-:p;"p;:" + .. . 
or 
PI q2'VPI'P2' + q2"VPI"P2" + q2'''VPI'P2' + .. . 
Z,QIVPIP2 
= ,Q2V~' 
P2 _ 2'~ + 2"V~' + P2"'VQI'"Q2''' + .. . 
PI - PI'VQl'Q2' + PI"VQ/'Q2" + PI"'VQ/"Q2'" + .. . 
_ Z,P2.yM 
- z, PIVqIQj' 
(5) 
(6) 
And the approximately correct geometric average has this 
formula, 
P 2 = :I ,lv'''3/ (P2') 'Vl'V2: (P2") 4Vl""'3': (P2"') 4 .,"'",/" 
PI Y PI' PI" PI'" (7) 
This geometric average errs here just as the corresponding 
geometric average, in formula (4), errs in the preceding 
supposition, no more and no less, not cumulatively, but 
neutralisingly.I09 And, again applied to two commodities 
equally important over both the periods, so that the simple 
geometric mean of their price-variations ( J~:: . ~:::) can 
be used, this method gives the exact truth. no 
But unfortunately, except in the last narrow case of only 
two equally important commodities (or two such groups of 
commodities with similar price-variabons in each group), 
formulre (5) and (6) are open to an objection to which 
formula (I) is not exposed-an objection which shows that 
they are not perfectly true, as that formula is. It would 
seem to be evident that if prices or quantities or both vary 
over a number of periods and then return to exactly the same 
state at a later period as they were in at the first (being the 
same quantities and the same prices of every commodity), 
then the measurement of the variations of the price-level 
from period to period, when combined and strung out in a 
series, should at the last period indicate the same level as at 
the first.ill This is only a negative test; for many different 
erroneous methods-in fact, the very worst method of all, 
109 M. C. E. -v., pp. 321, 323. 
110 M. C. E.-V., p. 330 . 
11l E.g., if the comparison of the second period with the first 
showed a rise of 20 per cent., and the comparison of the third 
with the second showed a fall of 5 per cent., this is a fall from 
P .E. H 
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Dutot's-satisfy it 112; but if a method does not satisfy this 
test, there is something wrong about it. This test is precisely 
analogous to the test which surveyors use in their triangu-
lations; for they measure round many lines and angles until 
they come back to their starting point, and the two ends of 
their measurements ought to fit, and when they do not (as 
they never do), they apply the method of least squares to 
adjust the error over all the intervening measurements.n3 
So here, after three or more measurements of price-variations 
over three or more periods after the starting period, if we 
assume as the next period the conditions of the first period, 
this last measurement, when combined with the others in a 
series, ought to indicate no variation, and if it does indicate 
some variation, it has in so many measurements committed 
error to that extent. This test, which because of its return-
ing to the starting point may be called the circular test, not 
only indicates that a method is erroneous (unfortunately it 
cannot indicate that it is correct), but also indicates the 
amount of its error, and its direction; and when various 
methods are tried by it in application to the same data, it 
indicates fairly well their comparative erroneousness. It is 
not serviceable for testing all methods; for those which 
satisfy it must be tested in other ways. But it is especially 
useful for testing the methods which have otherwise proved 
themsel ves nearly correct. 114 
Now, tried by this test, formula (I), with its two variants, 
shows no error at any later period, however extended be the 
series; and, being otherwise demonstrated, it may be 
regarded as absolutely true, on its purely theoretical condi-
tion, extended of course to require constancy of the quan-
tities over all the periods. But on the condition laid down 
in the present second supposition likewise extended to all the 
120 of '[hr, so that the series is 100, 120, II4. To form the series 
100, 120, II4, 100, the comparison of the fourth (= the first) with 
the third would have to show a fall of 12'3 per cent. This, of 
course, is the inverse of comparing the third with the first, which 
should show a rise of 14 per cent. 
112 M. G. E.-V., pp. 203, 205. This test is a particular appli-
cation of Professor Westergaard's test. The negative nature of 
Professor Westergaard's test has not always been recognised. 
118 This last operation suggests a hint for axiometry. 
lU This circular test is frequently used for this purpose in 
M. G. E.-V., pp. 324-41, 368--10, 389-92, 416-18, and especially 
423-33. When the quantities are not supposed the same at the 
final period, a complication arises: see pp. 399-402. 
DEVIATIONS AND VARIATIONS 99 
periods, the duplicate fOl'mulre (5) and (6) satisfy this test 
only in the case of three periods, but not always in the case 
of four and more periods. The reason is that, in the measure-
ment from the second to the third period the units have been 
changed, and if the next measurement is a comparison with 
the initial state of things, it , too, has another set of units. 
Only if we construct units that are equivalent over the whole 
series of periods compared, will this formula, adapted to such 
an adjustment, satisfy this test, and then only for that set 
of periods; wherefore it does not admit of extension into the 
future,m But, again, it is proved by trial, with the use of 
this test, that the aberration of these equivalent formulre is 
even smaller than that of formula (7), being for ordinary 
price-variations and quantity-variations, such as are likely 
to occur in experience, very small, and sometimes above and 
sometimes below, wherefore their errors are not cumulative, 
but tend to neutralise one another.116 
All the formulre so far given, whatever their merits and 
defects under the conditions supposed, have no practical 
uses, since the suppositions for which they are invented 
never occur actually. But, being simpler, they contribute 
to elucidate the remaining more complex cases, which alone 
represent the actual economic world. But before going on, 
it should be emphasised that all that has been advanced, 
except as to the amounts of error determined by trial, is 
demonstrative, and especially that in the first supposition 
formula (r) and its variants, and even formula (4) when 
restricted to its narrowed condition, are demonstratively 
true-as true as anything in Euclid. The problem of 
measuring the variation of th.e price-level, and inversely of 
the exchange-value of money, IS solved, as far as an economic 
world represented by that supposition is concerned.117 
(IlL) In the actual world both prices and quantities vary, 
so that it contains features from both the preceding imaginary 
economic worlds. Now, neither the arithmetic nor the har-
monic average of price-variations as obtained in the first 
supposition is transferable to this third case, because if we 
use the former with the weighting of the first period and the 
latter with the weighting of the second period, we no longer 
get identical results; and of course it would be absurd to com-
m M. G. E.-V., pp. 334-6; cf. 398-9. 
116 M. G. £.-V., p. 34I. 
117 M .. G. E.-V., pp, 40r-2. That, on this supposition, for-
mula (r) IS the correct method, has been recognised by many 
writers on the subject. Refer'lJ1ces are given, p . 544. 
H 2 
100 THE PROBLEM OF ESTIMATION 
pare merely the sums of the full values of the two periods.u.a 
But the geometric average is transferable from those sup-
positions to this case, because it requires the use of the weight-
ing of both periods. The form of it to be used is that given 
in formula (7); for in formula (4) the q really stands for 
YQlq2' and now YQlQ2PlP2 is = YV 1V2, and formula (7) is 
merely a more comprehensive, or distinguishing form of 
formula (4) . Now, if our third supposition is confined to a 
world with only two commodities, or of two groups of 
commodities in each of which the prices vary alike, and if, 
further, these two have the same importance over both the 
periods compared, then the simple geometric mean of these 
price-variations yields the absolutely true measurement of 
the variation of the price-leve1.119 But our misfOliune is 
that the geometric average applied to more than two equally 
118 Suppose we draw the arithmetic average of the price-
variations with the weighting of the first period: this gives us 
P "2ft2)p "2P pi = \PI Iql =---.:tb., which is the method recommended 
I "2Plql "2'hql 
by Laspeyres. Or suppose we use it with the weighting of the 
second period: thus ~i = "2(~)2q2 = "2 (Pf)q2, which is a 
I "2P2Qa "2v 2 
method recommended by Palgrave. An arithmetic mean 
between these has ne,,:"e~ been recommended. Evidently none 
of. these have an~ va.lIdIty. Nor would th~ harmonic average 
WIth any such weIghtmgs. Yet the harmomc average with the 
weighting of the second period gives Pp2 = :P2Q2, which has been 
I ~IQ2 
recommended by Paasche; and with the weighting of the first 
. d' . P a "2v I • peno It gIves PI (P21) - , WhIch has been recommended by 
"2 - ql 
P2 
nobody. 
m A~ do also formulre 6 (already given) and 8, 9, and 10 (still 
to be gIVen). See M. G. E.- V., pp. 402-3, 413, 422. We may 
now perceive the solution of the Jevons-Laspeyres dispute. It 
the two commodities are equally important over both the periods 
together, Jevons was right. If they were as Laspeyres supposed 
them to be, Laspeyres was right. But neither was fully right 
nl~s.s he expressly confined his solution to the particular sup-
pOSItion about the weights (or the quantities). This was done 
by neither of them. Cf. M. G. E.- v., p. 354. 
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important commodities is only approximative even under 
the first two suppositions, and it can be no more than 
approximative for the present case. The expectation that 
we could pass from the geometric mean to the geometric 
average has not been fulfilled. Like Moses, we have just 
caught a glimpse of the promised land, and are then kept out 
of it. But we have come near it, and we may abide near it. 
The geometric average is approximative in the present 
general case just as much, and in the same way-not cumula-
tively, but neutralisingly-as it was in those special cases. 
Other approximations may also be made. The geometric 
method is not the only one that can be taken over from the 
earlier suppositions to this third. In the second supposition 
formula (6) can be used without the condition that qIPl is = 
q2P2, that is, it can be used generally, or under our third 
supposition.lZO And now it yields results, as tested by our 
circular test, as good, but no better, than it yielded there. 
This formula (6), being analysed as formula b above was 
analysed, may be shown to be (I) the arithmetic average of 
the price-variations with weighting according to the prices 
of the first period multiplied by the geometric mean between 
the quantities of the two periods; (2) the harmonic average 
of the price-variations with weighting according to the prices 
of the second period multiplied by the same geometric means. 
By analogy we see that it will also be approximately (3) the 
geometric average of the price-variations with weighting 
according to the geometric means between the full values of the 
two periods. It is, then, approximately equal to formula (7). 
This is the inverse of what we knew before; for we have 
known that formula (7) is approximately equal to it . In 
the second supposition formula (6) is better than formula (7). 
Therefore in general we may expect formula (6) to be better 
than formula (7)-better than the geometric method. 
Another approximative method can be obtained by com-
bining the best results from the two elementary suppositions, 
that is, combining formula (I), in which the quantities of the 
two periods must be distinguished, with formula (5), which 
cannot be taken over alone as could formula (6), into this: 
P 'p '+ "P" + ' . Ip 'p , + "Vp "p " + -1_ qz 2 q2 2 ... ql 'V 1 2 ql 1 2 ... 
P - 'P' + "P" + " . Ip 'p '+ " . Ip "p " + 1 ql 1 ql 1 ... qz'V 1 Z qz 'V 1 Z ... 
_ ~Vz "i.ql..;p;p; 
- "i.v 1 . 2.q ZVPIPz' 
(8) 
m Cf. M. G. E.-V., p. 360. This method is there called Scrope's 
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in which it is evident that if the quantities are the same in 
both the periods, it reduces to formula (r), and if the full 
values are the same in both the periods, it reduces to formula 
(5). There is good reasoning leading up to this combination, 
too long to repeat here; 121 and yet this formula does not 
satisfy the circular test any better than does either the 
properly weighted geometric average or formula (6), though 
it meets that test about as well as they do.122 
Again: we have remarked that in the present extensive 
supposition the arithmetic average with the weighting of the 
first period and the harmonic average with the weighting of 
the second period yield different results. The fact is, as trial 
shows, they yield results which, when tested by the circular 
test, are found to lie on opposite sides of the truth, and 
apparently equally above and below it proportionally. This 
suggests taking the geometric mean between them, which 
works out as follows, 
p 2 _ /'i,=q-J;--;-2----;~"q-2:-2 _ / 'i,q J; 2 'i,v 2 (9) 
PI - V 'i,qJ;l . 'i,q2Pl - V 'i,q2Pl . 'i,v1 . 
This method still fails to satisfy the circular test; but perhaps 
it satisfies it best of all,123 Note that it involves the arith-
metic average, the harmonic average, the weightings of the 
first and second periods, and the geometric mean. It is, too, 
neither more nor less than the geometric mean between two 
forms of formula (r) applied to the quantities of the two 
periods one at a time. It seems to contain everything that 
could be desired. 
Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9, then, are four methods which seem 
to have much in their favour. They all keep very close 
together, and each comes very near to satisfying the circular 
test; and they err sometimes above and sometimes below 
the truth, so that their errors are not cumulative over a series 
of successive periods, but tend to neutralise one another. 124 
emended method, pp. 373, 543. It would have been better if this 
method, in all its forms, had been called Lowe's method. 
121 See M. G. E.-V., pp. 374-82. 
122 This method is analysed and compared with Drobisch's, 
Lehr's, and Nicholson's, in M. G. E.-V., pp. 383-96, and with 
formula! (6) and (7), pp. 396-407. 
123 This method is not formulated in M. G. E.- V.; but in 
note r6, on p. 429, it is tested and found wanting, but it happens 
to meet this particular test better than do any of the preceding 
methods. It was unduly overlooked in that work. 
124 For remarks on the comparative merits of three of them, 
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We have seen reason to believe formula (6) better than 
formula (7) . Perhaps formula (9) is the best of the rest, 
but between it and Nos. 6 and 8 it would be difficult to decide 
with assurance. The circular test may provide the criterion. 
Only it will require many laborious operations before a 
decision can be made. Who will undertake the labour? 
It may be questioned whether any method can be found 
that will satisfy the circular test perfectly, at the same time 
showing other ear-marks of correctness; for, as we have 
seen, the test can easily be satisfied by many wrong methods. 
The problem ofaxiometry may after all be mathematically 
insoluble with perfect precision, like the problem of squaring 
the circle. 125 l\Iathematicians can work out the value of the 
symbol 7i to any number of decimals; but practical workers 
rarely employ more than four or five. Surveyors, in working 
around a territory and coming back to their base, never strike 
it with perfect accuracy; and even after adjusting their 
measurements they are not sure of their results to every 
millimetre. If, then, our best methods, after proceeding 
over"many periods, when worked back to their starting point, 
do not fit into it with perfect exactness, we need not be dis-
couraged. Their precision is sufficient for practical purposes. 
Indeed, their precision is greater than is needed, when we 
consider the lack of precision that exists in the data that are 
presented to these methods to operate upon. Therefore 
even less precise methods may be adopted in practice, if more 
convenient and yet fairly agreeing with these theoretically 
best methods. 
see M. G. E.- v., p. 407. Unfortunately the fourth, formula (9), 
was not there discussed. 
120 Cf. M. G. E.- V., p. 408. There in a note some hints are 
offered for possible improvement of formula (7) . Perhaps the 
reason why that formula fails is because in the compound unit 
constructed that is to have the same exchange-value over both 
the periods together, there is error due to the fact that the full 
values at the two periods are reckoned in moneys of different 
exchange-value, and it is impossible to allow for that fact till the 
measurement of the variation of the exchange-value of money is 
completed, whereas that compound unit is needed for the making 
of that very measurement. Now, one of the exchange-values of 
money must be smaller than the other, and therefore its greater 
smallness should be allowed for. The arithmetic mean does not 
allow for it. The geometric mean allows for it too much. There-
fore some intermediate mean is needed that will allow for it 
correctly. 
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All these four theoretically best methods contain a geome-
tric feature, involving the extraction of square roots. These 
operations, even with the aid of logarithms, are laborious. 
Two methods, substituting an arithmetic for the geometric 
mean, have been proposed. The first, independently sug-
gested by Professor Marshall and by Professor Edgeworth, 
has been actually recommended by the latter and by the 
British Association Committee.126 The second has been 
merely suggested, like\'.rise independently, by Drobisch and 
Sidgwick,llI7 and has been used by Dr. Bowley, as will be seen 
presently. They are 
and 
P 2 ~(ql + q2)P2 
PI = ~(ql + Q2)PI' (ro) 
(Il) 
The first of these arithmeticises formula (6), and the second 
arithmeticises formula (9). Which is the better, theory does 
not say, although jf (9) is better than (6), (Il) is probably 
better than (ro). To decide between them appeal must 
again be made to the laborious task of testing them many 
times by the circular test. 128 Sufficient trial of them has 
already been made to show that even in unfavourable 
examples they come pretty close to the theoretically best 
methods. This congruence, along with their practical 
convenience, is the proper, and the only proper, reason for 
recommending them; and on this ground, formula (ro), 
being easier, may be preferred to formula (Il). Other 
methods, many of them in use to-day, are absolutely bad 
and pernicious. In many of them the errors are so great 
126 First Report, pp. 249-50; Edgeworth's Memora11dum 
thereto, p. 266. ef. M. G. E.-V, p. 543. 
127 Both suggestions were merely incidental. Sidgwick made 
his in a footnote, in which he added the remark that such a mean 
is wanting in " practical significance," Political Economy, p. 68 n. 
Likewise Wicksell has said that the use of this mean has only a 
" conventional meaning," and therefore he rejected it, Geldzil1s 
und Giiterpreise, Jena, 1898, pp. 8-9. 
128 The single use of this test in M. G. E.- V., pp. 427-8, shows 
a slight advantage in formula (rr). Formula (10) is examined in 
that work at length, pp. 409-23. There it is shown that this 
method and Lehr's method apparently err almost equally on 
opposite sides of the truth, suggestive of drawing a mean between 
them, though this would be too laborious for practice. 
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and so cumulative, that they cannot be used in the proper 
way, in the" chain" system; but must be measured from 
a common base, and then they give rise to all sorts of hap-
hazard weighting, involving unknowable errors, when later 
periods (the more recent periods) are compared with one 
another. All these should be thrown on the scrap heap.l29 
The two before us are sufficiently easy; and anyone who will 
shirk the trouble of working them, should abandon the 
subject. These two, then, may be declared unequivocally 
the best practical methods; and it is only necessary for the 
practical workers to come together and choose between them. 
Let us illustrate the matter by an example. In the 
chapter on index-numbers in his Elements 0/ Statistics 
Dr. Bowley uses an example with three commodities, one 
of which IS made to vary rather violently in price and 
quantity, as follows: 
First year. Second year. 
s. d. 
6 quart ems bread at 6d. 3 0 
4 Ibs. meat at 7d. 2 4 
t lb. tea at 3s. 1 6 
610 
7 quarterns at 5d. 
5 Ibs. at 8d. . It Ibs. at IS. 4d .. 
s. d. 
2 II 
3 4 
2 0 
8 3 
On these data Dr. Bowley performs five operations, rejects 
three as resting" on no sound hypothesis," and retains the 
first two because" they may be regarded" as giving" inferior 
and superior limits of the index-number, which may be 
estimated as their arithmetic mean (80'5) as a first approxi-
mation "{pp. 226-7). This final performance is in accord 
m There is, however, one practical method which avoids those 
errors and the consequent condemnation. This is the method 
used by Lowe and recommended by Scrope, and by many others 
since, notably by G. H. Knibbs, who calls it "the aggregate 
expenditure method," Prices, Indexes, alld Cost of Living in 
Atlstralia, 1912, pp. II-I4. Professor Mitchell, who adopts the 
same name for it, describes it thus: "By this method the cost 
of an unvarying bill of goods is calculated at the varying prices 
prevailing during different years," Index-Numbers and Wholesale 
Prices, p. 160. Its formula is No. I above, but with the q's 
representing no real quantities, but only general estimates of the 
average quantities that have been used during certain years. 
Professor Mitchell recommends it because its results can be 
shifted from one base to another. This is analogous to saying it 
satisfies the circular test. But we have seen that this test does 
not prove the correctness of a method. The truthfulness of a 
106 THE PROBLEM OF ESTIMATION 
with formula (Il) (multiplied by 100 to bring the result into 
comparison with 100 as the starting point)-and perhaps 
Dr. Bowley is the first to put that formula into operation. 
But because of these" may be's" Dr. Bowley's readers can 
hardly be impressed with the validity of this result, and still 
less when they remember that he has belittled the use of 
weighting (and never once mentioned double weighting, 
which is here employed) except in cases of great variations 
and few items, such as this is, and for such cases has recom-
mended the geometric average. Moreover, he himself casts 
doubt on the result by speaking of it as "a first approxima-
tion," though he gives no hint of any subsequent procedure. l30 
We are not surprised, then, that in his latest utterance on the 
subject, in a paper on The MeaS1trement of Changes in the 
Cost oJ L iving in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
May, 1919 (pp. 348-9), Dr. Bowley says little in favour of 
this method (which there is given as Method Ill.), but thinks 
it "appears valid" for certain purposes. This is not the 
way to recommend a good method. 
Now, on applying to these data the several theoretically 
best methods, worked out to the second decimal for distinct-
ness, and giving Dr. Bowley's also in this form, along with 
the other practical method, we get the following results: 
No. 6, giving index-numbers 80'92, indicating fall of 19'08 per cent. 
}} 7 81 '07 18 '93 
}} 8 80'80 19'20 
" 9 80'32 19'68 
"10,, ,,79'34 20'66 
" Il Dr. Bowley's ,,80'47 19'53 
If formula (9) be the best of the theoretically best methods, 
we see that Dr. Bowley's " first approximation," the practical 
formula (Il), is better, here at least, than some of the 
theoretically best, Here again also it looks better than 
No, 10, Then let us recommend it firmly, and not with 
mere" may be's," 131 
To return to theory: would anything be gained by drawing 
an average of the results yielded by several methods? 
method should not be sacrificed to obtain this and some other 
merely apparent advantages, But in past epochs, when the 
annual variations of quantities cannot now be ascertained, this 
is by all odds the best practical method to use, 
130 J evons likewise had spoken of his simple geometric average 
as " a first approximation," without making any second, Inves-
tigations, p. 122. 
131 M, G, E.-V. was published three months after the first 
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Hardly, as they have clifferent merits. All that we can do is 
to choose the best, after testing all the candidates; for to 
average the others with the best, would only vitiate the 
result. This is said in spite of Professor Edgeworth to the 
contrary, who has advocated such averaging of various 
methods in his first Mernol'andU'1"n (pp. 266, 297). Only if 
two methods can be shown to err nearly equally on opposite 
sides of the truth, can a mean between them give a closer 
approach to the truth, and then this mean constitutes a new 
method, as in formulre (9) and (II).132 Professor Edgeworth 
apparently conceives of all the methods as so many chance 
shots at a mark, and, having no knowledge of any way of 
testing them, he relies on the theory of probabilities that they 
are likely to err equally on opposite sides, so that their 
average is more likely to approximate to the truth. But 
this procedure rests on the supposition that the observations 
are made with equal care, or else they must be weighted-
and no astronomer or surveyor would include very carelessly 
made observations. But the methods which Professor 
Edgeworth would average are not made with equal care: 
some of them have been invented without any care whatever, 
being mere first guesses. They would, then, need to be 
weighted. But nobody can reckon the comparative careful-
ness with which the different methods have been invented. 
Therefore the only way to compare methods is to try them 
on cases where the true result is known, whereby we can 
measure their comparative erroneousness and their compara-
tive accuracy. And then we should choose the best, and let 
the others go. 
PROBABILITIES AND THE MEDIAN. 
Making reference, reported in the Journal 0/ the Royal 
Statistical Society, May, I9I9 (p. 366), to The Measurement 
01 General Exchange- Value, Professor Edgeworth criticised 
that work for "attempting to dispense with the need of 
Probabilities." If that work has any merit, it is because of 
that attempt. That work aimed at precision, at the attain-
ment of absolutely correct results as far as within our power-
not at " the juclicious compromise and happy ambiguity" of 
another writer, which Professor Edgeworth in a previous 
edition of Dr. Bowley's work. Consequently the means of testing 
the method he so slightingly recommended were in existence 
when Dr. Bowley revised his later eclitions. 
132 And compare what is said in note 128. 
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review of that work held up for imitation.133 Everything 
in it about the theory of averaging price-variations is 
demonstrative, except the calculations of the amounts of 
error of methods proved not to be correct. But for the 
unexpected breakdown of the geometric average in not 
fulfilling the promise of the geometric mean, that work would 
have left no room for the use of probabilities in the theory 
of the subject, but only in its application to practice. 
In that work the best methods of averaging price-varia-
tions were put to various tests-among them the circular 
test, never before used for measuring their comparative 
errors, and unfortunately never since made use of; and they 
were thus tested on hypothetical examples, and those 
examples were mostly, as in the usual practice with other 
writers, cases of two commodities varying in price (and often 
in quantity) oppositely. Two commodities were chosen 
because they are the simplest, and because they are always 
sufficient to disprove a method, though not always sufficient 
to prove one. They were chosen also because it is natural, 
in balancing opposite forces or influences, first to use two, 
and ' only later to extend the investigation to the case of 
many. And those two prices were generally supposed to 
vary extravagantly. This was in order that they should 
-serve, like Bacon's instantice ostensivce, to magnify any error 
that might lurk in the method under examination, and thus 
lay it open to more ready detection; and especially this was 
done when the erroneousness of different methods was being 
compared. Nobody knows better than Professor Edgeworth 
(for he has drawn attention to it 184) that different kinds of 
averages applied to the same many slightly divergent figures 
yield nearly the same results. Therefore little information 
can be elicited from applying the different kinds of averages 
to ordinary cases of price-variations; and while we have 
them in our power, as we have in hypotheses, it is the part 
of wisdom to make them strongly divergent, that the averages 
may be clearly distinguished. 
This is not Professor Edgeworth's method, and it seems to 
have displeased him. So much so that he has lost his 
judicial balance; for at the same time he made the above 
criticism he added another, to the effect that of the work in 
question" a great part was devoted to the investigation of a 
formula proper to the case, in which there were only two 
133 In the Economic Journal, September, I90I, p. 4IO. 
134 In the Economic Journal, March, I896, pp. I36-7. 
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prices! "ISS This is simply a misstatement of fact, all the 
more astonishing as that work was the first to point out the 
danger of relying on only two items in dealing with the 
geometric average.136 But that work did make much use 
of two prices of the sort mentioned, in negative tests mostly, 
or else in comparative tests. This is the point of offence to 
Professor Edgeworth. In the Econo'mic jomnal of March, 
I8g6, Professor N. G. Pierson made an attack on index-
numbers, in which he used extravagant price-variations of 
two groups of commodities described as "equally impor-
tant," their full values being posited as equal sometimes at 
the first period, sometimes at the second, and sometimes over 
both together. Then he applied to these price-variations 
the same system of index-numbers-the arithmetic average 
\ovith even weighting. Naturally he got very discordant 
results. Thereupon, without making any attempt to solve 
the difficulty, except by suggesting another worse system, 
the error of which he discovered, he hastily concluded that 
" all attempts to calculate and represent average movements 
of prices, either by index-numbers or otherwise, ought to be 
abandoned" (p. I3I). In the same number of that journal 
Professor Edgeworth took up the cudgels in A Defence of 
Index-Numbers. How did he conduct the defence? Did he 
point out that Professor Pierson, while using always the 
simple arithmetic average, had really obtained the " equal 
importance" of his groups in three different ways, only one 
of which could be proper for that average, though the others 
might be proper for the other averages? And did he show 
that each of the three simple averages applied to the suppo-
sition fitted for it would yield the correct result, and that the 
same would be given by the other averages (or by the geome-
tric at least approximately) when applied to the same 
suppositions, each with its proper weighting? No, he knew 
nothing of all this. He perceived, indeed, and pointed out, 
that different weightings were involved. He put his finger 
on the source of the trouble. But he did not know the 
remedy. So he brushed aside the various suppositions, 
calling them (( odd" "in view of the sporadic dispersion [of 
price-variations] which very generally prevails in this 
world" (p. I33). In their place he advised us to deal only 
135 This and the preceding are only repetitions of criticisms 
made in the review already referred to, several pages of which 
were devoted to the discussion of a problem in probabilities 
entirely irrevelant to the main subject. 
136 ef. above, note 68. 
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with" concrete, sporadically dispersed, price-ratios," mean-
ing many and not very divergent price-variations, as these 
would show only "insignificant" discrepancies; and to 
make our experiments, not on "artificially simplified 
examples," but "in the spirit of Probabilities," "not 
consciously selecting cases which will not work well" (p. 135). 
Such conscious selection of extravagant examples, simplified 
by confinement to two articles, but with their discrepancies 
magnified for better discrimination, we have seen purposely 
made by Galileo in his controversy with Nozzolini; and we 
have seen Nozzolini throw them out as improbable absurdities 
unfit for consideration by rational dialecticians, but really 
because they were cases that would not work well according 
to his view of the s~ject. It may be submitted that 
Professor Edgeworth follows Nozzolini rather than Galileo 
in his method of treating the subject. He would purposely 
confine attention to examples which minimise discrepancies 
and so hide the need of getting rid of them. · If this is 11 the 
spirit of Probabilities," it is not the spirit of science. 
But Professor Edgeworth has two special reasons for 
objecting to the use of only two prices. The one is that they 
do not admit the use of the calculus of probabilities; the 
other, that they do not admit the use of another pet of his, 
the median. Of the latter, later. As for the former, the 
fact that an example of two price-variations excludes the 
calculus of probabilities, merely proves that the calculus of 
probabilities should not be invoked-until it is needed. But 
Professor Edgeworth has made up his mind that "the 
problem now before us, in its data, methods and result, is 
germane to the Calculus of Probabilities." 137 So convinced 
is he of this that, as he tells us in another paper, if a case 
should turn up in experience of two large groups of commo-
dities simultaneously rising and falling in price, he would 
deny to the idea of a variation in the exchange-value of 
money any determinate meaning. His words are: "That 
in such a case the exchange-value of money has varied by so 
much, would appear to me a somewhat indefinite proposition 
-its subject deficient in logical clearness, and its predicate 
in numerical precision." Think of it! Because his demand 
for" Probabilities" has no application to this case, he denies 
to it significance! He denies, too, that the problem in this 
case admits of solution, for he adds: "On such a supposition 
137 Ibid., p. 132. He asserts that this 11 is generally implied," 
but does not say by whom. 
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the objections which have been urged by a dist inguished 
economist against index-numbers, that the results are widely 
different according as different species of averages are 
employed, would seem to me a fatal objection." 138 That is, 
Professor Pierson 's unweighted and t rivial objections are to 
be allowed, if such things happen ! Most certainly Professor 
Edgewortb has not answered Professor Pierson-has not 
known how to answer him, and does not wish to know. The 
balancing of opposite price-variations-how the rise of one 
price may compensate, or come short of or exceed in com-
pensating, the fall of another-remains beyond his ken. 
Yet what about the doubly weighted method indicated by 
formula (ro), which Professor Edgeworth has joined others 
in recommending? That method is perfectly applicable to 
this case, provided data about the quantities be also supplied. 
and it would give a result insignificantly discrepant from the 
results given by the theoretically best methods. Would 
Professor Edgeworth throw it overboard also, merely because 
some other wrongly weighted averages might give widely 
different results? Again, Professor Edgeworth is one of 
those who hold that formula (r) is correct on the supposition 
that the quantities have not varied.139 Would he say that 
this is no longer true, or that it has no meaning, if only two 
prices vary? And how about Dr. Bowley's example, above 
cited? That has three commodities, to be sure; but when 
does the number used begin to have meaning? In that 
example the price-variations are, at least, not sporadic, so 
that Professor Edgeworth would still have to discard it. 
Professor Edgeworth would have done better to confine 
himself, as before, to denying the probability of such things 
happening. 140 But he has admitted that it can happen by 
taking it into consideration; and now it seems strange if he 
cannot understand a problem which so many other econo-
mists-Jevons, Laspeyres, Messedaglia, etc.-have worked 
at, though unsuccessfully. Just because another has 
succeeded where they have failed and he himself has not 
tried-is that a reason for him to continue looking at the 
subject through a mist? The assertion may be added: if 
the case he supposed should happen, and if in addition it 
138 In the Eco1wmic journal, September, I90I, p. 408. Page4Io 
he says the widely different results may amount" as likely as not 
to 25 per cent." 
139 Memorandum to the first Report, pp. 264, 272, 293. 
140 This, in fact, he does again do, a little fw·ther on in the same 
paper, Economic journal, September, I90I, p. 4IO. 
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happened that the two groups should change in price in 
inverse ratio, and if they were of equal importance over both 
the periods together, then, no matter how many other 
commodities remained unchanged in price, the exchange-
value of money has remained constant. And this proposi-
tion has been proved and demonstrated, and is as certain (to 
repeat), and (we may add) as plain, as anything in Euclid. 
If Professor Edgeworth can disprove that proposition, let 
him do so. If he cannot, what value has his statement that 
he cannot see the meaning in it ? 141 
But here a concession may be made. Even if an abso-
lutely correct method of averaging price-variations were 
discovered, or one as correct as the use of the arithmetic 
average in reducing observations (and have we not reached 
one as good as that ?), yet the application of it to practice 
would give occasion for error, just as €ven the application of 
an absolutely exact yard stick to measuring the length of a 
line would give rise to error. Now, The Measurement of 
General Exchange-Value might have been a little more 
explicit by making some allusion to these errors of appli-
1U Professor Edgeworth seems to desire to retain what Mill 
called "the necessary indefiniteness of the idea of general 
exchange value," and says" we will never reach an exactly true 
method [of measuring it] ... until we are able to handle and 
weigh final utility, or ... < esteerri value: as we do material 
commodities" (ibid., p. 409) . On the contrary, we shall never 
reach an exactly true method even of understanding exchange-
value until we cease to mix with it the idea of esteem-value. 
Anyone who accepts Mill's denial of the possibility of measm-ing 
general exchange-value (a denial due to ignoring the balancing 
of opposite variations) ought, like Mill himself, to refrain from 
working over price index-numbers. Professor Edgeworth further 
agrees with Professor Marshall that, in the world as it is, "an 
absolutely perfect standard [of exchange value] is < unthink-
able'" (P.4IO). There is, of course, some inconsistency in saying 
that something one is thinking about is "unthinkable"; but 
the meaning seems to be that it is unthinkable, that is, it cannot 
be rightly thought that such a thing exists or can exist-that is, 
again, it must be thought or believed that the thing does not or 
cannot exist. But such a statement needs proof. Well, 
M. C. E.-V. has gone perhaps the furthest of all in showing that 
an absolutely perfect standard of exchange-value, in the complex 
economic world, does not exist, just as (see above, p. I03) there 
is no absolutely perfect value of r., or just as an absolutely perfect 
value of 7T is « unthinkable," since we simply cannot think what 
it is. See in that work p. 408. 
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cation according to the theory of probabilities. It might 
have expatiated more on the inaccuracy of observations 
or measurements, and on the probability of the increase or 
decrease of errors. The theory of probabilities shows that 
if in measuring a given magnitude four times as many 
observations be used as at first, the accuracy of the result, 
as indicated by its" probable error," is doubled, that,. is, it 
increases Thith the square root of the number of observa-
tions. Again, although a surveyor in measuring roo miles, 
involving roo times more partial measurements, pro-
bably commits roo times more errors and altogether roo 
times greater amount (or arithmetic sum) of errors, than 
in measuring a mile, yet, because his errors probably fall 
pretty equally on opposite sides of the truth, some of his 
partial measurements being too great and some too small, 
and because in the greater length greater opportunity is 
offered for the compensation of opposite errors, the pro-
bability is found to be that in measUling the longer line 
the balance of his errors, his final aggregate error (the 
algebraic sum of all the errors) is only ten times greater, or 
relatively to the lengths measured it is ten times less, or 
again, in other words, his accuracy is ten times greater, than 
in measuring the shorter line; that is, in general, the 
absolute error increases, the relative error decreases, and the 
accuracy increases, with the square root of the increase in the 
magnitude measured. l 4.2 Now, these principles may be 
taken over bodily into the mensuration of price-variations, 
with the proper mutanda nmtata of course, the numbers of 
commodities being substituted for the numbers of observa-
tions, and the relative numbers of periods for the relative 
lengths of the lines. Here it will appear that the probability 
is (r) that, even if we employ a perfectly correct method, the 
final errors which we shall inevitably commit in practice, 
being by the nature of the case relative, will decrease, and 
our accuracy increase, with the square root of the increase 
in the numbers of the commodities operated on; and (2) that 
as the measurements advance over a course of years, each 
being compared with the preceding in a new measurement, 
and the whole being strung out in one line, the errors to 
which even the perfectly correct method is exposed in 
practice will increase from the starting period (unless 
142 et. Professor Edgeworth, in the Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, June and September, r888, pp. 365, 367, 
602, 627. 
P.E. 
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adjusted by direct comparison with it) with the square root 
of the number of years traversed. The first of these propo-
sitions may be extended to all methods; the second to some, 
but not to all. The second can be extended only to the 
methods of which the errors are shown by trial to fall pretty 
equally on both sides of the truth. It cannot be applied 
to those of which the errors fall always or mostly on one side; 
for when such methods are used in the" chain" system just 
referred to, their errors will grow in almost geometrical 
progression with the arithmetical advance in periods.143 
That work omitted to elaborate these precise propositions. 
They are here supplied. Perhaps Professor Edgeworth will 
be satisfied with this filling up of the gap left by that omis-
sion. It does not appear, however, that very much is 
gained. Common sense, especially as it may rely on the 
study of probabilities made by others, would give the correct 
injunction to employ as many commodities in our averaging 
as is possible; which injunction was given in that work 
(p. 77) on the authority of Professor Edgeworth himself. 
Common sense also teaches that compensating errors do 
not increase as do errors that do not compensate. That 
work made considerable use of common-sense probability 
on the occasions when it was needed,l44 although it did not 
employ the calculus of probabilities. 
And continuing to use such common-sense probability, we 
may argue in tIlls wise. The arithmetic average is no better 
than the harmonic, and the weighting of the first period is 
no better than the weighting of the second; therefore let us 
use all these things together, and the result will have the 
greatest probability in its favour. Now, precisely all this 
is done, when the quantities are the same in both.. periods, 
by the single formula (I), which we have found to be true 
on that supposition. And it might further be argued: the 
geometric average lies between the arithmetic and the 
harmonic, therefore it with the weighting of both the periods 
(likewise geometrically averaged) will most probably give 
the true result, and therefore agree with the preceding. And 
this, too, we have found to be approximately true on the 
same condition, and exactly true if the condition is still 
Ha More specifically, methods are found that augment or 
diminish both rises and falls. If in a cycle prices first rise and 
then fall back to their former positions, such methods may be 
right at the end, but in the middle they will exaggerate or under-
rate the rise. 
lU Pp. 223 n., 321-4, 332, 341, 365, 394, 404, 406, 422, 423. 
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further narrowed to two commodities equally important 
over both the periods. Furthermore, if we drop the restric-
tion to quantities the same at both periods, we may still use 
combinations involving all the averages and weightings 
mentioned, and these will then be the most probable. Such 
combining is done in formulre (6), (7), (8) and (9), and with 
most perfect mixture in the last, which seems to stand the 
circular test best, and if it does, confirms the probability. 
And formaIre (ro) and (rr) are only slight departures from 
these, a more convenient average being substituted for a less 
convenient in parts of them; which substitution, when the 
formulre are applied, as they usually are, to a fairly large 
number of commodities varying not very greatly in prices 
and quantities, will produce little discrepancy in the results, 
so that they too have probability in their favour. One of 
these is the very formula recommended by Professor Edge-
worth in the second section of his 111 emoratulu11t to the fIrst 
Report of the British Association Committee, as also by that 
Committee itself. Yet Professor Edgeworth did not make 
this argument from probability for that method-in fact 
neither he nor that Committee gave any argument in support 
of that method. l45 If he himself did not use probability for 
deriving and defending the method he recommended, why 
should he require others to do so? Or if he had used it, would 
he have improved upon the arguments which have been 
given for it in the preceding section, and which were first 
given in The A1 easurement 0/ General Exchange- Value, 
although Professor Edgeworth failed to see them there.146 
But Professor Edgeworth has made use of the theory of 
probabilities, not in connection with that practical method, 
but in connection with the geometric average, and through 
it with the median. For Professor Edgeworth not only 
follows Laspeyres in advocating an arithmetic average, but, 
quite independently, he follows Jevons in advocating the 
geometric average-he follows both Galileo and Nozzolini . 
He advocates the geometric average for a special purpose 
145 The only thing like an argument appears in his Memorandum 
to the Third Report, p. ISO, where he speaks of the" twin 
methods" using the quantities of the two periods separately, 
and adds, "there is no reason to think this method [one of the 
twins] would be less accurate than its converse "-the other 
twin; which at least suggests combining them. 
14ft Had Professor Edgeworth noticed what is written in favour 
of his own method in that work (p. 423), he would have perceived 
that that work strengthened his position. 
I 2 
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different from the special purpose for which he advocated 
formula (ro). The speciality of purposes-or of qucesita, as 
he calls them-is a peculiar feature in Professor Edgeworth's 
treatment of the subject before us. In one of his papers, 
making a reference to Dr. Venn's Logic oJ Chance, Professor 
Edgeworth, perhaps influenced also by a remark of Jevons, 
writes: "The answer to the question what is the Mean of 
a given set of magnitudes cannot in general be found, unless 
there is given also the object for the sake of which a mean 
value is required." 147 In another he again writes: "It is 
with the index-numbers [of prices] as with conduct; in order 
to form a just judgment, we must always look to the under-
lying idea and purpose." 148 Apparently Professor Edgeworth 
views these two statements as equivalent. They are very 
different. The former is true. The latter is not true. The 
truth of the former has already been explained. The error 
of the latter consists in its putting a variety of purposes 
within a purpose. In averaging price-variations the purpose 
or object is given: it is to measure variations in the exchange-
value or purchasing power of money. This is precisely the 
purpose which Professor Edgeworth declares to be the 
object of his Memorandmn to the first Report of the British 
Association Committee; which Committee itself had been 
- appointed" for the purpose of investigating the best methods 
of ascertaining and measuring variations in the value of the 
147 New Methods, in the J O1'('rnal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
June, r888, p . 347. Jevons had previously in the Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, June, 1865, written: "It is probable 
that each of these [the three averages] is right for its own pur-
poses, when these are more clearly understood in theory," 
Investigations, p. r21. As it stands, Jevons's statement is per-
fectly true-and we have seen different purposes, or uses, for 
which each of these averages is proper. Jevons, however, seems 
to have had the present subject only in mind. Even so, if we 
substitute" on certain conditions appropriate to each" for" for 
its own purposes," his statement is true: see M. G. E.- v., p. 355, 
and cf. above, note II9. 
148 Recent Writings on Index-Numbers, Economic Journal, 
March, 1894, p. 163. It was perhaps Professor Edgeworth who 
inserted a similar statement near the opening of the first Report 
of the British Association Committee, making them say that the 
theoretical part of their work was" to distinguish analytically 
the different purposes which may be subserved by constructing 
a measure of a change in the value of money, and then to show 
what formula, what particular mode of combining the statistical 
data, is appropriate to each case." 
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monetary standard." 149 It There are many methods-not 
one method-of measuring and ascertaining variations in the 
value of money," says Professor Edgeworth in the same 
J.lelJloJ'{l1Idum (p. 259). There may be many methods, but 
only one true or best method-the one which comes nearest 
to giving the true variation of the exchange-value of money. 
To get at this true variation in the exchange-value of money 
is the sole object or purpose of averaging the price-variations, 
just as to get at the true length of a line by averaging the 
observations of it is the sole object or purpose of averaging 
those observations. There is no other object or purpose-
that is, no other main or final purpose.I50 The single object 
or purpose has been stated. It is specific. l51 No further 
"arietal subdivision of it is needed, nor is it possible, so far 
as the method of averaging the price-variations is concerned, 
including the method of weighting them. 
The only differences that can come into our subject are 
differences as to the money itself of which the variations in 
exchange-value are being measured.l52 Is it the money of 
England or the money of France? Is it the money of a whole 
country or the money which passes through the pockets of 
one class of its population? Obviously different data must be 
collected in each of these cases-different quantities always, 
W So runs the official title of that Committee. Professor 
Edgeworth opens his Memorandum thus: "The object of this 
paper is to define the meaning, and measure the magnitude, of 
variations in the value of money. " 
150 There may be some subsidiary purpose sometimes in averag-
ing price-variations, as to study their dispersion. But this is 
only in aid of the metrical purpose, and cannot be put on a level 
with it or be substituted for it. It is conducted on the same 
price-variations and by the use of the same method of averaging. 
There may be such a subsidiary purpose in averaging observa-
tions of length, etc.; but nobody has supposed that this calls 
for a different method of measuring length. 
151 Dr. Venn has thus repeated his doctrine: an average, 
being a fictitious value, cannot take the place of actual values 
" for purposes in general, but only for this or that specific pur-
pose," On the Nature and Uses of Averages, in the Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, September, r8gr, p. 430, again p. 432. 
152 There are other kinds of value, such as the esteem-value 
and the cost-value, of money, that may be measured; and 
naturally the methods of measuring them, whatever they be, 
are different from the method of measuring the exchange-value 
of momy But these are not in question. Who cannot dis-
tinguish between these, ought not to dabble with economics. 
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different prices sometimes. But the method of averaging the 
data is the same in all of the cases. We do not require 
different methods for averaging prices in England and in 
France; and the method of averaging the prices of family 
budgets should be the same as the method of averaging the 
prices of the national budget. Only the collection oj the data 
is different in these different cases, different being the quan-
tities and sometimes the prices that go into the budgets of 
employer families from those which go into the budgets of 
employee families, different those which make up the national 
budget of England from those which make up the national 
budget of France. Of course for political economists the 
exchange-value of the money of their country-of the whole 
country, not of anyone class in it-what Professor Mitchell 
calls "the general-purpose index-number" 153_is the plin-
cipal object of interest. "Let debtors and creditors," well 
says Professor Edgeworth, " regulate their private affairs by 
a special index-number, if they like. That is not the affair 
of statesmen and financiers. But the currency is within the 
province of government." 154 In the collection of the 
commodities and of their quantities and prices many varieties 
of detail have to be considered (see above, pp. 88-9)-and 
these may be spoken of as different methods, if you care to 
do so; but they are different methods of collecting the data. 
Totally distinct is the method of averaging the price-varia-
tions of these data once collected. This is the method under 
consideration. Of this method there is no subdivision . It 
is simply the method proper for averaging what is presented 
to it, for the one common purpose of measuring variation in 
exchange-value of the money brought into relation with the 
data. l54• 
153 I ndex-Numbers and Wholesale Prices, p. 26. Professor 
Mitchell complains that we " cannot conceivably devise a single 
series that will serve all uses equally well "-that is, all par-
ticular or private uses. There is nothing peculiar about this in 
political economy. Every tax, every tariff, affects individuals 
and classes differently. The political purpose is to look after the 
general interest. 
164 Memorandum to the Third Report, p. I35 . 
154& In fact the measuring proper is done in collecting the prices 
and quantities at the different periods; which provides the 
particular price-variations and their weights. These are the 
analogues of the measurements made by surveyors and the 
observations made by astronomers. The inversions of the price-
variations provide the variations of the particular exchange-values 
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In no other subject of mensuration is there any differentia-
tion of methods to be used according to different ulterior 
pmposes held in view. How, indeed, in any subject could 
there be two different equally correct methods of measuring 
any magnitude? If the different methods give different 
results, how could they both be correct? It does not help 
matters to say that the one is correct for one purpose and the 
other for another. Should a civil engineer employ two 
different methods of measuring a line (or rather of reducing 
his measurements to a final result), and on obtaining different 
results should he say the one was correct for laying out a 
railway and the other was correct for laying out a highway, 
he would probably get few customers. Of course different 
degrees of precision may be required for different purposes; 
but this acknowledges that only the most precise method is 
the truest. "Then the magnitude to be measured is the 
variation in the exchange-value of money (of the same 
money, naturally, at the same time and place, and for the 
same people), there is no more room for two different but 
equally correct results. In other kinds of mensmation there 
may be variety of different instruments fashioned to fit 
different objects that are to be measmed: these different 
objects correspond to the different collections of data in our 
subject. There may even be sometimes a secondary more 
convenient method of roughly making some measurements, 
always tested by the one true method, as when we measure 
elevations by the barometer: such a method corresponds 
to the practIcal methods in our subject, substituted for the 
one best method, to which they should approximately 
conform. Otherwise the purposes we have in view when we 
measme the length of something (to repeat tlus instance) 
have nothing to do with the method of measuring it: what 
we are going to do subsequently with the measurements 
made does not enter into the making of them. 
And so it is with the measurement of variations in the 
exchange-value of money. To measure variation in the 
exchange-value of money is the object or purpose of averaging 
of money. The averaging of these data yields the final measure-
ment, but is not a measurement itself, although it is of course 
an essential element in the final measurement. In axiometry, 
where the averaging yields the inverse variation of the general 
exchange-value of money, the theoretical problem is concerned 
with the averaging. And there can be two or more ways of 
averaging (as regards the best method) for different purposes or 
qucesita, no more in axiometry than in astronomy or in surveying. 
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price-variations. If there is any other object or purpose 
in averaging them, then that is something else, and does not 
belong to our sUbject. To seek within the operation of 
measuring variation in the exchange-value of money by 
averaging price-variations for an undefined number of 
different methods according to arbitrarily chosen ulterior 
objects or purposes called qucesita, is an illusory refinement. 165 
In fact, a couple of Professor Edgeworth's eight qucesita 
involve merely varieties of ways of forming the collection of 
data,166 and four others do not belong in our problem at alP67 
166 In a notice of M. G. E.-V. in the Yale Review, May, I902, 
following Professor Edgeworth's lead, Professor Fisher criticised 
that work for seeking only one method, instead of taking different 
pul poses into view; and illustrated the matter by a very curious 
description of two methods of measuring the height of a car, when 
really different heights of its whole and of a part of it were 
measured. But in his own Purchasing Power of Money, pub-
lished nine years later, in the sections devoted to the mensuration 
of that power, he, t oo, sought only one method of averaging (with 
another as substitute), and said that the elements which enter 
into the construction of index-numbers must be chosen according 
to the pUlpose for which the index-number is desired (pp. 204-5, 
232; and p. 392) ; giving an instance of such a purpose, he said 
'~the same formula JJ may be employed (as in the other case), 
but the t erms of this formula" have different meanings/' that 
is, apply to different prices and quantities. Professor Fisher's 
last position is the correct one. He also criticised that work for 
not using the theory of probability ; and in his own work he did 
not use it. He further criticised that work for devoting all its 
efforts to measuring variation in the exchange-value of money, 
instead of extending them to measure variation also in the 
esteem-value of money; and he confined the treatment of 
mensuration in his own work to the measurement of variation in 
the purchasing power (= exchange-value) of money. 
us The second differs from the first (" the consumption stan-
dard JJ of a whole country) by employing private budgets, and 
the eighth differs from it by employing all the quantities sold 
and resold in all the mercantile and financial transactions of a 
country. 
157 The third, fourth, and fifth are concerned with the ques-
tions whether the standard should itself vary with the national 
affl uence, income, or capital; and the sixth with the definition 
of the appreciation (then going on, now depreciation) which 
monetary reformers (then the bimetallist s) wished to rectify by 
infusing more money into (now abstracting some from) the 
circulation. All these are questions which the author of 
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Only the first and the seventh require two distinct methods 
of averaging price-variations. These two are one too 
many.158 
In his first qllCBsitll11l Professor Edgeworth recommends 
formula (10). In the seventh he recommends the geometric 
average. All the first six qllCBsila are expressly made without 
any hypothesis as to the causes of the changes in prices. 
The seventh drops this denial, and introduces a clause about 
the" changes [of prices ?] affecting the supply of money," 
while the eighth contains the seemingly opposite" hypothesis 
that a common cause has produced a general variation of 
prices." 159 Incidentally, we might have supposed that 
particular causes produce variations in the prices (the true 
prices, relatively to variations in the exchange-value of 
money 160) of particular commoditie , while a general cause 
with reference to commodities, but a particular cause with 
reference to money, is what produces the general variation 
in prices and the particular inverse variation in the general 
M. G. E.- V. has discussed in a separate work, The Fwndamental 
Problem I'll 1\[ onetary Science. 
155 Professor Edgeworth even has a third; for in the Economic 
Journal, June, 1918, p. 197, he agrees with Professor Mitchell in 
recommending "the aggregate expenditure method" as "the 
best form" for the latter's "general pw pose series." (Above, 
in note 129, that method has also been recommended for use in 
past times, as the best practical method feasible for such occa-
sions. It is there not recommended for any different purpose, 
the single purpose always recognised being that of making the 
best measurement we can of variations in the exchange-value of 
money.) Exactly how Professor Edgeworth intended to relate 
this new" best" method with formula (10) already recommended 
as the best, is not stated. As it is only briefly mentioned in 
passing, we may ignore it. 
159 Apparently suggested by J evons, who, for continuing to 
use the simple geometric average, gave three equally poor addi-
tional reasons, the third of which is: "It [the simple geometric 
average] seems likely to give in the most accurate manner such 
general change in prices as is due to a change on the part of gold. 
For any change in gold will affect all prices in an equal ratio," 
Investigations, p. 121. If by " change in gold" he meant change 
in the exchange-value of money, the last statement is true 
(cf. ibid., p. 128). But if he meant change in the quantity of 
money (which is the way Professor Edgeworth seems to take it) 
the statement is wrong, as it ignores what Del Mar felicitously 
named" the precession ef prices." 
160 ef. M. G. E.-V., pp. 466,475. 
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exchange-value of money-the bias above referred to (p. 72) 
-whenever such variations occur. However this be, causes 
that have produced a magnitude which we wish to measure, 
do not properly enter into the measurement of the magnitude. 
Professor Edgeworth recognises this by saying near the 
beginning of ills first Memorand'ttm that" the business of this 
Committee is to measure a fact, not to speculate about its 
causes or consequences" (p. 258). Unfortunately he 
immediately abandons this restraint by restricting it; for he 
sUbjoins "it is only in the simpler kinds of measurement 
that the metretic art can be entirely divorced from theory 
about its subject-matter." And so now in the seventh 
q2tcesit2tm, though he had not done so in the first, he brings 
into consideration the quantity theory that, other things 
being equal, prices vary inversely with the quantity of money 
(p. 280). This theory would seem to most of us to call 
especially for the consideration of the quantities of the 
commodities the prices of which are varying. Not so to 
Professor Edgeworth. To him it seems that the price-
variations of particular commodities may be affected by the 
" other things," but the general price-variation of all commo-
dities is a "residual phenomenon," 16()a affected by the 
quantity of money. The general price-variation is obtained 
by an average of the particular price-variations, and accord-
ing to Professor Edgeworth it is to be obtained from them 
alone, simpliciter and per se. Thus he says: "it would be a 
significant operation "-significant, apparently, of the quan-
tity of money (or of what ?)-" to take the average of all the 
price-variations, irrespective of the quantities of the corre-
sponding commodities" (p. 281). This gets rid at least of the 
usual kind of weighting, and suggests either even weighting 
or some other kind. Then," the problem before us may be 
thus defined. Given a number of observations consisting 
each of the ratio between the new price and the old price of 
an article, to find the mean of the observations." Finally, 
"the problem as thus conceived belongs to that higher 
branch of the calculus of probabilities which may be called 
the doctrine of error" (p. 282). Here are several questions-
about the average, the weighting, the distinction from the 
first qucesitum and its formula, and the invocation of the 
higher probabilities. It is difficult to disentangle these 
various things. So let us get down at once to the last, and 
investigate its meaning and validity. 
160' The Jou.rnal of the Royal Statistical Society, June, 1888, 
p. 353; Economic Journal, March, 1896, pp. 132-3. 
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Would it not have been better to reverse the last statement 
quoted, and say that the calculus of probabilities belongs to 
the economic problem-if we choose to apply it thereto? 
If we choose, we can apply it to anthropological measure-
ments, as Quetelet did. But Quetelet had his single method 
of making his measurements before he subjected-not his 
method, which he never did, but-his measurements to the 
calculus of probabilities. And he did this only because he 
found an analogy, before unsuspected, between his measure-
ments and the chances of black and white balls coming out 
of an urn in certain combinations. Now, Professor Edge-
'worth, having made a collection of "price-observations JJ 
(which phrase means what is generally meant, not by 
" prices," but by " price-variations," I61), arranged them in 
order, as Quetelet had done with his chest measurements 
of Scottish soldiers, and found that-they did not follow" the 
typical law of error" (of observations), but fell into an 
unsymmetrical, though regular, curve, as he had suspected 
they would because of their similarity with estimates.162 
He therefore concluded that they should be averaged geome-
hically, like estimates; and as estimates are averaged 
simply, or with even weighting, and because of some mis-
applied analogy with gravity and the motion of the solar 
system through the sidereal system, he inferred that price-
variations ought also to be averaged simply, "after the 
manner of Jevons " (pp. Z81-2, 288). 
All this is very pretty. The analogy with estimates sets 
up a rival method, by the evenly weighted geometric average, 
over against the unevenly weighted formula (10), which he 
has already recommended. We might expect, then, that 
Professor Edgeworth would examine and compare them, to 
see whether the geometric average, with proper weighting, 
would agree with the other method, and if not, how much 
they would differ; and then weigh them in the balance and 
determine which is the better. No, he adopts them both! 
Only the one is for one qucesiht1n, and the other is for another I 
And meanwhile what is the calculus of probabilities doing? 
As regards the method of measuring variations in the 
exchange-value of money by averaging price-variations, it is 
)61 The phrase occurs again in the second Memorandum, p. 206. 
The price-variations, however, have probably been put in the form 
of price-deviations from a common starting point, which is 
omitted, leaving only the deviated prices to be operated on. 
162 Here, in the first IvIemorandu1n, pp. 28z-3, occur the 
passages quoted above, pp. 79-80. 
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doing nothing. It had nothing to do with Quetelet's method 
of averaging chest measurements. It has nothing to do with 
Professor Edgeworth's method of averaging price-variations. 
Professor Edgeworth tries his best to bring this calculus 
into the inquiry about the axiometric problem, but without 
success except to confuse the subject. All that this calculus 
can properly do is to come in after the method has been 
adopted and the measurements made. Then it may be 
applied to the dispersion of the price-variations around their 
average. And if Professor Edgeworth would confine it to 
this use, there could be no objection to his doing so. He is 
at liberty to experiment all he pleases with the dispersion 
of price-variations, to investigate their modes and medians 
and quartiles, etc. Perhaps some interesting developments 
may come from this application of the calculus,-but we 
still wait for them. In the hands of Quetelet some interest-
ing results did materialise. In the hands of Professor 
Edgeworth none have appeared.163 
And the reason is clear. Professor Edgeworth has mis-
taken the analogy. Because Quetelet got what he considered 
an objective fact from his measurements-his observations, 
not on the stars, but on men,-which he called a type, and 
conceived of as having objective existence (which others have 
since controverted), Professor Edgeworth thinks that in 
averaging "price-observations" in the simple geometric 
way he is getting something more than he got by the complex 
formula (ro). Formula (ro) yields only an " average," not 
a " mean" (in the Quetelet-Herschel-J evons phraseology) ,-
only an ideal thing, a mere general average variation of 
prices (although its reciprocal is a variation in the exchange-
value of money, which might seem objective enough); but 
163 He makes a suggestion, however, and leaves it at that. 
Quetelet, we have seen, noticed that if a population were made up 
of two races, the dispersion of their height measurements (and of 
others too) might show two modes (which would make the curve 
representing such dispersion look like the silhouette of a Bactrian 
camel's back) . And we have seen that Bertillon got some 
positive result from this study of the dispersion of stature in the 
Department of Doubs. This question has also exercised Professor 
Edgeworth. Perhaps price-variations are not of one type, but 
of two types-perhaps their curve is not" monocephalous," but 
" bicephalous" (not one-humped, but two-humped). "This is 
a question of fact," which he leaves for others to decide. New 
M ethods, in the J ourl1al of the Royal Stat'istical Society, June, r888, 
P,368. 
DEVIATIONS AND VARIATIONS 125 
the simple geometric formula, because it conforms to the 
nature of price-variations as dispersing themselves geome-
trically, reveals, he thinks, a real thing, a cause. This latter 
operation he condescendingly calls "secondary" to the 
other as "the primary." But he conceives it as a close 
second. Its" position of high collateral dignity," he says, 
"is all the more deserved in that the secondary measure 
enjoys an objective or external character, which cannot, 
according to my view of the subject, be accorded to the 
primary qIlCBst'tlt1n." 164 That it is viewed as yielding some-
thing objective is expressed also in his speaking of it as 
serving the "purpose of ascertaining a type." 165 More 
fully he once refers to " that variety of index-number which 
purports to determine a real quantity, a cause or charac-
teristic, such as 'scarcity of gold,' in some more objective 
sense than a mere fall of prices on an average. The qUCBst'tum 
in this case may be likened to a physical quantity which is to 
be ascertained from a set of measurements. The method 
accordingly presents certain peculiarities derived from the 
theory of errors-of-observation." 166 In other words, Pro-
fessor Edgeworth thinks that in averaging (geometrically) 
not prices, but price-variations, we are performing an opera-
tion analogous to the operation of averaging observations. 
The latter operation is conducted for the purpose of getting 
the true magnitude-" a real thing." Therefore the former 
also aims to get a true and real magnitude-which we may 
grant, seeing that it is the true magnitude of the variation 
of the price-level and inversely of the exchange-value of 
money which is aimed at (at least when we perform the 
averaging properly, or fairly well, as by formula (10)), 
although this is not his meaning; for his meaning refers to 
some other" real thing," discoverable only by his geometric 
average-a type or a cause, never yet described in clear 
lineaments, but a something which he once adumbrated as 
hovering "between genuine being and not being," "a 
muffled or masked representation of some real entity" 167_ 
for such nebulous phrases are his delight. Now, this analogy 
164 In the Economic j ournal, September, r90I, p. 415, cf. 
pp. 40 9, 413. 
165 In the journal of the Royal Statistical Society, June, r888, 
p. 360, again p. 363; and pp. 352, 367, the average is said to 
represent" a real thing," an " objective thing." 
166 In the Economic journal, March, r894, p. r63. 
167 In the journal of the Royal Statistical Society, June, 1888, 
P·352 • 
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is false. We have already seen the true state of the case 
(above, p. 71). In averaging price-variations for the 
purpose of ascertaining and measuring variation in the 
exchange-value of money, we are doing something slightly 
analogous to what astronomers and surveyors do when they 
average their errors for the purpose of ascertaining and 
measuring the "probable error" of their observations or 
measurements. This" probable error" is far from being 
an objective reality, and certainly it is not a type or cause 
of anything, though it may be an effect of something (of our 
carelessness or imperfection). Or, better still, it has con-
siderable resemblance to the operation of getting the centre 
of shots deflected from the bull's-eye by a common cause, the 
wind; which new centre never was, and never can be, aimed 
at, and is not a real thing existing anywhere" in heaven or 
earth." Hence the failure of Professor Edgeworth's search 
after an objective reality in the sense of an independently 
existing entity. He has missed Quetelet's trail. And what 
good, now, the appeal to the theory of probabilities (which 
he so identifies with the theory of averages as to call it by 
the latter's name 168) can do in our problem ofaxiometry, 
still remains to be seen; and until the good it serves is shown, 
we may be excused from bothe1ing ourselves with it. 
Possibly, however, an objective thing may be disclosed by 
the geometric average of price-variations, even though the 
analogy is false which is offered as a base for it. In fact, it 
may be repeated that an objective thing-a variation in the 
general exchange-value of money-is very approximately 
shown by the inverse of the geometric average of price-
variations when properly weighted (and perhaps equally well 
by formula (IQ)). But Professor Edgeworth is now search-
ing for some other objective thing, to be disclosed by the 
geometric average not weighted in the way we have seen to 
be its proper weighting. That other objective thing, con-
ceived as existing apart from the price-variations, he has 
generally described very vaguely, but sometimes he has given 
it a body and a name, referring to it as" a scarcity of gold," 
which is only a particular way of describing the proper 
quantity of money" in relation to the work it has to do " ; 169 
168 In the Economic Journal, September, 1901, p. 412. 
169 New Metlwds, in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
June, 1888, p. 355. Obviously scarcity of money may exist 
independently of the averaging of prices, just as the height of a 
star above the horizon exists independently of the astronomer's 
averaging of his observations of it; whereas general exchange-
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for he was writing in a period of monetary appreciation. If 
it is anything so definite as this, we can only wonder why 
Professor Edgeworth on other occasions made so much of a 
mystery of iU70 Yet if we pin him down to this definite 
description of the "real thing" to be disclosed by his 
geometric average, it becomes merely a question of fact 
whether his geometric average does disclose such a thine-. 
This question must be simply negatived. Here of course IS 
where the quantity theory comes into play; for if prices 
vary inversely according to the quantity of money, we have 
only to measure the variation of prices to determine the 
inverse variation in the quantity of money. But Professor 
Edgeworih knows that the quantity theory rests on the 
condition of " other things being the same." He therefore 
tells us that a " prior operation" is necessary to " reduce the 
problem to the simple case of general prices varying, other 
things being the same," which extraordinary operation he 
leaves" to the currency doctors." 171 As he abandons to 
others the most difficult pari of the job, he has not solved it . 
Moreover, in a similar connection he truly says that" varia-
tion in the effect indicates, but does not measure, variation 
in the cause." 172 Therefore if scarcity of gold is the cause 
of falling prices, its amount is not measured by the amount 
of their fall . Finally, if the purpose of averaging price-
variations geometrically were to measure variation in the 
relative quantity of money, its purpose would be different 
from that of measuring valiation in the exchange-value of 
money, and would not belong to axiometry. 
value of money cannot exist independently of the particular 
exchange-values of money, of which it is composed, and which 
are inversely indicated by prices. But this does not prevent the 
general exchange-value of money from being as objective as are 
its particular exchange-values. See M. C. E.-V., pp. IO, 12-13. 
Of course the general exchange-value of money that is measured 
is as general only as are the quantities of the commodities taken 
into consideration compared with the totality of commodities. 
So the general run of the stature of a race, rendered definite by 
an average, can be measured only from samples, as already 
remarked. 
170 Perhaps it is because the" scarcity of gold," being a cause 
rather than an effect, belongs as the object to the eighth qucesitum, 
leaving the" real thing" which is the object of the seventh 
qucesitum entirely undefined. 
171 Loc. cit. 
172 Ibid. , p. 352 . 
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Still, the geometric average has been advanced as one 
belonging to the subject before us, and we must consider the 
question of the use in our problem of the geometric average 
either with even weighting or weighted as Professor Edge-
worth would weight it. Here Professor Edgeworth has been 
misled, not so much by an analogy wrong from the beginning, 
as by one which he either does not follow or would still follow 
beyond the point where it ceases. The model he has set up 
for imitation is what should be done with estimates, which 
itself is modelled upon what is done with observations. Now, 
astronomers and surveyors average their single observations 
of the same magnitude with even weighting, provided they 
have made them with equal care. But they have two ways 
of weighting their observations of the same thing. The one 
is when two or more observations turn out alike: then they 
treat them as one observation and weight this with a coeffi-
cient corresponding to the number of the repetitions. As 
already quoted, weights are "merely numbers denoting 
repetition." The other is when two or more sets of observa-
tions of the same thing-the different sets made perhaps by 
different observers, or with different instruments-are 
themselves to be combined and averaged: then the procedure 
is the following. In each set its "probable error" is 
calculated, which shows inversely its precision. If the 
probable errors are equal, the sets (supposed to contain the 
same number of observations) are averaged with even 
weighting. If the probable errors are unequal, the sets are 
averaged with weights inversely proportional to the squares 
of their probable errors; for when one set is, for instance, 
twice as precise as another, it is as if it contained four times 
as many observations made with the same care as those in 
the other, wherefore it must be weighted as four to the other 
as one. l73 The principle is the same in both cases. Let us 
take the latter model first. If Professor Edgeworth should 
desire, for instance, to combine two sets of measurements 
of the same money over the same two periods, say Mr. Sauer-
beck's and The Economist's index-numbers, he might 
calculate, if he could, their probable errors, and weight them 
accordingly. As a fact, we rarely care to make any such 
combination of two sets of index-numbers. We generally 
prefer to accept the one we belive the better and let the other 
go. Remains the first method of weighting observations. 
Now, this model has been imitated above in the section 
173 Cf. above, pp. 67, II3. 
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devoted to weighting, where we found that in our subject 
the individual can only be a certain quantity of value, 
wherefore commodities are to be weighted according to the 
repetitions of this quantity in their full values (with extra 
complication caused by the question of periods). And this 
kind of weighting has been employed in all the subsequent 
formulc.e for averaging price-variations, including formula (ro), 
as recommended by Professor Edgeworth, though it may be 
questioned whether he understood the full nature of that 
formula. Professor Edgeworth, however, in the present 
part of his work, takes for a single or individual price-varia-
tion, corresponding to a single observation of an astronomer 
or surveyor, the price-variation formed by the price-
quotations at two periods of every single commodity that 
is entered in his list. But a single commodity is only a name 
for a greater or less number of objects, or of money-unit 's 
worths of objects, so that it is sheer nominalism to treat 
every name of a commodity as an individual thing. Yet in 
his use of the geometric average in imitation of the use of the 
arithmetic average by Herschel or by Quetelet, Professor 
Edgeworth would give no more weight to the price-variations 
of the multitudinous money-unit's worths of wheat than to 
the scanty money-unit's worths of cloves. How far he 
wanders from true imitation of his model, should be evident. 
And it should be evident that he has no right to depart from 
it in the formula for his seventh qucesitum any more than in 
the formula for his first qucesitum, where he kept to the 
model. Or rather, he has no right to lay down a qucesitum 
" irrespective of the quantities of commodities," since this 
has no rational meaning. 
But Professor Edgeworth is not altogether satisfied with 
even weighting. The oft-repeated condemnation of weight-
ing wheat and cloves alike was perhaps too much for him. 
He makes concessions, and speaks of allowing some different 
weights to the price-quotations. Only they must still be 
different from the weights used in formula (ro); they must 
not be regulated by the importance of the commodities to 
the consumers (or to the nation)-not by the numbers ot 
money-unit's worths repeated in them. Why this continual 
refusal to weight the geometric average as he weighted 
formula (IO)? Because astronomers and surveyors allow 
two similar observations to count as two only if they are 
independent of each other; but a double quantity of wheat 
(over against barley) has similar prices not independent of 
each other, since the same commodity always commands the 
P.E. K 
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same price in the same market.174 Here is where Professor 
Edgeworth clings to an analogy no longer existing. For as 
a matter of fact the price of barley is also not independent 
of that of wheat. And in wheat itself a factor of its price is 
its material quantity. A new element here comes in, which 
has no existence in the problem of averaging observations. 
This new element differentiates our present problem from 
that problem, and henceforth the analogy ceases; for to 
leave the new element out is simply to shut one's eyes to a 
factor which exists all the same. But there is one principle 
which underlies all averaging, which is that the individuals 
a veraged must be weighted according to their repetitions. 
Now, at least the two quantities which make up the double 
quantity of wheat are independent of each other, and to that 
extent the full values which make up the double full value 
of wheat (compared with that of barley) are independent of 
each other. This is as far as the alleged total independence 
of observations can be carried. And there is no need of 
carrying it further. There is a good reason why observations 
must be independent; for their individuality is conditioned 
by their independence~ But in prices this is not so: the 
individuality of the price-variation of one quantity of wheat 
exists notwithstanding that the price-variation itself must 
go hand in hand with the price-variation of some other 
quantity of wheat. Thus independence of the items, though 
necessary in observations, is not necessary in prices. v\le 
average many things that are not totally independent. The 
heights of men of the same race, for instance, are not totally 
independent, since they are dependent upon the physical 
conditions to which their ancestors have been subjected. 
For that matter, the observations of astronomers and sur-
veyors are not totally independent, since they depend upon 
three common factors-the object itself, the instruments, and 
the observer. They are independent only as separately made. 
Independence as well as individuality differ in different 
objects. But individuality, not independence, is the uni-
versal element. Professor Edgeworth has inverted the true 
relation, giving to independence the precedence which is due 
to individuality. 
But having rejected weighting according to full values or 
importance, and being not altogether satisfied with even 
weighting, Professor Edgeworth looks around for another 
system of weighting, and finds it in the dispersion of the 
174 ef. Memorandum to the First Report, p. 287. 
DEVIATIONS AND VARIATIONS I3I 
prices. The quantities of the commodities are still to be 
excluded: the weighting is still to be irrespective of them. 
Thus in his first Memorandum (pp. 286, 287-8) he speaks 
of weighting the price-variations inversely according to the 
width of their dispersion, that is, according to their own 
amounts, so that commodities whose prices fluctuate little 
shall have greater weight than those whose prices fluctuate 
much. Herein he adopts one of the careless suggestions 
thrown out by Jevons (see above, p. 87). The width of a 
commodity's price-variation is considered a gauge of that 
commodity's importance, not to its consumers, but to " the 
calculators of probabilities" ! 175 This is said to be on the 
principle that according to the theory of errors of observation 
(and of estimates) It in the combination of the given observa-
tions less weight should be attached to observations belonging 
to a class which are subject to a wider deviation from the 
mean." 176 But that rule of astronomers and surveyors 
refers to the combination of different sets of observations 
of the same magnitude, not to the averaging of different 
observations in the same set, and so is an entirely different 
affair, misused as a model here. Perhaps, however, this is 
not his meaning; for then his weighting would have had to 
be inversely according to the squares of the price-variations, 
treated as "probable errors." Perhaps he, and Jevons 
before him, had reference to a problem of true errors like that 
which we have discussed above, and in which we found, 
in effect, that the weighting had to be inversely according 
to the relative amounts of the errors (p. 62); which may 
here be assimilated to the relative amounts of the fluctua-
tions of the prices. But that, too, was another considerably 
different problem. Price-variations, put in the artificial 
form of price-deviations, have some resemblance to errors; 
but they are not errors, and have differences too. And these 
differences are especially influential in this very subject of 
weighting, as we have already seen (above, pp. 8I-2). The 
mere fact that a certain weighting is proper in one problem, 
is not a sufficient reason for introducing it into another. 
In that problem of true errors we saw plainly the reason for 
giving a greater weight to the smaller error. Professor 
Edgeworth here says that It if more weight attaches to a 
change of price in one article rather than in another, it is 
. on account of its importance . . . as affording an 
176 Memorandum to the Third Report, p. 157. 
l7S Repeated in the Economic Journal, June, 1918, p. 188. 
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observation which is peculiarly likely to be correct." 177 
This is hardly so. The data of a commodity whose price 
has varied 5 per cent. from one period to another are not 
more likely to be correct than the data of a commodity 
whose price has varied 10 per cent. Certainly they are not 
likely to be twice as correct in the former as in the latter. 
The consideration of likelihood or probability brings the 
analogy back to that of probable errors; and now our 
astronomers and surveyors do not attach more weight to 
observations near the average than to observations further 
from it, notwithstanding that the former are more likely to be 
correct than the latter. Professor Edgeworth both follows 
and does not follow his models. It is difficult to make out 
his meaning with regard to his new kind of weighting; and 
it is needless to do so, as he reverts in the end to even 
weighting.17s It is mostly with the median that he would 
use his new kind of weighting. To the median, then, let us 
turn. 
Professor Edgeworth has noticed in this connection what 
he calls "the curious fact, that the median seems to keep 
closer to the geometric than [to] the arithmetic" average.179 
There is nothing curious about it (provided the data be 
numerous enough), if the data are those which arrange 
themselves according to the geometric law of dispersion. 
The median then follows the geometric average, as it follows 
the arithmetic average when the data arrange themselves 
according to the arithmetic law of dispersion (cj. above, 
p. 43). Observations arrange themselves in the latter way, 
estimates in the former; and prices have been found to 
arrange themselves in the former way too. And now, for the 
same special qucesitum for which he recommended the 
geometric average, he recommends the median as following 
it.1S0 He uses even an opposite reason for it, because of its 
departure from the geometric average on some occasions, 
when the latter is unduly influenced (and the arithmetic 
average still more) by some abnormally high price-variations, 
as of cotton in 1862, which troubled Jevons; for then he 
thinks the median, being unaffected by their extravagation, 
would have given a better result.1S1 But we have seen that 
177 Third Memorandum, loco cit. 
178 First Memorandum, p. 288. 
179 Memorandum to the Second Report, p. 208. 
180 Ibid., pp. 208--9. 
181 New Methods, in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
June, r888,PP.3S8,360,362. 
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that trouble was due, not to the geometric average in itself, 
but to its use with wrong weighting (above, p. 87). This, 
however, is a minor detail 182 for extraordinary occasions. 
For ordinary occasions the principal argument is the median's 
fellowship with the other average. There is even a double-
headed argument for the median. For if it turns out after 
all that he was mistaken and price-variations do behave 
according to "the normal probability curve," that is, the 
arithmetic, then the median follows the arithmetic average; 
and if he was right and price-variations behave according to 
the revised (logarithmetic) probability curve, the geometric, 
then the median follows the geometric average ; and so it is 
the safest, as it is close to being right in either case.183 This 
is the argument of one who is not sure of his position. But 
perhaps his idea rather is, that prices do disperse themselves 
in both these ways on different occasions, and therefore the 
median is the best, as it automatically adjusts itself to either 
behaviour of the prices. 184 The median, then, is "the 
method "- " the most comprehensive combination," the 
best" compromise between all the modes and purposes." 185 
Apparently it is recommended also to replace formula (10) : 
its following tl1e arithmetic average as well as the geometric 
justifies its ousting them both. 186 The argument is lax, 
because the median follows the one or the other with any 
bighly probable closeness only in' cases when a great many 
items are taken into consideration. Otherwise it follows the 
others erratically, as Professor Mitchell, who has much dealt 
182 Professor Fisher, who likewise recommends the median on 
top of another method already recommended as the theoretically 
best, urges another detail in its favour: that" it has the advan-
tage of easily exhibiting the tendency to dispersion of prices," 
P urchasing Power of Money, p. 23r, again p. 427. 1£ there is any 
need of such an exhibition, there is nothing to prevent any 
statistician from arranging price-variations in their order of 
magnitude and studying their dispersion, whatever be the 
method he adopts for measuring variation in the exchange-value 
of money. Why not keep distinct things separate? 
183 ct. Memorandam to the First Report, p. 291. 
184 Ct. New Methods, in the journal of the Ro:yal Stat1'stical 
Society. June, r 888, p. 362. 
185 First Memorandu.m, p. 296. 
1 86 But we have seen in note rs8 that Professor Edgeworth 
admits the median is not so good an average as another for at 
least one purpose not clearly defined. What his exact opinion 
is, cannot be fathomed. 
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with it, has found by experience, as might have been expected 
from theory, since " its precise position is often dependent 
on the relative price of a single commodity, which stands in 
the middle of a scale of relative prices." 187 Yet Professor 
Edgeworth would allow its use applied to only forty-five 
commodities, that is, to forty-five price-variations.188 With 
such small collections, close agreement of the median with 
either the geometric or the arithmetic average can be expected 
only in the long run. "But we must remember "-it is 
Professor Edgeworth himself who says this-" that what is 
true only in the long run is apt not to be serviceable on a 
particular occasion." 189 What opinion, indeed, would 
people have of an astronomer or a surveyor who should use 
the median? "To take the median for the sake of avoiding 
computation," says an authority on the subject, " can only 
be justified when the observations are rough ones, and then 
the median itself is liable to differ considerably from the 
arithmetical mean. The uncertainty of the probable error 
of the median is greater than that of the arithmetical mean, 
217 observations being necessary in the former case to give 
the same [as little] uncertainty as lOO observations give in 
the latter case." 189& What is here said of the median in 
comparison with the arithmetic average in connection with 
Qbservations, applies similarly, though with somewhat 
differing proportions, to the median in compalison with the 
geometric average in connection with estimates and with 
price-variations. To be sure, in the field of price-variations 
(and still more of estimates) the data collected are only rough 
approximations themselves; yet this is not a good reason 
for avoiding the trouble of computation, with risk of raising 
the uncertainty by nearly half. Professor Edgeworth him-
self admits that the probable error of the median is slightly 
greater than that of the arithmetic average; 190 and for 
measuring the general trend of prices he has maintained that 
the arithmetic average is less accurate than the geometric. 
Then why all this advocacy of an average admitted to be the 
least accurate? 
187 Mitchell, Gold Prices under the Greenback Standard, Ig08, 
p. 58, cf. p. 33 n.; cf. Inde-N~(.mbers and Wholesale Prices, 
pp. 85, go. . 
1B8 Memorandum to the Second Report, p. 20g. 
189 New Methods, in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
June, I888, p. 350 n. 
1B"" Merriman, Method of Least Squares, § I67. 
190 In the Economic Journal, June, IgI8, pp. Ig3-4. 
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But here again the consistency of his argument is broken 
by his allowing some uneven weighting to t he median. Or 
is it only when the median is supposed to take the place of 
formula (ro) that uneven weighting is to be allowed? But 
then the automatic working of the median, which was 
supposed itself to choose its own guide, is interfered with. 
This does not seem to be his position. But what the weight-
ing is to be, it is difficult to make out. It must not be 
according to the importance of the commodities, or to their 
relative" masses of value"; for, "from the present point 
of view, in order to determine a type by the Calculus of 
Probabilities, the attribute which gives importance to an 
article is not its quantity, but the independence of its 
fluctuation. From this point of view pepper may be as good 
as cotton," 191 that is, apparently, cotton need have no more 
weight than pepper. Yet" upon this ground," he " recom-
mended assigning rather larger weights to the more massive 
commodities," that is, more to cotton than to pepper! 
"For technical reasons I advise that each price-variation 
should count for as many, should in effect be repeated as 
often, as the square root of the number of units in the 
quantity of the corresponding commodity" (ib·id.). What 
the units are, is not specified. Nor are the technical reasons 
given; but we may suspect one to be the familiar law that 
closeness of practice to theory, or the diminution of error, 
is increased proportionally to the square root of the number 
of items employed. The idea may be that the quantities 
of the more massive commodities, being more numerous or 
more often repeated, yield more accurate results in this 
proportion. But we have seen that they should then be 
weighted according to the squares of their probable errors. 
This would bring their weights back into direct proportion 
with their relative massiveness or importance or full values 
(for we cannot believe he referred to physical masses), 
though the question of the periods is left untouched. Still, 
if weighting is to be allowed to the median, it might equally 
well be allowed to the geometric average; and if we used 
the weighting of both periods, we should be using formula (7), 
which Professor Edgeworth never dreamt of. At all events, 
no superiority of the median over the geometric average 
would now appear: rather, the median would sink back 
into its proper inferior position as a mere more or less 
191 New Methods, in the J ournal of the Royal Statistical S ccieily, 
June, r888, p. 363. 
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faithful attendant. The median can be advocated only 
because it is more convenient to consult than is the average 
it is supposed to attend. But a weighted median is again a 
difficult average to work with, and the margin of convenience 
is much reduced. As for the geometric average, this, with 
its proper weighting (as in formula (7) ), does not need to be 
confined to any such special qw:esitum as Professor Edge-
worth would confine it. Professor Edgeworth did not know 
that, applied to the data collected for his first quasitum-the 
practical part of his subject, the case for which he recom-
mended formula (lo),-the geometric average with its 
proper weighting even in extravagant examples closely 
approximates to (and in practice so closely as to be almost 
indistinguishable from) that other formula. Had he known 
this, he would have had no occasion to distinguish the cases. 
Instead of following both Galileo and Nozzolini, both Jevons 
and Laspeyres, when they differed, he would have seen that 
in this our subject, because of the peculiarity here of the 
weighting, the positions of these opponents, when properly 
laid off, come so close together that their difference is 
negligible. 192 
One root of trouble in all this matter is the unwillingness of 
Professor Edgeworth and his followers to give due attention 
to weighting even in theory, because they think it of little 
importance in practice. Even in practice, however, it is 
important. Professor Edgeworth in his Memorandum to the 
Second Report or the British Association Committee studied 
the discrepancies of averages differently weighted, and came 
to the conclusion that "other things being the same, the 
inaccuracy of the price-returns affects the result more than 
inaccuracy of the weights" (pp. 197-8). As" a practical 
conclusion" he therefore advised: "Take more care about 
the prices than the weights" (p. 200) . Yet this is not a good 
reason for not giving all the care that we can to weights; ~md 
192 Professor Edgeworth not only did not know this and some 
other things when he invented his theory, but he continues in the 
same ignorance since the publication of M. G. E.-V, which he 
reviewed and criticised and presumably read. So enamoured is 
he of his own probabilistic way of looking at the subject, that 
he refuses to be instructed, and shuts his eyes to the truth, just 
because it has come from another mode of treating the subject 
more analytical (dialectical he called it) and systematic than his 
own. Yet where plain algebra is sufficient for dealing with a 
problem, it is simple pedantry to lug in the so-called higher 
mathematics. 
DEVIATIONS AND VARIATIONS 137 
it is only perverted when Dr. Bowley says" Do not strain 
after exactness in weighting." Ins A consequence has been 
that, although in their Reports the British Association 
Committee always recommended the use of uneven weighting, 
they did so half-heartedly, and damned it by adding that, 
notwithstanding their recommendation of it, it was" in one 
aspect [whatever that refers to] almost an unnecessary 
practice to secure accuracy." 194. What is meant by "accu-
racy" here may be judged by the fact that in the annexed 
},If elilorandum their secretary, Professor Edgeworth, had 
characterised as small such discrepancies as those of IIo'4 
and rrs, 94.6 and 92'4, II9 and rr6, etc.195 If a government, 
whose business it 1'S to regulate the currency, were to use 
index-numbers liable to such errors, which might accumulate 
from year to year (for the Committee rightly recommended 
what has since been called the " chain" system of making 
index-numbers for every year compared with its prede-
cessor 196), that government would do better to leave the 
currency alone. Evidently the statistical problem has been 
injuriously affected by such want of precision; and few 
statisticians have paid attention to the recommendation of 
the Committee, despite the fact that the formula they 
recommended is a very good one, and perhaps the best 
(unless formula (rr) is better) for practical purposes. 
Is it not time, then, that the Report of the Committee 
should cease to be spoilt by the imperfect theoretical treat-
193 Elements of Statistics, p. IIS. More recently he has written: 
" It does not seem at all certain that any improvement is made 
by weighting," in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
May, 1919, p. 34D. Compare with the above the practical advice 
given in M. G. E.- V., p. 180 n. 
194 Second Report, p. ISS. 
195 Memorandum to the Second Report, pp. 202, 206. In 
the Economic Journal, June, 1915, p. 185, Professor Edgeworth 
disputes Professor Mitchell's statement that the "chain" 
system is more trustworthy than the " fixed-base" system, by 
attempting to show on an example that the difference is slight. 
The one system indicates a rise from III'S to II3, and the other 
one from 126 to 130. The latter is the same as a rise from rrI'S 
to IIS. The difference between II3 and IIS, or between rises of 
I '35 per cent. and 3 '13 per cent., is treated by Professor Edge-
worth as a " remarkable consilience . . . greater than was to be 
expected"! Evidently he would have been content with an 
even greater discrepancy. 
188 First Report, pp. 250, 252. 
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ment with which it was accompanied? Professor Edgeworth 
has won a high place of authority in this subj ect of averaging 
price-variations. But it may be contended that the recog-
nition of his authority has stood in the way of progress. A 
five-fold charge may be brought against him. He has led 
others astray (I) by underrating the importance of weighting 
as well in theory as in practice, (2) by complicating the 
subject with a variety of qucesita artificially construct ed and 
apparently unlimited in number, (3) by ignoring the balanc-
ing of opposite price-variations, (4) by insisting on introduc-
ing the theory of probabilities in places where it does not 
belong, and (5) by winding up always with the median 
because of the mere probability that it follows close upon the 
average for which he would substitute it . 
Would it not be well if statisticians and economists should 
again come together and decide authoritatively on the 
proper method of constructing index-numbers ? And as 
regards the formula to be adopted, why should they choose 
any other than the one recommended by the Committee, 
unless indeed it be formula (Il)? If this had been done a few 
years ago, it might have prevented such a regrettable relapse 
as that of Professor Fisher, who has tried to revive Paasche's 
use of the quantities of the second period, in a form which 
really is the harmonic average of the price-variations with 
the weighting of that period.197 It might also have prevented 
the still more regrettable, since practically mi sleading, 
relapse of the Labour Department in their Labour Gazette 
197 Cf. above, note lI8; The Purchasing Power of Money, 
pp . 201-3, 218, 231-2, 421. Professor Fisher used four t ests 
(each with a duplicate), of which the first is incomplete, the second 
unnecessary, the third questionable, and the fourth is Wester-
gaard's test. All these tests can be satisfied by very bad methods. 
But the circular form of the last test-the most important of all, 
since it alone measures the amount of error in a method-he did 
not use. He therefore never measured whether a method failed 
to meet his tests only slightly or very badly. He apparently did 
not notice the criticism of Paasche's method in M . G. E. -V., 
pp. 193-4, 541-2, nor the bad failure of that method to meet the 
circular test in an example on p . 428. But in his recently pub-
lished Stabilising the Dollar, he has dropped that method (and the 
median too), and recommended, pp. 3-4, 85-{), 206-1, Lowe's 
"tabular standard" method referred to above in note 129. 
This, really a multiple standard, though not the best method, is 
of course a great improvement on the single gold standard which 
it is intended to supplant. But cf. p. 494 of the first work. 
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into revival of Laspeyres's equally faulty use of the quanti-
ties and weighting of the first period, with arithmetic averag-
ing. The subject is one that is growing in importance. 
Labourers are more and more clamouring for regulation of 
their wages by index-numbers. The use of them has been 
recommended to bankers for the regulation of their issues'. 
Professor Fisher himself is advocating their use for stabilising 
the monetary standard. The day for slip-shod methods, it 
would seem, is passing, 
, 
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